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Abstract 
This dissertation critically analyzes the commercial practices and products of the 1976 
Montreal, 1988 Calgary and 2010 Vancouver Olympics. The central questions I ask are: 
how did the Olympics in Canada become a platform for the intersection of patriotism and 
consumption? What were the key ideas about Canadian identity, history, and citizenship 
that Olympic organizers and corporate sponsors promoted? How did commodities 
symbolize these ideas? Finally, how do these ideas relate to political policies and 
practices?  
 
This work contributes to an understanding of how branded commodities shape Canadian 
identity and citizenship norms by arguing that the objects sold during the Montreal, 
Calgary and Vancouver Olympics embodied unresolved contradictions in the meaning of 
national identity. Commodities (like mascots, Petro-Canada glassware and Hudson’s Bay 
Company mittens) represented a version of national identity that glorified European 
settlement in Canada and obscured the disparity between Indigenous and Settler 
Canadians’ quality of life. Further, by buying these commodities, Settler Canadians 
constructed their identity as valued citizens who make important material contributions to 
the nation. The production, consumption and promotion of branded products helped 
popularize the idea that reconciliation between Indigenous and Settler Canadians has 
been achieved when, in fact, it is an ongoing and unfinished process. Moreover, these 
practices deepened pre-existing conflicts involving land and natural resources in Canada, 
often at the expense of Indigenous peoples’ interests and well-being. 
  
The research is grounded in material from Olympic archives in Montreal, Calgary and 
Vancouver, which I use to conduct the first book-length study of the Olympics hosted in 
Canada. The theoretical framework that underpins this project is based on Anne 
McClintock’s conceptualization of fetish and Avery Gordon’s theory of “ghostly 
hauntings.” McClintock’s work helps explain how commodities can hold together 
contradictory ideas about Canadian identity while Gordon’s theory provides a basis for 
understanding how the absence of information (e.g. facts about Canada’s colonial past) 
can become perceptible or, in her words, “seething absences.” Using this approach, I 
iii 
demonstrate the importance of studying the symbolic significance of Olympic 
commodities rather than focusing exclusively on Olympic-related sponsorship and 
marketing practices. I argue that the production, consumption, promotion, and symbolism 
of the commodities have significant social and political consequences which include: 
shaping Canadian identity, influencing public knowledge about the nation’s past, 
intervening in debates about land possession and resource allocation, including and 
excluding citizens from participation in civic life, educating children and teens about the 
nation, and influencing reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. 
This research contributes to scholarship on branded nationalism by demonstrating the 
importance of studying the symbolic significance of Olympic commodities rather than 
focusing exclusively on Olympic-related sponsorship and marketing practices. It also 
illustrates that the rise of neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism in the 1980s helped 
popularize branded nationalism, cause-related marketing, and region branding in the 
Olympic Games hosted in Canada. Finally, this dissertation contributes to scholarship on 
the modern Olympic Movement by showing that the commercialism of the Olympics in 
Canada did not eclipse the political dimensions of the Games. Rather, they mutually 
reinforced one another.   
Keywords 
The Olympics; Canadian identity; branded nationalism; nation branding; Indigenous 
rights; consumer culture; fetish; Marx; McClintock; ghostly haunting; contractualization 
of citizenship; consumer-citizen hybrid.  
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Chapter 1  
Marx and McClintock Go to the Games: Introduction and 
Theoretical Context  
 
During the opening ceremony of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games, the flag 
bearer for the Canadian team marching in the Parade of Nations, Clara Hughes, was 
distinguished from the other athletes by her blue, red, green, yellow, and white striped 
scarf, the stripes an iconic Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) pattern. As the athletes waved 
to the crowd and the camera, the white maple leafs etched on their red mittens, also 
produced by the HBC, echoed the movement of Hughes’ flag. The athletes’ hands 
appeared as smaller Canadian flags, a literal and metaphorical embodiment of national 
identity. They walked toward a large group of Indigenous peoples dancing at the far end 
of the stage. The joyful music, cheering crowd, and exuberant expression on the athletes’ 
faces juxtaposed against a surprising, and likely unintentional scene: from afar, the 
athletes, dressed mostly in red, looked like Mounties who were invading the Indigenous 
dancers’ space.1  
                                                 
1 I am grateful to an insightful commentator at the 2012 International Symposium on Olympic Research 
who drew my attention to this juxtaposition.  
2 
 
Figure 1: Vancouver 2010 Olympics opening ceremony, IOC Marketing Report Vancouver 2010, 89.  
 
 
Figure 2: Vancouver 2010 Olympics opening ceremony, screen grab from YouTube, 
www.youtube.com. 
3 
 
Although the HBC initially designed the red and white mittens exclusively for torch 
bearers and Canadian Olympians to wear, consumer demand for them was immense. The 
company sold more than three million mittens by the end of the Vancouver Olympics and 
news stories quoted everyday Canadians saying that wearing the mittens made them feel 
proud of their national identity.2 According to the HBC, the garments “became the iconic 
item for Canadians as the Games were celebrated on home soil.”3 While many Canadian 
consumers embraced the HBC mittens, other groups saw them more critically. The 
Olympic Resistance Network (ORN), a coalition of activists who opposed the Vancouver 
Olympics, distributed pamphlets showing the red and white HBC mittens dripping with 
blood under the caption “Blood On Your Hands.”4 The activists argued that, because the 
federal government did not negotiate treaties with most of British Columbia’s First 
Nations, the province lay on unceded Indigenous territory. The pamphlet told readers 
that, prior to Canada’s political founding in 1867, the HBC “acted as the colonial 
government” and it encouraged readers to boycott the company.5  
 
                                                 
2 See: Trish Crawford, "$10 Olympic mittens a runaway success," Toronto Star, February 9, 2010. 
http://www.thestar.com/life/2010/02/09/10_olympic_mittens_a_runaway_success.html;  
Karon Liu, "HBC's Olympic mittens are the it item at the Games,” Toronto Life, February 9, 2010. 
http://www.torontolife.com/style/toronto-stores/2010/02/09/hbcs-olympic-mittens-are-the-it-item-at-the-
games/ 
3 “Hudson’s Bay: Official Outfitter,” Canadian Olympic Committee.http://olympic.ca/partners/hudsons-
bay/hudsons-bay-official-outfitter/ 
4 “Blood On Your Hands,” PAM 2010-37, AM1519: City of Vancouver Archives pamphlet collection 
(PC), City of Vancouver Archives (CVA).   
5 Ibid.  
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Figure 3: “Blood On Your Hands” pamphlet, City of Vancouver Archives, PAM 2010-37, Fonds: 
AM1519: City of Vancouver Archives pamphlet collection, City of Vancouver Archives. 
 
Like the HBC mittens, many commodities sold during the Olympic Games in Canada 
contained symbols of the nation and some Canadians used them to express their national 
identity and pride, while others used them to express their disaffection with the nation. 
These objects include commemorative coins and stamps, plush toys of Olympic mascots, 
glassware and clothing produced by Olympic sponsors, and trinkets like key chains, 
buttons and pens etched with the Olympic Games’ emblem. I argue that the production, 
consumption, promotion, and symbolism of the commodities linked to the Olympics in 
Canada have significant social and political consequences that are not immediately 
obvious. The symbolic meaning of these commodities and the activities surrounding them 
are part a broad set of practices that, collectively, shape Canadian identity, influence 
public knowledge about the nation’s past, intervene in debates about land possession and 
resource allocation, include and exclude citizens from participation in civic life, educate 
children and teens about the nation, and publicize government-led reconciliation efforts 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. By arguing that the symbolism and 
consumption of commodities are equally as important as the content of promotional 
narratives that link a brand’s identity to national identity, I seek to make an original 
5 
contribution to the existing scholarship on the interplay of national identity and consumer 
culture.   
My examination of the commodities sold during the Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver 
Olympic Games and the promotional and consumptive practices surrounding these 
commodities gives rise to the following questions: How did the Olympics in Canada 
become a platform for the intersection of patriotism and consumption? What were the 
key ideas about Canadian identity, history, and citizenship that Olympic organizers and 
corporate sponsors promoted? How did commodities symbolize these ideas? 
Furthermore, how do these ideas relate to political policies and practices? Finally, how 
were Canadian children educated about the meaning and value of consumer goods that 
represent national identity?  
I advance four key lines of argument in this dissertation. First, relying on Anne 
McClintock’s conceptualization of fetish, I argue that many Olympic objects embodied 
unresolved contradictions in the official narratives about Canadian identity, history, and 
citizenship. Some commodities represented and obscured traumatic moments in Canadian 
history, such as the existence and ongoing legacy of the Indian Residential School 
System. Other commodities symbolized the fact that official narratives about national 
identity recognized and repudiated Indigenous peoples’ rightful claim to land and natural 
resources in Canada. A third group of commodities represented the fact that, as an 
identity category, some Canadians were both included and excluded as citizens in the 
nation. Second, applying the works of Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida on haunting to 
the Olympics in Canada, I argue that the Olympic Games, and related commodities, were 
haunted by information, such as Canada’s identity as a Settler colonial country and the 
historic and ongoing trauma of the assimilation of Indigenous peoples in Canada.6  This 
information, I argue, breaks the coherence of official narratives about national identity, 
history, and citizenship promoted during the Games. If, as I argue, Olympic commodities 
both represented and effaced facts that complicated or contradicted official narratives 
                                                 
6 As I discuss later in this chapter, I define Settlers as all non-Indigenous Canadians, including immigrants 
to the country.  
6 
about the nation, these facts were, in Gordon’s words, “seething absences.” Although not 
always obvious, their presence could be felt.7  
Third, I use Margaret Somers’ concept of the contractualization of citizenship to argue 
that, in Canada, the rights and privileges of citizenship became something that individuals 
had to earn, in this case by consuming Olympic commodities. By purchasing such 
commodities, many Canadians endorsed official narratives about the nation and ignored 
the contradictions embodied in these commodities. However, as I argue in my fourth and 
final point, it was not possible to completely obscure the unsettling truths about national 
identity, history, and citizenship that Olympic commodities represented. Anti-Olympic 
activists and protestors publicized these unsettling truths and exposed the contradictions 
inherent in official narratives about the nation promoted during the Games. Exposing this 
information had the potential to arouse an uncanny feeling in consumers. This 
uncanniness, in turn, could undermine the idea that Olympic commodities represented 
familiar and positive ideas about Canada.  
This research highlights the socio-cultural significance of critically analyzing the 
symbolic meaning of consumer goods. Although Olympic-related commodities are banal, 
their impact on the construction of Canadian identity and citizenship norms is anything 
but banal. These commodities represented a version of national identity that glorified 
European settlement in Canada and obscured the disparity between Indigenous and 
Settler Canadians’ quality of life. Further, by buying these commodities, Settler 
Canadians constructed their identity as valued citizens who make important material 
contributions to the nation. Significantly, the promotion and consumption of Olympic 
commodities contributed to a broader cultural process aimed at shaping public memory of 
Canada’s colonial past and preserving the state’s claim to posses land and natural 
resources that Indigenous peoples argue rightfully belongs to them.  
Put another way, what is at stake in this project is an understanding of how commodities 
and consumer practices help sustain the legitimacy of Canadian settler society. By 
                                                 
7 Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 1997), 21.  
7 
identifying the socio-economic factors that made it possible for commodities to become 
popular symbols of national identity, I show how these commodities became intertwined 
with other processes and practices that helped maintain the legitimacy of the state. 
Moreover, my research shows that despite the popularity of Olympic objects, and the 
overt ideas about the nation they represented, their meaning was neither fixed nor 
uncontested. Indigenous groups and their supporters used the Olympics in Montreal, 
Calgary and Vancouver to raise awareness about the devastating impact of government 
policies and business practices on their communities. In doing so, these groups 
challenged the privileged meanings of Olympic consumer goods. Moreover, by 
highlighting the social exclusion, political disenfranchisement, human rights violations 
and low standards of living many Indigenous peoples (and other Canadians) experience, 
anti-Olympic activists undermined the coherency of the ideas about Settler society that 
were promoted through the Olympics and posed a direct challenge to the legitimacy of 
the Settler state.  
 “A Crisis in Social Meaning:” Commodities as Fetish Objects  
 
The theoretical starting point for my project is a consideration of commodity fetishism. In 
1760, the French philosopher Charles de Brosses used the word “fetishisme” to describe 
religious practices that, in his view, relied on “primitive” ideas about magic. Karl Marx 
drew on this idea to formulate his concept of commodity fetishism, using “the idea of 
primitive magic to express the central social form of the modern industrial economy.”8 
He argued that in capitalist societies commodities take on a life of their own and appear 
to have inherent value.9 Marx famously wrote: “the relationships between the producers, 
                                                 
8 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 181. 
9 Karl Marx, Captial Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 164.   
9 Marx, Capital Volume One, 164, Michael Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s 
Capital, trans. Alexander Locascio (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012), 74. 
8 
within which the social characteristics of their labours are manifested, take on the form of 
a social relation between the products of the labour.”10 
A product becomes a commodity when it is exchanged for other objects.11 The value of 
the commodity, however, is created prior to its exchange and is directly related to the 
labour required to produce the product. The process of exchange is merely an expression 
of the commodity’s value. In other words, the value of a commodity cannot be separated 
from the social processes related to the conditions under which it is produced and 
exchanged. Thus, individuals remain unaware of the labour involved in commodity 
production. Moreover, as Michael Heinrich points out, individuals in capitalist societies 
incorrectly assume that all commodities, in every social context, have inherent value.12  
A process of concealment is always involved in commodity fetishism because the labour 
invested in producing a product becomes concealed when it is exchanged for money. 
Michael Billig draws a link between Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism and Freud’s 
work on repression when he argues that the act of forgetting lies at the heart of 
commodity fetishism. Billig writes that, through commodity fetishism, “the labour 
expended in the production is forgotten in the everyday understanding of the value of the 
commodity. The result is a routine concealment or forgetting....In daily exchanges, the 
labour involved in the production of commodities is pushed from awareness.” 13 Billig 
relies on Freud’s concept of repression to describe the psychological process that people 
undergo when they forget the labour required to produce a commodity. According to 
Freud, people repress disturbing thoughts by banishing them from their conscious 
awareness.14 Billig writes: “One might see the routines of consumer capitalism as 
practices which accomplish a form of repression, as disturbing thoughts are pushed from 
consumer consciousness.” 15 This approach to fetishism is valuable because it includes, 
                                                 
10 Marx, Capital Volume One, 164. 
11 Ibid., 59.   
12 Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital, 74. 
13 Michael Billig, "Commodity Fetishism and Repression: Reflections on Marx, Freud and the Psychology 
of Consumer Capitalism," Theory & Psychology 9, no. 3 (1999): 315. 
14 Ibid., 320. 
15 Ibid., 320.  
9 
but goes beyond, considerations about labour and the production of commodities. 
Similarly, James Carrier writes that fetishism refers “to the ignoring of denial of the 
background of objects” and that Marx’s work on commodity fetishism helps highlight 
“the general tendency to obscure the people and processes, of which labour power is a 
component, that are part of creating an object and bringing it to market.”16 
Like Billig, Anne McClintock’s understanding of fetish relies on a Marxist and 
psychoanalytic understanding of the term. She argues against Freud’s assertion that fetish 
objects help men psychologically manage their fear of castration. According to Freud, 
this fear emerges when men learn that women do not have penises. Moreover, fetish 
objects do not entirely erase men’s fear of castration but, rather, allow them to disavow 
their fear. 17 He wrote: “The fetish remains a token of triumph over the threat of castration 
and a protection against it.”18 For McClintock, fetish objects are not “merely phallic 
substitutes.”19 Rather, “fetishes can be seen as the displacement onto an object (or 
person) of contradictions that the individual cannot resolve at a personal level.”20 This 
approach identifies a key similarity in Marx and Freud’s writing on fetish, namely, that 
the fetish represents, in McClintock’s words, “a crisis in social meaning.” 21 According to 
McClintock the fetish exists “at the cross-roads of psychoanalysis and social history, 
inhabiting the threshold of both personal and historical memory” and is an “embodiment 
of an impossible irresolution.”22 Finally, “By displacing power onto the fetish, then 
manipulating the fetish, the individual gains symbolic control over what might otherwise 
be terrifying ambiguities. For this reason, the fetish can be called an impassioned 
object.”23 
                                                 
16 James Carrier, "Protecting the environment the natural way: ethical consumption and commodity 
fetishism," Antipode 42, no. 3 (2010): 673.  
17 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 
XXI, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth press, 1953), 153-154. 
18 Ibid., 154.  
19 McClintock, Imperial Leather, 184.  
20 Ibid.  
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22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
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McClintock applies fetish theory to her analysis of national symbols, arguing that 
“nationalism inhabits the realm of fetishism”  because objects including a country’s flag, 
uniforms, airplane logos, maps, anthems, and national flowers are fetish objects that 
embody crises in social meaning.24 Unlike Benedict Anderson, who credits the 
emergence of nationalism primarily to the development of print media, McClintock 
argues that the power of nationalism since the late 1800s “has been its capacity to 
organize a sense of popular, collective unity through the management of mass national 
commodity spectacle.”25  These commodity spectacles include team sports, military 
displays, and mass rallies. McClintock uses the example of the Afrikaner Tweede Trek 
through South Africa in the mid-1900s as an example of a national commodity spectacle. 
She notes that the trek offered “a potent symbolic amalgam of disjointed times, capturing 
in a single fetish spectacle the impossible confluence of the modern and the archaic, the 
recent displacement and the ancestral migration.”26   
McClintock’s theorization of fetish is applicable to Canadian commodities because it 
helps explain how these commodities have the capacity to paradoxically hold together 
contradictory ideas. She provides a framework for thinking about how the symbolic 
meanings of commodities hold in tension competing ideas about Canadian identity. This 
argument is informed by other scholars who have applied McClintock’s work on national 
fetishes to a Canadian context. Donica Belisle, for example, writes:   
When it is bought and sold as a commodity, for instance, the Canadian 
flag becomes a fetish that signifies and displaces the violence of Canadian 
nation building. The representation of nature on the flag (the maple leaf) 
can be, on the one hand, interpreted as symbolizing the contradiction 
between the state's ‘empty lands’ ideology, and on the other, the presence 
of Indigenous peoples throughout Canada.27  
                                                 
24 Ibid., 374.   
25 Ibid., italics in original.  
26 Ibid., 376. 
27 Donica Belisle, "Toward a Canadian Consumer History," Labour/Le Travail 52 (2003): 185.  
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According to Belisle, the flag is a fetish object because it draws attention to, but also 
hides, the fact that Indigenous peoples lived in Canada before European Settlers first 
arrived in the country. Belisle perhaps invests too much symbolic power in the maple leaf 
and I am less convinced that it represents an “empty lands ideology.”28 However, her 
work provides an early example of scholarship that considers Canadian commodities as 
fetish objects in line with McClintock’s definition of the term.  
Belisle’s work also draws attention to the fact that symbols of the nation can 
paradoxically expose and hide information about Canadian identity and history. Margot 
Francis provides a nuanced exploration of this paradox in her book, Creative 
Subversions: Whiteness, Indigeneity, and the National Imaginary. Francis argues that 
emblems of national belonging in Canada, such as the beaver, the Canadian Pacific 
Railway and Banff National Park, convey knowledge about national identity and history 
“that is both articulated and refused.”29 She argues that Canadians Settlers’ historical 
mistreatment of Indigenous peoples is an open secret, information that is publicly known 
but not openly acknowledged. The nation, she contends, is “a country founded on a 
commitment to democratic forms of order and good government for some” but 
“devastating forms of legal exclusion, forced assimilation, and mass deaths for others.”30 
By analyzing Olympic commodities, I extend Francis’ argument that unsettling truths 
about the nation’s past inform the meaning of emblems of national identity by arguing 
that these truths also inform the meaning of popular consumer objects in Canada.  
The image of Canada depicted through Olympic commodities (and, more generally, 
through the Olympics), such as the idea that the country is free of conflict and racial 
inequality, exists only in a hypothetical future. Thus, like other fetishes, these objects 
represent multiple time periods, embodying “contradiction, repetition, multiple agency 
and multiple time...time without progress.”31 In other words, the commodities linked to 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 185. 
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UBC Press, 2011), 4.  
30 Ibid., 9. 
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the Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver Olympics represented the nation’s shameful past 
and an idealized nation that exists in an imagined future.   
Merging the Visible and Invisible: Haunted, Uncanny 
Commodities  
 
Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida use the concept of ghostly haunting to explain how 
the past makes itself felt in the present. I apply Gordon and Derrida’s work to Olympic 
commodities, arguing that they are haunted by unsettling knowledge about Canada’s past. 
According to Gordon, a ghostly haunting is “a story about what happens when we admit 
the ghost – that special instance of the merging of the visible and the invisible, the dead 
and the living, the past and the present – into the making of worldly relations and into the 
making of our accounts of the world.”32 Similarly, Derrida argues that the line dividing 
the past, present, and future is permeable, writing: “Before knowing whether one can 
differentiate between the specter of the past and the specter of the future, of the past 
present and the future present, one must perhaps ask oneself whether the spectrality effect 
does not consist in undoing this opposition, or even this dialectic, between actual, 
effective presence and its other.”33  
Gordon uses three case studies to explore ghostly hauntings: Sabina Spielrein’s 
relationship with Jung and Freudian psychoanalysis, accounts of the disappeared in 
Argentina (individuals who were tortured and killed by the state but whose bodies were 
never found) and the story of slavery in the United States. She argues that the invisibility 
of women haunts psychoanalysis and its history, the disappeared haunt Argentinean 
society and, even when slavery ended in America, it haunted former slaves and forced 
them to coexist with ghosts.34 For example, in her analysis of Toni Morrison’s book 
Beloved, Gordon argues that the book’s characters must confront events in their past that 
impact their present condition. In the novel, Sethe, a runaway slave, chose to kill her 
                                                 
32 Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 24.   
33 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Morning and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1993), 48. 
34 Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 194.  
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young daughter, Beloved, rather than allow her to be apprehended by slave catchers and 
returned to slavery. After the Civil War, when Sethe is free, she is haunted by the 
memory and aftermath of her violent act and, more broadly, by the trauma of slavery in 
the United States. Beloved, who returns to Sethe’s life as a ghost, is haunted herself and 
Morrison uses the figure of a haunted ghost to illustrate that grappling with this double 
form of haunting is a necessary part of the reconstruction process in post-Civil War 
America.35  
Derrida argues that Marx’s theories are still relevant in capital societies and are present in 
spectral form. He writes: “At a time when a new world disorder is attempting to install its 
neo-capitalism and neo-liberalism, no disavowal has managed to rid itself of all Marx’s 
ghosts.”36 When proponents of capitalism declare communism a thing of the past, “they 
do no more than disavow the undeniable itself: a ghost never dies, it remains always to 
come and to come-back.”37  
Fetish objects are often haunted by the past. McClintock argues that fetishes are “haunted 
by both personal and historical memory.”38 Olympic-related commodities, I argue, are 
haunted by the memory of disturbing parts of Canadian history. Indeed, the authors of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, published in 1996, write that the ghosts of 
Canadian history “haunt us still. The ghosts take the form of dishonoured treaties, theft of 
Aboriginal lands, suppression of Aboriginal cultures, abduction of Aboriginal children, 
impoverishment and disempowerment of Aboriginal peoples.” 39 As I show in my project, 
these ghosts also haunt everyday consumer goods like HBC mittens and Petro Canada 
glassware. 
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Gordon describes ghostly matters as “seething absences”40 or, in other words, absences 
that can be perceived and felt and asserts that “the ghostly haunt gives notice that 
something is missing.”41 Similarly, Derrida writes that the “non-presence of the specter 
demands that one take its times and its history into consideration, the singularity of its 
temporality or of its historicity.”42 Noticing how invisible or imperceptible things make 
their presence felt is not limited to material things like bodies but, rather, extends to 
immaterial things like historical facts. Moreover, an investigation of a haunting brings to 
light information that has been excluded from conscious public memory. In Canada, 
exposing information about the nation’s history that continues to haunt contemporary 
society is an important step toward achieving a more just society because it compels non-
Indigenous Canadians to reckon with and come to terms with the nation’s colonial past. 
According to Gordon, reckoning with ghosts requires “providing a hospitable memory for 
ghosts out of a concern for justice.”43 This type of reckoning draws attention to people or 
things that have been neglected and allows scholars to “make contact with what is 
without doubt often painful, difficult, and unsettling.” 44 Derrida similarly argues that 
exorcising a ghost does not chase it away but, rather, allows scholars to grant ghosts “the 
right, if it means making them come back alive, as revenants who would no longer be 
revenants, but as other arrivants to whom a hospitable memory or promise must offer 
welcome...Not in order to grant them the right to this sense but out of a concern for 
justice.”45 He further argues that, if the scholar “loves justice,” he will learn from the 
ghost by discovering how to talk to it.46  
Learning from the ghosts of Canada’s past means understanding how unjust and 
traumatic events in the nation’s history destabilize popular narratives that depict the 
nation as harmonious and free of discord. In their introduction to a special edition of 
University of Toronto Quarterly journal on haunting and Canadian literature, Marlene 
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Goldman and Joanne Saul argue that “the spectral presences of North America’s 
Indigenous peoples and the Québécois repeatedly unsettle the imaginary, unified vision 
of an Anglo-Canadian nation-state.”47 Sharon Rosenberg, Amber Dean, and Kara 
Granzow argue that Alberta’s Centenary Celebrations, held in 2005, were marked by “a 
series of haunted encounters that disrupt the centenary’s prevailing remembrance strategy 
of coherence, pride and accomplishment.”48 They further contend that “Alberta’s colonial 
past bears on and continues through its present rather than being ‘settled’ by a 
recognition of (pre)colonial history or the encouragement of (multi)cultural renewal 
efforts.”49 For example, a picture included in a handbook about the centenary celebrations 
ostensibly showed a single Aboriginal settlement but the authors discovered that it was 
actually a composite of 4 or 5 photographs. They argue that the photograph is a 
“ghost(ed) image: a representation of a repressed yet haunting presence repeatedly 
disavowed by the origin story of a centennial discourse that evacuates colonial history 
from the present.”50  
Emilie Cameron observes that, after the Nisga’a Nation successfully regained its title 
over a portion of the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park in British Columbia, 
unsubstantiated urban legends depicting the valley as haunted emerged. Cameron argues 
the ghost stories non-Indigenous Canadians told reflected their anxiety over questions 
about Indigenous peoples’ rightful ownership of the land. She interviewed individuals 
who described their encounters with the ghosts of the Stein Valley “as frightening, 
unsettling, and scary, an impression of being unwelcome trespassers in what is ostensibly 
a public park.”51 Cameron concludes that, because the language of haunting can “re-
inscribe the interests of the powerful upon the meaning and memories of place,”52 
geography scholars should be wary of using Gordon’s theorization of haunting in their 
work. While I appreciate Cameron’s emphasis on the importance of using appropriate 
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language in academic writing, I do not share her conclusions. Unlike the Settlers in 
Cameron’s article, Gordon encourages scholars to embrace, rather than repudiate, ghosts 
and to find ways to learn from these ghosts. According to this perspective, the ghost 
stories about the Stein Valley are haunted themselves. The stories are haunted by the fact 
that Settler Canadians settled on land that was inhabited by Indigenous peoples who have 
a rightful claim to that land.  
Confronting the ghosts that haunt Canada can be an uncanny experience. Warren Cariou 
argues that the recent resurgence of Indigenous ghosts in Prairie literature “reflects a 
widespread and perhaps growing anxiety suffered by Settlers regarding the legitimacy of 
their claims to belonging on what they call ‘their land’.”53 Cariou describes this anxiety 
in Freudian terms, as uncanny. Freud argues: “Uncanny is what one calls everything that 
was meant to remain secret and has come into the open.”54 The German word for 
uncanny is un-heimlech, which literally means unhomely (heimlech means homely).55 
Francis writes: “an experience of the uncanny can emerge when the place one considers 
home is somehow rendered unfamiliar.”56According to Cariou, the Settlers’ uncanny fear 
was linked to “a lurking sense that the places Settlers call home are not really theirs, a 
sense that their current legitimacy as owners or renters in a capitalist land market might 
well be predicated upon theft, fraud, violence, and other injustices in the past.”57  
Conceptualizing Olympic commodities as haunted by unpleasant facts about Canadian 
identity and history can arouse an uncanny feeling in consumers. In other words, the 
potential for the uncanny emerges when consumers acknowledge and confront the truths 
about national history and identity that are not publicized in popular narratives about the 
nation. For Derrida, the uncanny and haunting are linked. The word “uncanny,” he writes, 
“is the word of irreducible haunting or obsession. The most familiar becomes the most 
disquieting....the familiar, the domestic, or even the national (heimlich) frightens itself. It 
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feels itself occupied, in the proper secret (Geheimnis) of its inside, by what is most 
strange, distant, threatening.”58 Gordon similarly argues that “uncanny experiences are 
haunting experiences”59 and emphasizes the importance of confronting the uncanny by 
facing ghosts rather than repudiating them. I argue that Canadians must reckon with how 
the ghost is felt in the material objects that fill their homes and cover their bodies, even if 
(or perhaps because) this confrontation is uncanny.  
A “Symbol of Canadian Cool:” Branded/Corporate 
Nationalism  
   
By applying McClintock, Gordon and Derrida’s theories to the Olympics hosted in 
Canada, I fill a gap in existing scholarship on branded/corporate nationalism and draw 
attention to the importance of commodities’ symbolic meanings. Steven Jackson defines 
corporate nationalism as “the process by which corporations, both national and 
transnational use the nation and its symbolic value for commercial interests.”60 Catherine 
Carstairs uses the term branded nationalism to describe the emergence, in the 1980s, of a 
new form of Canadian nationalism linked to consumption and branding rather than 
cultural or economic factors.61 Carstairs recognizes that many brands use symbols of 
national identity in their campaigns. Coca-Cola, Ralph Lauren and Tommy Hilfiger 
include the American flag in their promotional material62 while IKEA uses Swedish 
colours in its brand and ad designs. Moreover, the Swatch brand emblem is a modified 
version of the Swiss flag.63 What is new about the branded nationalism that emerged in 
the 1980s, Carstairs argues, is that brands like Roots (a clothing company) have come to 
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represent a distinctly Canadian way of life.64 Similarly, Patricia Cormack and John 
Cosgrave argue that Tim Hortons, a chain of coffee shops in Canada, is “the most 
successful and long-standing private commercial enterprise to brand itself by way of 
overt national identity and pride.”65 
Like Tim Hortons, Canadian beer companies depict themselves as central to national 
identity. Ira Wagman argues that many Canadian beer ads emphasize the idea that 
Canadian cultural values are superior to American values.66 Gregory Millard, Sarah 
Riegel, and John Wright use examples from Molson Canadian, Labatt’s, and Roots to 
debunk the stereotype that Canadians express their national pride less assertively than 
Americans. They argue that in these companies’ ads, Canadians loudly announce that 
they are quietly and politely patriotic: “Waving the Canadian flag wherever one goes on 
grounds that it stands for the ‘quiet North American’ is like entering a library and loudly 
announcing one’s silence.”67 
Jackson argues that Molson Canadian’s “I Am [Canadian]” ad campaign united 
stereotypes about masculinity and Canadian identity and produced hegemonic “masculine 
nationalisms” and “national masculinisms.”68 Further, a series of the “I am [Canadian]” 
ads that aired during the 2008 Stanley Cup Finals exemplified “the holy trinity of sport, 
beer and masculinity within a particular expression of nationalism.”69 Like Jackson, Mary 
Louise Adams introduces considerations of sport and gender into scholarship on 
branded/corporate nationalism. Adams uses the example of a Labatt’s ad aired during the 
1998 Nagano Winter Olympics to support her argument that narratives depicting hockey 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 241. 
65 Patricia Cormack, and James Cosgrave, Desiring Canada: CBC, Contests, Hockey Violence, and Other 
Stately Pleasures (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 64. 
66 Ira Wagman, "Wheat, Barley, Hops, Citizenship: Molson's 'I Am [Canadian]' Campaign," The Velvet 
Light Trap - A Critical Journal of Film and Television Fall (2002): 87.  
67 Gregory Millard, Sarah Riegel, and John Wright, "Here's where we get Canadian: English-Canadian 
nationalism and popular culture," American Review of Canadian Studies 32, no. 1 (2002): 78.  
68 Jackson, “Globalization, Corporate Nationalism and Masculinity in Canada,” 909. 
69 Ibid., 909.  
19 
as the iconic symbol of Canadian identity privilege native-born, white men.70 In the 
Labatt’s ad, white men play an impromptu game of shinny while women and people of 
colour watch the game from the sidelines.  
Carstairs notes that, beginning in the 1980s, Canadians began to embrace Roots clothing 
as a way to express their patriotism.71 The Roots “poor-boy” hats that sold during the 
1998 Nagano Olympics were unexpectedly popular and, in Carstairs’ words, became “an 
international symbol of Canadian cool.”72 Cormack and Cosgrave argue that difference 
and identity are increasingly being constructed through consumption and “the subtle and 
endless meanings that coffee allows makes it the ideal commodity for the work of 
identity.”73 Unfortunately, Carstairs and Cormack and Cosgrave do not devote a great 
deal of attention to the symbolic meaning of Roots hats or Tim Hortons coffee cups or 
other merchandise. I fill this gap by examining the meaning and significance of 
commodities that represent the nation. To be clear, I do not ignore the importance of 
promotional campaigns but, rather, illustrate that it is important to study the symbolic 
meanings of commodities in addition to analyzing ad narratives.  
Carstairs argues that Roots nationalism lacks the positive features of earlier versions of 
Canadian nationalism such as tolerance, diversity, and community. 74 Similarly, Millard et 
al. describe the version of nationalism in ads for Molson, Labatt’s and Roots as an “in-
your-face, though ultimately empty nationalism.”75 I take a different view to Carstairs 
and Millard et al. and argue that the nationalism represented through Olympic 
commodities is not empty or void of positive values like harmony and tolerance. On the 
contrary: it is too full of these, bursting with contradictory ideas about national values 
and identity. Additionally, Carstairs and Millard et al. do not consider how commodities 
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represent ideas about early European settlement in Canada, a form of representation that, 
I argue, is highly selective.  
Surprisingly, scholars have not studied the significance of the fact that children and teens 
often consume nation-branded products like Roots clothing. I argue that, like other 
Olympic-related objects, Olympic mascots marketed to children embody contradictory 
ideas about the nation. Furthermore, the educational resources that Olympic organizing 
committees distributed to schools in Canada taught children about these mascots and 
exposed students to ideas about Canadian history, culture, and values that were consistent 
with the ones conveyed through Olympic-related promotional practices. These resources 
exemplify the fact that, during the Olympic Games in Canada, political and commercial 
narratives about national identity often converged.  
Wagman and Cosgrave and Cormack argue convincingly that commercial practices in 
Canada have political effects. Wagman writes that the Canadian Heritage Minister Sheila 
Copps showed a Molson Canadian ad during a talk she delivered at the International 
Press Institute’s World Congress in 2000. The talk was part of a panel discussion called 
“American Culture: The People’s Choice or a Form of Imperialism?” and Copps used the 
ad to argue that Canadians did not like the homogenizing effects of globalization.76 
According to Wagman, Copps’ decision to show the Molson ad allowed her to make a 
rhetorically effective point and enhanced Molson’s brand image.77 Like Copps, Peter 
McKay, Canada’s Foreign Minister, bridged cultural and political spheres in 2006 when 
he took the U.S. Secretary of State, Condaleeza Rice, to a Tim Hortons kiosk in 
Afghanistan. Cormack and Cosgrave argue that politicians affiliate themselves with the 
Tim Hortons brand in order to gain legitimacy and appeal to voters because the company 
has effectively positioned itself as “the new authority for the collective practice of 
memory over and against other sources.”78   
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Marketizing Social Life: Neo-Liberalism and Market 
Fundamentalism  
 
The Montreal Olympics occurred in 1976, when branded nationalism had yet to emerge 
as a popular phenomenon in Canada. By the time Calgary hosted the Olympics in 1988, 
however, branded nationalism had become a popular marketing tool. Thus, a comparison 
of the commercial practices linked to the Montreal and Calgary Games provides insight 
into the rise and evolution of branded nationalism in the country. Carstairs identifies two 
reasons why branded nationalism became prominent in the 1980s. First, brands were 
responding to Canadians’ concern that the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, signed in 
1988, would cause American culture to eclipse Canadian culture. Second, a number of 
events fragmented Canadians’ sense of shared identity.79 In 1990 and again in 1992, the 
government failed to pass a constitutional amendment recognizing Quebec as a distinct 
society. Moreover, in 1990, a sustained and at times violent confrontation broke out 
between the Quebec provincial police (and, eventually the Canadian army) and members 
of the Mohawk Nation over contested land in Oka, Quebec. Moreover, during the 1995 
referendum on Quebec sovereignty, 49% of Quebecers voted “yes” to the question: “Do 
you agree that Québec should become sovereign?”80 
Belisle argues that, although branded nationalism became pronounced in the 1980s and 
1990s, it did not emerge at that time. Rather, the phenomenon dates back to the 1890s, 
when Eaton’s, Simpson’s, and the HBC depicted their department stores as national 
icons.81 Similarly, Paula Hastings argues that in the early 1900s representations of the 
Canadian landscape and political figures “permeated the language and iconography of 
consumer culture.”82 For example, images of the Canadian Parliament buildings, political 
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figures, rural landscapes, and Indigenous peoples appeared on labels for products like 
canned fruits and vegetables, shoe polish, cream separator, and tomato chutney.83 
Carstairs, however, never argues that branded nationalism emerged in the 1980s and she 
acknowledges that Canadian companies used symbols of the nation in their marketing 
campaigns prior to the ‘80s. Her central argument is: “What is new is the degree to which 
Canadians have been willing to drape themselves in branded products such as Roots and 
Molson Canadian gear, embracing them as part of a Canadian way of life.”84 
The Montreal Olympic coin and stamp programs failed to meet fundraising targets, I 
argue, partly because Canadians were not familiar with branded nationalism in 1976. On 
the other hand, branded nationalism was prevalent in 1988, when Calgary hosted the 
Olympics, and its prevalence helps explain why the Olympic mugs that Petro Canada 
produced became so popular. Additionally, the marketing and branding of national 
identity in the Vancouver Olympics was more intense and prevalent than in the previous 
two Olympic Games. In Vancouver, ideas about the nation permeated Olympic-related 
promotional and cultural practices to an unfprecedented degree. Canadians were not only, 
in Carstairs words, “willing to drape themselves in branded products” but were inundated 
with promotional messages about the value of this activity.85  
In addition to the factors Carstairs identifies (NAFTA and the fragmentation of national 
identity), another factor helped popularize branded nationalism in the 1980s. The rise of 
neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism contributed to the popularity of Olympic 
commodities that symbolized the nation and shaped the organizing of the Calgary and 
Vancouver Olympic Games. As David Harvey writes, neo-liberalism is an economic 
theory which “proposes that human well-being can be best advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
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characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”86  
Proponents of a neo-liberal economic model favour minimal government involvement in 
citizens’ lives and few restrictions on market capitalism. Thus, neo-liberals reject 
Keynesianism, an economic policy which asserts that the success of capitalist economic 
systems depends on government regulation of the market. In contrast to Keynesianism, 
neo-liberalism is underpinned by the belief that individuals’ prosperity, freedom, and 
happiness thrives when governments allow market capitalism to operate largely 
unfettered.87  
Margaret Somers uses the term market fundamentalism to describe a comprehensive 
worldview and political movement governed by the belief that market capitalism exists in 
a natural state outside the realm of politics and government and, as such, should not be 
heavily regulated. 88 Somers acknowledges that market fundamentalism is similar to neo-
liberalism but she prefers the former term because many Americans, who associate 
“liberalism” with left-wing ideals, sometimes find the word neo-liberalism confusing.89 
Somers also prefers this term because it highlights that market fundamentalists, like 
religious fundamentalists, build a system of beliefs around a central idea (the natural state 
of the market).90 George Soros used the term to describe the idea that all aspects of social 
life should be organized according to market principles.91 Accordingly, any element of 
government or civil society that is not marketized is coercive and inefficient. Somers 
defines marketization as “the processes, techniques, policies, and technologies used to 
convert all areas of social life that are considered inefficiently marketized into markets or 
pseudo markets.”92 Thus, under market fundamentalism, goods and services that were not 
previously subject to market pressure become treated as commodities that can be priced 
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and sold.93 In accordance with Somers, I use the term market fundamentalism to describe 
the philosophy that all areas of social life should function according to the logic of the 
market. In contrast, I use the term neo-liberalism to describe specific economic practices 
and policies.94  
Nation, region, and city branding practices exemplify the market fundamentalist drive to 
turn all elements of society into marketable commodities. These practices use marketing 
strategies taken from the corporate world to situate geographic regions competitively 
within the global economy.  Thus, nation/region/city branding “allows national 
governments to better manage and control the image they project to the world, and to 
attract the ‘right’ kinds of investment, tourism, trade and talent, successfully competing 
with a growing pool of national contenders for a shrinking set of resources.”95 
Scholarship on nation, region, and city branding first emerged in the early 2000s in the 
fields of marketing and business studies.96 Simon Anholt’s book, Competitive identity: 
The new brand management for nations, cities and regions, is a formative text on this 
topic. Anholt is a branding consultant who claims to have coined the term “nation 
branding.” 97 Since 2005, Anholt has released an annual Anholt Nations Brands Index 
(ANBI), which measures a country’s global brand equity. Anholt also writes about city 
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branding and place or destination branding, which relies on the same logic that governs 
nation branding and treats geographical locations “as ‘products’ to be marketed, through 
tourism development and branding activities.”98  
The best known nation branding campaigns associated with the Olympics are linked to 
the 2000 Sydney and 2004 Athens Olympics. The Australian Tourist Commission 
launched the Brand Australia campaign in 1995, two years after the IOC awarded Sydney 
the 2000 Summer Olympics. This campaign brought together and strengthened three 
brands: Brand Australia, the Olympic brand, and Olympic partners’ brands.99 Roy 
Panagiotopoulou argues that hosting the 2004 Athens Summer Games helped Greece 
push for a greater role within the European Union (EU) and improve its infrastructure. 100 
Pere Berkowitz et al. argue that one of the reasons that China scores low on the ANBI is 
because of incidents like Tiananmen Square which tarnished the country’s international 
image.101 Writing before China hosted the Olympics, Berkowitz et al. argued that China 
could improve its ANBI rating by using the Beijing Games to re-brand itself and re-shape 
the international community’s perception of the government. Writing after the Beijing 
Olympics, Li Zhang and Simon Xiaobin Zhao argue that, for Beijing, hosting the 2008 
Games only partially changed global perception of the city’s brand. While citizens and 
tourists were impressed by its economic growth, the realities of everyday life in Beijing, 
such as its substandard housing and poverty contradicted and the ideas that city branders 
promoted.102  
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Zhang and Zhao do not view the gap between the appearance and reality of Beijing’s city 
branding campaign as an ethical problem. Rather, they argue that the campaign failed 
because it did not successfully convert citizens into “brand ambassadors.”103 This 
perspective overlooks the fact that socially and economically marginalized citizens are 
often unable or unwilling to represent their city in a favourable way to the global 
community. In fact, these scholars do not consider the social and political implications of 
nation branding in the Olympics. In contrast, Aronczyk, Zala Volcic and Mark 
Andrejevic have provided insightful critiques of nation branding. Aronczyk argues that 
the practice shifts decision making about culture from the political to the corporate 
sphere. She writes:  
 By transposing authority from elected government officials to advertising 
and branding professionals, by replacing accountability with facilitation, 
and by fitting discussions of the nation into categories that privilege a 
particular kind of collective representation over diverse expression, nation 
branding affects the moral basis of national citizenship”104  
Similarly, Volcic and Andrejevic use the example of Slovenia’s nation branding 
campaign to argue that nation branding frames national identity as a consumer choice 
“rather than a site of collective belonging and action.” 105 Moreover, Aronczyk and 
Volcic and Andrejevic argue that nation branding campaigns oblige citizens to “live” the 
nation’s brand by compelling them to build, reinforce, and reproduce a nation’s brand 
identity.106 In other words, nation branders offload “the work of message circulation onto 
the populace.”107 For Aronczyk, this obligation glosses over the pluralities, conflicts, and 
potentials for resistance in public life and, rather, perpetuates a homogenous version of 
national identity and culture.108 I add to these critiques by showing how region and 
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corporate branding practices mutually supported one another during the Calgary 
Olympics. Collectively, they helped shape public perception of the petroleum industry in 
Alberta and gave the impression that the province should have jurisdiction over its oil and 
gas resources. However, these branding practices obscured the devastating effect that oil 
and gas extraction practices were having on the Lubicon Cree, whose territory in northern 
Alberta sat on valuable petroleum reserves.  
A “Market Exchange:” Cause-Related Marketing and the 
Contractualization of Citizenship  
 
In addition to examining nation/city/region branding, my project considers the Olympics 
in Canada in relation to two other phenomena that emerged within the context of neo-
liberalism and market fundamentalism: cause-related marketing and the 
contractualization of citizenship. Cause-related marketing (CRM) is a practice in which 
brands affiliate themselves with a social cause and create marketing campaigns that help 
raise money for this cause.109 CRM campaigns encourage individual consumers, rather 
than governments, to contribute to social services and emerged within a neo-liberal 
economic environment.110 Inger Stole argues that when governments began to cut 
investments in social services in the late 1970s in accordance with neo-liberal economic 
policies, businesses teamed up with private not-for profit organizations that were seeking 
to repair a broken safety net.111 She writes: “Cause marketing fills a function, not only as 
a promoter of products and producer of consumer goodwill, but in [sic] an important tool 
in the neo-liberal struggle for greater privatization of welfare and social services.”112 
Samantha King argues that CRM is a type of strategic philanthropy. She argues that, prior 
to the 1980s, companies used to support charities in random and unscientific ways. 
However, they began treating their philanthropic practices as activities that could increase 
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profits.113 Most large corporations now focus on one charitable cause (i.e. breast cancer, 
environmentalism), integrate their giving programs with their marketing and public 
affairs programs, form partnerships with outside groups, provide incentives to employees 
who volunteer for the cause and measure the results of their giving programs.114  
Like Stole, King situates the emergence of strategic philanthropy within a neo-liberal 
economic context. She writes: under neoliberalism, “public-private initiatives and 
individual corporate giving are promoted as morally and economically viable means 
through which to respond to social needs, in lieu of the state’s role in mitigating the 
social effects of capitalism.”115 King points out that, in 1981, U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan created the Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives to encourage individuals and 
private companies to support non-profit organizations. The President also increased the 
amount of charitable donations that companies could deduct from their taxes, which gave 
them added incentive to donate money to social causes. At the same time, public funding 
for non-profit companies dried up and companies began receiving an unprecedented 
number of requests for aid from non-profit organizations.116 As companies fought to 
succeed within a highly competitive business environment, businesspeople began 
evaluating their companies’ philanthropic practices using the same measures they used to 
evaluate other business practices and started to treat charitable donations as investments. 
CRM emerged as an effective way for companies to increase their brand value and earn 
consumer loyalty.117  
A portion of the proceeds from sales of many commodities sold during the Montreal, 
Calgary, and Vancouver Olympics helped fund the Games. The promotional campaigns 
for these products shared many similarities with CRM. Olympic organizers and sponsors 
told Canadians that they could materially support the Olympics hosted in Canada and 
demonstrate their national pride and loyalty by buying these commodities. I show that 
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this option was open to Canadians as early as the 1976 Montreal Olympics, when the 
proceeds of the sales of Olympic coins and stamps helped fund the Games, but it only 
became successful during the 1988 Calgary Games.  
At the same time as CRM was becoming popular, citizenship was becoming 
contractualized. Somers uses the phrase “the contractualization of citizenship” to describe 
“the process by which the government’s relationship with its citizenry changes from 
noncontractualism to contractual quid pro quo market exchange.”118 She recognizes that 
the ability to enter into private contract with others has, historically, been understood as a 
right that citizens hold. However, Somers holds that the criteria used to determine 
citizenship was never limited to a person’s contractual relationship to the state until the 
rise of market fundamentalism. She argues that, under market fundamentalism, inclusion 
in a national, civil, and political community is a privilege that citizens earn by 
contributing to the nation in economically profitable ways.119 She writes:  
when citizenship has been contractualized, failing to provide a good or 
service of equivalent market value in exchange for what is now the 
privilege of citizenship, results in a reduction of the moral worth of the 
citizenship. And depending on the degree and frequency and quality of 
such failures to meet contractual criteria, there will be an increasing 
refusal to recognize the citizen as deserving of membership altogether in 
the political and social community.120  
Thus, only individuals who make profitable contributions to their community, such as 
adding to the economy by working a job, are valued and included within that 
community.121 Somers defines social inclusion as “the right to recognition by others as a 
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moral equal treated by the same standards and values and due the same level or respect 
and dignity as all other members.”122 
Drawing on Somers, I argue that during the 1988 Calgary and 2010 Vancouver Games 
Canadians could earn the privilege of citizenship by buying Olympic-related 
commodities. For example, a portion of the proceeds from sales of Petro Canada 
commemorative mugs and red and white HBC mittens helped fund Olympic athletes; as 
such, Canadians made materially valuable contributions to the nation and supported the 
Games when they purchased these objects. The fact that Canadians could earn the 
privilege of citizenship by consuming Olympic commodities reveals that the categories of 
citizen and consumer have become blurred, but not in the way that scholars have 
traditionally written about the citizen-consumer hybrid. Lizabeth Cohen and Michael 
Schudson argue that consumerism and citizenship, long believed to be oppositional 
categories, are interconnected.123 Of course, citizens are also consumers (and vice versa), 
but citizenship and consumption were considered separate categories, the former 
relegated to the public sphere and the latter to the private sphere.124 In her study of the 
history of consumer culture in the United States, Lizabeth Cohen found: “Rather than 
isolated ideal types, citizen and consumer were ever-shifting categories that sometimes 
overlapped, often were in tension, but always reflected the permeability of the political 
and economic spheres.”125 Michael Schudson argues that consumption practices often 
have political dimensions to them.  Consumer choices, he maintains, have political 
implications and, conversely, political choices share many similarities with consumer 
choices.126 According to Schudson, people are “doing politics” when they vote, but also 
when they choose to hold a trade union meeting in a particular hotel, when they buy a 
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ticket to a benefit concert or donate their frequent flyer miles to a charitable 
organization.127   
Many people use consumption, or non-consumption, to agitate for social change. In 2006, 
Deirdre Shaw, Terry Newholm, and Roger Dickinson interviewed ethical shoppers in the 
United Kingdom and found that “in many instances participants viewed their market vote 
as more effective than a vote in a political election.”128 Similarly, in his study of 
consumer boycotts of Starbucks, Bryant Simon argues that citizens often use 
consumption as a way to become politically engaged. He writes: “Through their 
consumer actions, shoppers are attempting to shape policy and be heard in the corridors 
of state power, recognizing that even if formal politics have lost their traction, access to 
government and broader structures of power still matters.”129 Americans boycotted 
Starbucks to voice their positions on a range of issues including police accountability, 
gun control, food production and politics in the Middle East. Simon argues that 
consumers are using their “power as consumers, ahead of their power as voters, to try to 
shape the social order.”130 
In the context of the Olympics in Canada, some activist groups advocated consumer 
boycotts as a way to bring about social change. For example, during the Vancouver 
Olympics, the ORN encouraged individuals to boycott the HBC. However, most 
Canadians did not act like the consumer-citizens Cohen, Shaw et al. and Simon describe, 
who linked consumption (or anti-consumption) to social activism. Rather, understood in 
the context of Somers’ theory of the contractualization of citizenship, consumption was 
often a way that Canadians earned citizenship and, correspondingly, the right to be 
included in civil and political society. While these consumers were not trying to change 
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public policy, their consumer practices are salient examples of Cohen and Schudson’s 
argument that consumption cannot be neatly separated from civic life.  
Cormack argues that the roles of citizens and consumers are not easily reconciled: “The 
obligation of the citizen is to maintain an imaginative or thoughtful relationship to the 
notion of the common good. The consumer is not a political actor in this sense, at least 
not without a huge degradation of the notion of the political.”131 Drawing on this critique, 
I argue that that using Olympic-related commodities to express and reflect national 
identity is deeply flawed. Consumers are not obliged to be thoughtful about the 
symbolism of consumer goods. The pleasure derived from buying and owning objects 
lies at the core of consumption and consumers often experience pleasure from things that, 
on a superficial level, represent positive Canadian values. On the other hand, Canadian 
citizens concerned with the common good should grapple with difficult and unpleasant 
issues, such as conflicts between Indigenous groups and the government over unresolved 
land claims. Moreover, by applying Somers’ work to a consideration of Olympic 
commodities, I add to Johnson and Cormack’s critiques of consumer citizens. I show that, 
in the context of the Olympics, what is at stake in the convergence of these two identities 
is the status of citizenship in Canada. Specifically, individuals who do not endorse the 
symbolic meanings of Olympic-related commodities are often unable to earn the rights 
and privileges of Canadian citizenship.  
The Gap Between “Idealist Rhetoric” and Reality: 
Commercializing the Olympic Games  
 
One additional socio-economic factor helps explains why branded nationalism was more 
prominent in the 1988 Calgary and 2010 Vancouver Olympics compared to the 1976 
Montreal Olympics. Specifically, the Olympics became more commercialized in the 
1980s. In their book, Selling the Five Rings: the IOC and the Rise of Olympic 
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Commercialism, Bob Barney, Stephen Wenn, and Scott Martyn argue that the IOC 
transformed itself from a sporting body to a commercial organization in the early 1980s. 
During Juan Antonio Samaranch’s term as President of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), from 1980-2001, the IOC took control of the TV rights negotiation 
process from host cities and forged a closer relationship with corporate sponsors.132 
Barney et al. and Alan Tomlinson argue that the 1984 Los Angeles (LA) Summer 
Olympics marked a turning point for the commercialization of the Olympics. Unlike 
previous Games, which for the most part were unprofitable, organizers of the LA Games 
generated a surplus of over $22 million (US) and relied exclusively on private funds to 
fund the Games.133 Gary Whannel argues that, before the LA Games, most countries did 
not want to host the Olympics because the associated costs were too high. However, 
when the 1984 Games showed that one could host the Games without going into 
enormous debt, countries renewed their interest in hosting the Olympics.134  
Barney et al. argue that, more than any other factor, income from broadcast rights, which 
increased significantly in the 1980s, transformed the IOC into a profitable entity.135 TV 
networks pay enormous sums of money to secure the broadcast rights to the Olympics 
because they can make money off ad sales and can promote their own TV shows to a 
large and captive audience.136 Maurice Roche argues that TV influences the nature and 
scale of major sporting events, especially the Olympics, and that TV complements the 
Olympics by adding to their intensity and dramatic appeal.137 Andrew Billings argues that 
broadcasters skew audiences’ perception of the Olympics by creating highly edited and 
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packaged telecasts of events. For example, he found that viewers of NBC’s broadcast of 
the 2006 Torino Winter Olympics estimated that American athletes won approximately 
three times as many medals as were actually won.138 
Tomlinson argues that the overt commercialism of the Games transformed them into a 
celebration of global consumerism rather than of universalism or idealism.139 Similarly, 
Maurice Roche contends that the intrusion of commercialism into the Olympics threatens 
Olympism.140 Olympism, the philosophical framework that underpins the Games, 
maintains that sport helps people co-exist harmoniously and educates young people about 
peace, justice, fair play, mutual understanding, and international friendship.141 However, 
according to Roche, “There have always been...major gaps between the idealist rhetoric 
of Olympism and the realities of international sport culture and political economy,” with 
these gaps widening in the 1980s and 1990s.142 Other scholars argue that the IOC 
constructs and articulates Olympic ideals in order to attract commercial interest in the 
Games. Joseph Maguire et al.’s study of the IOC’s “Celebrate Humanity” campaign is a 
case in point. The ad agency TBWA/Chiat Day developed the Celebrate Humanity 
Campaign, a multi-platform ad campaign celebrating the Olympic Movement’s ideals 
that launched in 2000.143 However, according to Maguire et al., the campaign’s true aim 
was to enhance the brand equity of the Olympics.144 They maintain that, by drawing 
attention away from criticisms leveled at the increasing commercialism of the Olympics, 
the campaign paradoxically made the Olympic brand more attractive to Olympic 
sponsors.145  
Momin Rahman and Sean Lockwood argue that the IOC references the ancient roots of 
the Olympic Games in order to enhance the authenticity of the modern Games. This 
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appearance of authenticity, in turn, allows the IOC to secure “the continued commercial 
and cultural viability of the Games.”146 In other words, the IOC tries to prevent audiences 
from realizing that they are being interpellated as consumers by referencing the origins of 
the Olympics.147  The IOC establishes this link between the contemporary and ancient 
Olympics by emphasizing the amateur status of most athletes.148 However, the Olympic 
ideal of amateurism is tied to class biases and is historically more nuanced than the IOC’s 
account. When the modern Olympic Games were revived in 1896, only the upper classes, 
who had access to private means of income, could afford to participate in sport on an 
amateur basis.149 Additionally, athletes who participated in the ancient Greek Olympics 
often won monetary prizes and were sometimes paid to compete in the Games. Moreover, 
upon completion of ancient Olympic Games, many successful athletes were given 
money.150 
Like Olympic ideals of justice, peace, and international co-operation, the national values 
promoted through Olympics in Canada helped make these Olympics more valuable to 
marketers and sponsors. The Calgary and Vancouver Games inspired Canadians to feel 
national loyalty and pride, and marketers drew on these emotions when they promoted 
products like Petro Canada mugs and HBC mittens. Sporting events are an ideal platform 
for advertisers to promote brands because viewers are often in a heightened emotional 
state when they watch the ads.151 Often, these emotions derive from a sports viewers’ 
strong feelings of national pride. For example, companies who sponsor the FIFA World 
Cup hope that fans will transfer the loyalty they feel for a national team onto their 
brands.152 The fact that the national values celebrated through the Olympics in Canada 
strengthened their commercial value helps explain why branded/corporate nationalism 
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was so prevalent during the Games, and why commodities that represent the nation, like 
the HBC mittens, became so popular.  
Whannel argues that the commercialism of the Olympic Games undermines their 
capacity to engender political protests and activism. He observes that, after 1988, the 
Olympics were no longer associated with political protests and boycotts and, instead, host 
cities hoped to build their global image and earn money by hosting the Olympics.153 
Similarly, Jim McKay contrasts the black power salute of Olympic sprinters Tommie 
Smith and John Carlos at the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympics with basketball 
players Michael Jordan and Charles’ Barkley’s decision to honour their sponsor, Nike, by 
refusing to wear a Reebok jacket during the medal ceremony of the 1992 Barcelona 
Summer Olympics. Jordan and Barkley eventually wore the jacket but hid Reebok’s logo 
by draping themselves in the American flag. McKay writes that a stark difference exists 
“between the defiant fists of Tommie Smith and John Carlos at Mexico City and the loyal 
corporate bodies of Barcelona.”154 Helen Lenskyj argues that the Gay Games, which 
began in 1982 and were intended to be a radical and egalitarian alternative to the 
Olympics, became undermined by commercial interests and came to emulate the profit-
oriented nature of the Olympics.155 
Unlike Wannell, McKay and Lenskyj, I argue that the commercialism of the Olympics in 
Canada has not eclipsed the political dimensions of the Games. Rather, they mutually 
reinforced one another. The example of Indigenous activists using the 2000 Sydney 
Summer Olympics to discuss reconciliation is a case in point. Indigenous groups 
pressured the Australian government to apologize for the mass removal of Indigenous 
children from their family homes by government agencies, a practice that occurred 
between 1910 and 1970. However, the government claimed that the activists would 
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tarnish the nation’s global image if they continued to demand an apology.156 Nike 
released an ad entitled “Sorry” around the same time that activists were demanding an 
apology. It featured Australian Olympians apologizing, ostensibly for being too 
preoccupied with training. However, the ad implied that the apology was actually 
directed at Cathy Freeman, who was the only Indigenous athlete in the ad and the only 
one who did not apologize. Instead, she ran past the camera and asked, “Can we talk 
about this later?”157 Indigenous groups criticized the ad for trivializing the importance of 
reconciliation as a political issue.158 McKay argues that the ad effaced institutionalized 
class and racial barriers that Indigenous peoples face because it only showed successful 
racial minorities. 159 The ad is also an example of a company making statements about, 
and dismissing, a controversial national issue. Like the Australian government’s 
unwillingness to address substantive issues related to reconciliation, the ad suggested that 
an apology to Indigenous peoples (presumably for the mass removal of Indigenous 
children from their families) could wait. 
This dissertation also contributes to scholarship on the commercial dimensions of the 
Olympic Games held in Canada by focusing on the political and social significance of the 
fusion of nationalism and consumption in the Games. Writing on the Montreal Olympics, 
Bruce Kidd, Romain Roult, Sylvain Lefebvre, David Whitson and Donald Macintosh 
consider political controversies linked to the Montreal Games, but do not address the 
relationship between the commercial and political dimension of these Games. Kidd 
argues that the impulse by Montreal Games organizers to “stage grandiose Games and the 
failings it led to were magnified by the clash of nationalisms which preoccupied and 
polarized Canadian society during the period.”160 Moreover, he argues that the Games 
helped ease, but did not eliminate, tensions between French and English Canadians.161 
Romain Roult and Sylvain Lefebvre observe that the Montreal Games are “the perfect 
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model of post-Olympic failure.”162 Organizers did not adequately plan for post-Olympic 
use of the stadium and, as a result, it became underused and unprofitable.163 Additionally, 
David Whitson and Donald Macintosh argue that Montreal incurred so much debt from 
hosting the 1967 World Expo and 1976 Olympics that it was not left with enough money 
to provide adequate social services to citizens.164  
A number of authors contribute valuable insight about the political implications of the 
Olympics in Canada by arguing that organizers of these Games misrepresented 
Indigenous peoples’ cultures and perpetuated long-held stereotypes about them. Christine 
O’Bonsawin, who is the only scholar to compare Indigenous groups’ participation in the 
Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver Games, writes: “Despite varying efforts to incorporate 
Indigenous people and imagery into official Olympic programs, all three organizing 
committees (1976, 1988, 2010) have been heavily criticized for failing to follow a 
respectful process of dialogue and for misappropriating Indigenous cultures.”165 Janice 
Forsyth and Kevin Wamsley argue that Montreal Olympics organizers appropriated 
Indigenous images in order to depict Canada as a multicultural nation.166 Wamsley and 
Mike Heine argue that organizers of the Calgary Games relied on archetypes such as the 
Mountie, the cowboy, and “their symbolic complement, Native people”167 to depict 
Calgary as a stereotypical Western Canadian town. Moreover, they argue that organizers 
involved Indigenous peoples in the planning of the Games in order to divert attention 
from the Lubicon Lake Cree community’s opposition to the Games.168 They write: “The 
advocates for the Games and cultural programs appropriated the discursive power not 
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only to strategically incorporate Native symbols for the purposes of the Games, but also 
to minimize the impact of resistance to the structures of significations produced by such 
incorporation.”169 
O’Bonsawin argues that organizers and sponsors of the Vancouver Olympics 
misappropriated symbols of Indigenous cultures. For example, she criticizes the logo of 
the Vancouver Olympics, an inukshuk (plural: inuksuit), arguing: “Attempts to market 
inuksuit dishonours Inuit cultures as it threatens to taint and avert their original function” 
as directional markers.170 Additionally, the sweaters that the HBC sold at the Vancouver 
Games were imitations of traditional sweaters made by members of the Cowichan First 
Nation on Vancouver Island. The HBC admitted that it considered hiring Cowichan 
knitters, who pass on knitting skills from generation to generation, to make the sweaters 
but hired a professional company instead because of strict production deadlines.171  
I contribute to literature on Indigenous peoples’ involvement in, and opposition to, the 
Olympics in Canada by critically analyzing Olympic commodities using McLintock’s 
work on fetish and Gordon’s theory of ghostly. This approach also adds a new 
perspective on the Games not shown in existing graduate theses on the Vancouver 
Olympics.172 I highlight the role that commodities played in shaping how Indigenous 
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peoples’ cultures were represented in the Olympics and makes explicit the commercial 
practices of the Games to larger political issues related to Indigenous peoples’ rights and 
well-being.  I link the meaning of Olympic commodities to broader political struggles 
over issues like Indigenous groups’ unresolved land claims in British Columbia and 
Alberta. Moreover, by arguing that many Olympic-related commodities are fetish objects, 
I consider how these objects embody ambivalent meanings about Indigenous peoples’ 
cultures and, in so doing, paradoxically celebrate and dishonour Indigenous cultures. 
Finally, I describe how the practice of including symbols of Indigenous cultures in the 
design of Olympic-related commodities originated in the Montreal Olympics.  
Looking and Thinking: Methodology and Terminology  
 
I ground my examination of the Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver Olympics in archival 
material from municipal and provincial archives in Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver. 
After each Olympic Games is completed, the organizing committee gives all Olympic-
related documents to the archives of the host city or province. I collected material on the 
following categories: Olympic mascots and logos; Olympic merchandise; ceremonial and 
cultural elements of the Games; educational initiatives related to the Games; partnerships 
between organizing committees and civic groups; Olympic sponsors; and print and 
broadcast ads. The IOC mandates that select material, including information related to 
corporate sponsorship, remains sealed until 15 years after the completion of the Games, 
so many documents related to the Vancouver Olympics are inaccessible to the public 
until 2025. Moreover, much of the unrestricted material has not been processed yet, so I 
have collected less archival material on the Vancouver Olympics than on the Montreal 
and Calgary Olympics. I rely mostly on documents about Vancouver’s Olympic Bid and 
the anti-Olympic flyers and pamphlets that are housed in the Vancouver municipal 
archives.  
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The archival documents that were most relevant to my research were correspondence 
between organizing committee members, meeting minutes and memos produced by the 
fundraising, marketing, and arts and culture departments of the organizing committees. In 
addition, I consulted a number of publicly available Olympic-related documents. For 
example, I accessed official reports of the Montreal, Calgary and Vancouver Games and 
IOC documents, including marketing reports, that are available for download on-line173 
as well as Olympic ads and the Vancouver Olympic opening ceremony that are posted on 
YouTube. Finally I also used newspaper articles about the Olympics in Canada published 
in The Globe and Mail.  
Julie D’Acci’s circuit of media study guides how I structure, organize, and analyze my 
research material. D’Acci’s circuit modifies Stuart Hall’s Encoding/Decoding model by 
expanding it to contain four (rather than two) interconnected sites of analysis: cultural 
artifact, production, socio-historical context, and reception.174 Each chapter of my thesis 
discusses consumer objects linked to the Olympic Games in Canada, such as souvenirs 
and official coins and stamps. However, by addressing all the sites on the model, I avoid 
narrowly framing my analysis of these commodities. Recognizing that situating artifacts 
within their socio-historical context is just as important as studying the objects 
themselves, I contextualize them within the commercialism of the Olympic Games, the 
educational and cultural elements of the Games, and relevant political events in Canada. 
Moreover, I examine ads, the labour required to produce products and the pleasure some 
Canadians derived from consuming these objects.  
I once attended a history conference where the presenter advised the audience: “look, 
don’t think.” His point was that rigorous scholarship emerges from strong archival 
research. However, I look hard and think hard about my archival material. To this end, 
the archival documents I have collected guide the direction of my project and my 
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theoretical framework, based on fetish and haunting theory, shapes my analysis of this 
material. Paul Rutherford articulates the importance of theory to historians when he 
argues that it “enables the practicing historian to put his work in the broader context of 
culture” and that theory “offers explanations. It serves as a kind of lingua franca to link 
otherwise disparate projects...it can provide a frame which makes all the archival work 
meaningful.”175 Indeed, without haunting and fetish theory, my work would be 
incomplete, as I would be unable to examine the full significance of Olympic 
commodities in relation to citizenship, national identity, consumption, social justice, 
Indigenous rights and collective memory.  
Gordon’s approach to studying ghostly haunting also shapes my analysis of archival 
material. Gordon argues that identifying examples of hauntings draws “attention to a 
whole realm of experiences and social practices that can barely be approached without a 
method attentive to what is elusive, fantastic, contingent, and often barely there.”176 
Similarly, I identify what relevant information is included and missing from the archival 
material. Gordon encourages scholars to reckon with the ghost but, as Rosenberg et al. 
point out, she “does not fully conceptualize what she means by reckoning” and they build 
on Gordon’s work by developing a methodology of “thinking in relation.”177 This 
approach uses juxtaposition to identify how documents and narratives “are haunted by 
what they cannot contain.”178 Instead of simply identifying the “contours and limits”179 of 
narratives, this method considers narratives in relation to relevant but unacknowledged 
events or information. For example, Rosenberg et al. juxtapose the discovery of the 
bodies of three women on the outskirts of Edmonton in 2005 (the same year the 
province’s centenary celebrations took place) with the celebratory narratives of 
Indigenous cultures articulated during the centenary celebrations. This juxtaposition, they 
argue, reveals how the ghosts of colonial sexual violence haunt the centenary 
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celebrations.180  This approach encourages scholars to embrace the complexity and 
ambiguity that emerges when seemingly incompatible pieces of information are 
considered in relation to each other.  
A central focus of this thesis is how narratives about national identity, history, and 
citizenship popularized during the Olympic relate to contemporary social and political 
issues facing Indigenous peoples in Canada. To this end, I draw heavily on scholarship 
about Indigenous peoples’ history and rights in Canada. Taiaiake Alfred, for example, 
shaped my understanding of the meaning of colonialism. He makes the convincing 
argument that the “invasion and eventual domination of North America by European 
empires that we know as colonization is best understood as the culmination of thousands 
of years of differential societal developments under specific environmental 
conditions.”181 For Alfred, colonialism in Canada involves, but is not limited to, actions 
and institutions like the exploitation and appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ land, the 
Indian Residential School system, racism, and the eradication of Indigenous peoples’ 
rights. Alfred emphasizes the fact that Indigenous peoples experience colonialism as 
“causes of harm to them as people and as communities, limitations placed on their 
freedom, and disturbing mentalities, psychologies, and behaviours.”182 Like Alfred, I 
recognize that colonialism has dramatically impacted, and continues to impact, 
Indigenous peoples’ lives in Canada and this project examines a number of specific 
examples of colonialism’s enduring effects on Indigenous communities in the country.   
In keeping with Alfred and others, I use the term “Settlers” to describe the non-
Indigenous people who first arrived in Canada and contemporary non-Indigenous 
Canadians. As Paulette Regan makes clear, the term, “Settler” “refers not only to Euro-
Canadians whose ancestors came to Canada during the colonial period but also to more 
recent immigrants from a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds who are part of 
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[contemporary Canadian] Settler society.”183 I use the term Indigenous peoples rather 
than Aboriginal peoples to describe the original inhabitants of Canada because, as Alfred 
argues, the label “aboriginal” “is a legal and social construction of the state, and it is 
disciplined by racialized violence”184 Additionally, O’Bonsawin uses the term 
“Indigenous” in her work because “it represents an identity that is not geographically or 
socially defined.”185   
Chapter Outline  
 
The chapters in this study address the Olympic Games chronologically, starting with the 
1976 Montreal Summer Olympics and ending with the 2010 Vancouver Winter 
Olympics. I dedicate two chapters to each of the Olympic Games held in Canada. One 
chapter focuses on the economic details of the Games and the regional context in which 
they were held. The other chapter pays greater attention to critical issues related to the 
narratives about national identity and history promoted during the Games.  
Chapter Two examines the programs that helped finance the 1976 Montreal Summer 
Olympic Games. Two of these programs -- the sponsorship, licensing and supplier 
program, and coin and stamp programs -- raised far less money than expected. I identify 
two interrelated factors to explain why sales of Olympic commodities were low. First, the 
Organizing Committee for the Montreal Olympic Games’ (COJO)186self-financing model 
offered Canadians the opportunity to support the Olympics by purchasing commodities. 
However, consumers were not yet familiar with cause-related marketing campaigns. 
Second, COJO could not draw a link between the Games and national pride because 
French and English Canada were divided over linguistic and cultural differences. 
Moreover, I argue that the eventual success of the Olympic lottery had less to do with the 
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Olympics and more to do with the fact that it was the first legal national lottery in 
Canada.  
In Chapter Three, I analyze the symbolic meanings of commodities sold during the 
Montreal Olympics like objects bearing the Games’ emblem, mascot, and 
commemorative coins. I argue that some of these objects represented the idea that the 
Olympics were Quebec’s Games, rather than Canada’s Games. Other objects, like plush 
toys of the mascot and certain coins, represented the history of the fur trade in Canada 
and were haunted by past efforts to assimilate Indigenous peoples into Settler society. By 
applying Gordon and Derrida’s work on haunting to Olympic commodities, I illustrate 
that important information about the nation’s history can be obscured, but not completely 
expunged from public memory. Additionally, I argue that many Olympic commodities 
symbolized irreconcilable ideas about Canada and highlighted, rather than resolved, 
conflicts between English- and French- Canadians. 
Chapter Four discusses city and region branding practices of the 1988 Calgary Winter 
Olympics. I show that these practices overlapped and complemented the oil industry’s 
sponsorship of the Games, arguing that the rise of neo-liberalism and market 
fundamentalism in Canada during the 1980s made this overlap possible. Collectively, the 
city, region, and corporate branding campaigns in the Olympics depicted Calgary and 
Western Canadian cultures as rooted in, but not constrained by, the region’s pioneer 
history and positioned the petroleum industry as central to Alberta’s modern prosperity 
and growth. Many Olympic commodities represented these ideas, but the Cree Lubicon’s 
highly publicized opposition to the Calgary Olympics undermined the coherency of the 
region and corporate branding messages of the Games, thus undermining the intended 
symbolism of Olympic commodities. 
In Chapter Five, I analyze how organizers of the Calgary Olympics used the terms 
“Olympic spirit” and “Canadian spirit” to describe Olympic and Canadian values. I argue 
that the spirit of the Olympics was linked to the contractualization of citizenship because 
Canadians could only share in the spirit if they increased the Games’ commercial value. 
Significantly, buying Olympic commodities was one way in which Canadians could 
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fulfill their contractual obligations as citizens. Anti-Olympic protestors who did not share 
the spirit were excluded from the Games. Despite this exclusion, their protests drew 
attention to the fact that the Lubicon Cree did not have, in Hannah Arendt’s words, the 
“right to have rights.”187 
Chapter Six explores the partnership between the Bid Corporation/Organizing Committee 
of the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games and four First Nations in B.C., known 
collectively as the Four Host First Nations (FHFN). I show that the FHFN played a 
central role in Vancouver’s successful Olympic bid and helped make the Games 
profitable for organizers, the IOC and sponsors. Additionally, the FHFN’s involvement in 
the Olympics was part of a broader set of practices within B.C. aimed at mitigating the 
risk that Indigenous peoples’ land claims would weaken the economy. Ultimately, the 
Games did not leave a positive impact on most Indigenous communities in B.C.  
In Chapter Seven, I identify narratives about national identity and history that were 
promoted in the commercial and non-commercial activities of the Vancouver Olympics. I 
argue that the ideas about Canadian identity represented in the Games obscured the 
history and legacy of colonialism in Canada.188 By contrast, anti-Olympic protests 
brought pressing political and social issues to the fore and made it difficult to ignore the 
colonial practices and policies in Canada’s past. Olympic commodities, I argue, were 
fetish objects that were haunted by the history and legacy of colonialism in Canada. 
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Chapter 2  
Marketing Avery Brundage’s Apoplexy: The 1976 
Montreal Olympics Self-Financing Model  
 
In May 1970, Montreal’s Mayor Jean Drapeau was in Amsterdam bidding against Los 
Angeles and Moscow for the 1976 Summer Olympic Games. Hours before the final vote, 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asked the mayors to provide them with 
financing guarantees. The Americans and Russians quickly obtained funding pledges 
from their federal governments, but Drapeau knew that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
would not do likewise. The federal government had financed much of the 1967 Montreal 
Exposition and many Canadians did not want their tax dollars going to another large-
scale cultural event in Montreal.1 When he addressed the IOC the following day, Drapeau 
said that he did not need to give any financial guarantees because he was staking 
Montreal’s reputation on the Olympics. Moreover, Drapeau promised something that the 
other Mayors had not: he vowed to preserve the amateur nature of the Games and avoid 
extravagant costs.2 This promise impressed the IOC and Montreal won the bid on the 
second round of voting, after Los Angeles was eliminated and all the IOC members who 
voted for Los Angeles transferred their votes to Montreal.3  
Upon returning to Canada, Drapeau faced tough questions from the press about how he 
planned to fund the Olympics. The Organizing Committee for the Montreal Olympic 
Games (COJO)4 designed a self-financing model, which was intended to raise all the 
money required to finance the Olympics through private fund-raising projects. The 
Mayor famously declared that the Olympics could “no more have a deficit than a man 
can have a baby.”5 The Montreal Gazette ran a cartoon by Aislin (Terry Mosher) in 1974 
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in response to Drapeau’s statement that showed a pregnant Mayor calling Dr. 
Morgentaler, a well-known Canadian abortion provider.6 The cartoon was prophetic, as 
COJO’s self-financing model did not raise close to enough money to cover the cost of the 
Games. They ultimately left Montreal and Quebec with a joint debt of approximately $1 
billion.7  
COJO’s self-financing model is an under-studied but significant component of the 
Montreal Olympics. Existing scholarship on the financial dimensions of these Games 
mostly focuses on the enormous costs of building Olympic infrastructure, especially the 
Montreal Olympic stadium.8 Thus, by analyzing COJO’s self-financing model in-depth, I 
address a gap in the academic literature on the Montreal Olympics. I focus on three 
COJO fundraising programs: its sponsorship, licensing and supplier program; the coin 
and stamp programs; and the lottery program. Profits from the sale of Olympic 
commodities fell far below COJO’s expectations while, conversely, the Olympic lottery 
raised far more money than expected. This result is significant considering that later, in 
Calgary and Vancouver, sales of Olympic goods, most notably Petro Canada glassware 
and Hudson’s Bay Company mittens, were unexpectedly high.  
Two interrelated factors influenced sales of Montreal Olympic commodities. First, 
COJO’s self-financing model offered Canadians the opportunity to support the Olympics 
by purchasing commodities. However, consumers were not yet familiar with the idea that 
they could contribute to a social cause through consumption and they did not widely 
embrace this idea. Second, COJO could not draw a link between the Games and national 
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pride because French and English Canada remained divided over linguistic and cultural 
differences. Moreover, I argue that the popularity of the Olympic lottery had less to do 
with the Olympics and more to do with the fact that it was the first legal national lottery 
in Canada. This chapter lays out the foundation for my analysis of the fusion of 
commercialism and nationalism in the Olympics. I show that Olympic commodities only 
became popular symbols of Canadian identity within a particular socio-economic context 
and that the conditions required to create this context were missing in the Montreal 
Olympics. Thus, in this chapter, I identify the absence, rather than presence, of the social 
and economic factors needed to fuse commercialism and nationalism.  
The “Golden Rule:” The Self-Financing Games   
 
After Montreal won the bid to host the 1976 Olympics, Trudeau stood firm on his refusal 
to give the city any direct financial assistance. In 1972, the Liberals were gearing up for a 
federal election and facing low ratings in political polls. Brian McKenna and Susan 
Purcell write that, given the “continued unpopularity of Montreal’s plan to stage the 
Olympics, Trudeau had no choice but to maintain a firm position toward Montreal and 
the financing of the games.”9 The 1972 election left Trudeau’s Liberals with a minority 
government and, in July 1973, he introduced legislation authorizing the Olympic coin and 
stamp programs, along with the Olympic lottery. 10 COJO would receive no direct federal 
funding.  
The City of Montreal was responsible for the construction and installation of Olympic-
related infrastructure, while COJO was responsible for organizing and staging the 
Olympics.11 This division, however, was far from rigid, as Mayor Drapeau sat on 
COJO’s board of directors and handpicked many of its members. These included: Louis 
Chantigny, a sports writer and civil servant in the Quebec provincial government; Pierre 
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M. Charbonneau, a Sun Life insurance executive and the president of the Quebec Sports 
Federation; and Gerry M. Snyder, an entrepreneur and Montreal City Council member.12 
After consulting with the Prime Minister and Ministry of External Affairs, Drapeau asked 
Roger Rousseau, a career diplomat who at the time was serving as the Canadian 
ambassador to Cameroon, to be COJO’s President and Commissioner.13  
Drapeau created the initial budget for the Montreal Games in 1972, estimating the total 
cost would be $310 million.14 The projected revenue from sales of Olympic coins and 
stamps was $250 million and $10 million respectfully, which would cover all 
construction costs.15 Other projected sources of revenue were: the Olympic lottery ($32 
million), ticket sales ($9.5 million), TV rights ($3 million), souvenirs ($2 million), 
brochures, posters, photographs, slides, films and official guides ($1.5 million), the 
Olympic village ($1 million), interest on investment ($1 million), donations ($100, 000), 
and “other expenses” ($800, 000).16 Paul Howell, COJO’s planning advisor, wrote that 
Drapeau presented his budget “far too early for the cost estimates to be reliable, given the 
time and effort required to acquire data and make rigorous computations.”17 Howell 
claims that if he or his colleagues had challenged Drapeau’s numbers, they “would surely 
[have] been seeking other work.”18  
Drapeau’s budget proved wildly inaccurate. In the end, according to the Official Report 
of the Montreal Olympics, COJO’s self-financing model only covered about one third of 
all Olympic costs. The coin program raised about $100 million in profits, “less than half 
the return originally estimated.”19 The stamp program raised approximately $7 million 
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13 COJO, Official Report, 24.  
14 Howell, The Montreal Olympics, 23.  
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compared to the forecasted $10 million.20 In contrast, Drapeau’s initial estimate of $32 
million for the lottery was too cautious, which in fact, raised $235 million. Other sources 
of income were: $32 million in TV rights, $27 million in admission ticket sales, $9 
million in interest on investments, $9 million from the revenue division, which included 
COJO’s official sponsorship, licensing and supplier program, $2 million from athletes’ 
accommodation and $1 million in program sales.21 Even with the unexpected surplus 
from lottery revenue, the Montreal Olympics ultimately left Quebec with close to $1 
billion of debt.22 Montreal gave $8 million to cover the cost of the Olympics and took on 
$200 million in debt. The Quebec government gave $25 million to the Games and took 
on $790 million in debt. The province instituted a special tax on tobacco products and 
used the proceeds from this tax, as well as from the Olympic lottery, which the Canadian 
parliament extended until 1979, to help repay this debt.23 Quebec only settled all its 
outstanding Olympic debt in 2006.24  
Rousseau described self-financing as “the Golden Rule of the Olympic Games of 
1976.”25 Moreover, the guidebook COJO provided to Olympic hostesses and guides, 
which contained information they had to memorize and were tested on, stated: the “great 
innovation that characterizes the organization of the 1976 Olympic Games is the self-
financing project that COJO established in collaboration with the federal, provincial, and 
municipal governments.”26 COJO’s sponsorship, licensing and supplier program was a 
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key part of its self-financing program. In his 1973 marketing plan, Alfred Warkentin 
proposed that “everything and anything is potentially sponsorable. We should, on this 
basis, be theoretically able to obtain a supplier or sponsor for all the goods, services and 
facilities required at the 1976 Olympics.”27  
Neil Asselin, COJO’s Director-General of Marketing, celebrated the fact that COJO’s 
sponsorship, licensing and supplier program was pushing the Olympics in a more 
commercial direction: “We’re breaking new ground in areas of financing the Games. 
Traditionally the approach has been very amateur. Commercialism was not encouraged. 
Governments put up most of the money. But there’s a realization now that there are other 
ways to finance them.”28 It is ironic that Asselin depicted amateurism, a value the IOC 
has consistently and proudly associated with Olympic athletes, as antiquated. 
Commenting on COJO’s sponsorship and marketing program, journalist Jim Kearney 
wrote: “It’s a good thing [former IOC President, Avery] Brundage, the last of the 
unreconstructed amateurs, has retired. The way Montreal is going, even Avery’s 
apoplexy would have wound up being copyrighted. And marketed.”29 Bruce Kidd 
supports this view when he writes: “COJO’s innovative approach to sponsorships paved 
the way for the heady commercialization of the 1980s.”30 Julian Boykoff concurs, writing 
that “Montreal should be viewed as a key step toward the corporate commercialization of 
the Games.”31  
The ambitious nature of COJO’s sponsorship and licensing program is evident in its 
impact on the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games. Their marketing division 
developed an official sponsor and licensing program modeled on COJO’s program. 
According to a report by the division, “one of the most productive sources of 
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information” on licensing came from COJO.32 However, few companies were interested 
in affiliating themselves with the Edmonton Commonwealth Games and organizers were 
unable to match the scale of COJO’s marketing program. One Commonwealth Games 
report noted: the Olympics “have had the effect of reducing the stature of the 
Commonwealth Games by the inevitable comparisons that are made.”33 
In July 1973, the federal government passed the Olympic Act (1976), establishing the 
Olympic stamp and coin programs and the Olympic lottery. That same year, Canada Post 
launched its fund-raising program, concentrating on four areas: Olympic action stamps, 
stamp sculptures, commemorative stamps, and stamp souvenirs.34 It added a surcharge to 
the cost of action stamps, the first time in history it added such a charge, and issued one 
series of action stamps every year for four years.35 The first series bore the emblem of the 
Montreal Games and subsequent series depicted Olympic water sports, body-contact 
sports and team sports. Also available for sale were eight series of commemorative 
stamps but, unlike the action stamps, these ones did not come with a surcharge. 
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Figure 4: Montreal Olympics action stamps, COJO, Official Report, 69-72. 
 
The Royal Canadian Mint issued seven series of commemorative coins between 1973 and 
1976, adding a surcharge to the face value of each coin. Every series contained two coins 
with a face value of $10 and two with a face value of $5.36 Each series was based on one 
of the following themes: geography, Olympic symbols, early Canadian sports, track and 
field sports, water sports, team and body-contact sports and Olympic souvenirs.37 In 
addition, Ottawa granted the Mint the authority to issue a gold coin with a $100 face 
value.38 Individuals could purchase the coins and related commodities at chartered banks, 
financial institutions, post offices, coin dealers, and major department stores.39 
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Figure 5: Montreal Olympics coins, COJO, Official Report, 69-70.  
 
The Olympic lottery was the most profitable part of its self-financing program. When 
compared to the initial estimate of $32 million, the lottery’s ultimate net profit of $235 
56 
million marks a 750% increase in expected vs. received profit.40 “Returns were so high,” 
the Official Report concluded, “that the Olympic lottery became the keystone of the 
overall financing scheme.”41 The Olympic Lottery Corporation, a federally chartered 
corporation, held nine draws between April 1974 and August 1976. 42 The price per ticket 
was $10 and winners received $1 million.43 Participating provinces, which had to 
formally agree to operate the lottery, received 50 cents on every ticket sold in their 
province. In total, provinces received more than $25 million, which they used to fund 
amateur sport.44 Quebec was permitted to use its share of the lottery proceeds to pay for 
Olympic-related construction, but COJO was not permitted to transfer its lottery earnings 
to the city to help pay construction costs.45  
“Help It Happen:” Self-Financing and Consumption   
 
COJO believed, unrealistically, that its self-financing model would entirely eliminate its 
dependence on public funding. It hoped to replace its reliance on Canadians’ tax dollars 
with their consumer dollars and framed consuming Olympic-related goods as a way for 
individuals to contribute to a charitable cause. The official report noted that the self-
financing model allowed Canadians to “make voluntary contributions toward the cost of 
organizing the Games.”46 The writers of COJO’s 1973 marketing plan observed: “In 
conversation with several persons it has been suggested to us that we should not neglect 
the probability of individuals contributing to the success of the Olympic Games much the 
way they would contribute to a charity of their choice.”47 That same year, Drapeau wrote 
a letter to Trudeau, anticipating that COJO’s self-financing program would offset its need 
for federal funding: “the self-financing formulas and programs and programs already 
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presented to the federal government’s analysts...permit us to state that the City of 
Montreal will not have to ask the federal government to contribute to the Olympic Games 
out of federal funds.”48 
In addition, Drapeau believed that the income from sales of coins and stamps would raise 
enough money to cover the entire cost of constructing Olympic infrastructure, thus 
eliminating the need for public funding. He was of course incorrect, as revenues proved 
far lower than construction costs.49 Yet this belief contributed to the fetishization of the 
stamps and coins. Sut Jhally argues that “to make a fetish out of something is to invest it 
with powers that it doesn’t have.”50 Moreover, Russell Belk argues that many 
commodities, including collector objects (like coins and stamps) “are invested with 
special meanings that remove them and set them apart from the everyday items thought to 
typify marketplace exchanges.”51 In the case of the Olympic coins and stamps, COJO 
invested them with a special meaning and power: the ability to make the Olympic Games 
possible or, in Canada Post’s words, to “help it happen.”  
COJO, Canada Post and the Mint consistently promoted this message about Olympic 
stamps and coins. Canada Post used the theme of civic participation in its Olympic stamp 
marketing campaign. It ran ads in all major Canadian newspapers and magazines and 
aired ads on TV and radio using the theme: “Make it Happen.”52 Companies publicized 
their support of the Olympics by buying special postal meters that stamped envelopes 
with the Games emblem and the slogan, “We Help It Happen,” or, “Official Supplier of 
the 1976 Olympic Games.” The Postmaster General argued that purchasing Olympic 
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action stamps “allows every citizen to participate, on a purely voluntary basis, in 
defraying the total cost of the Games.”53 A pamphlet issued by Canada Post about the 
action stamps echoed this sentiment, noting: “The purpose of the surcharge [on the 
stamps] is to give the public a convenient opportunity to support the Games on a 
voluntary and personal basis.”54 Asselin discussed the coin program in similar terms. He 
argued: “The Olympic Coin Program has been conceived as a means of encouraging 
international and individual participation in the financing of the Olympic Games.”55 
 
Figure 6: Montreal Olympics postal meters, Canadian Design Resource website 
http://www.canadiandesignresource.ca/olympics/1976-olympic-postal-meter/. 
 
COJO also fetishized the coins and stamps by obscuring an important fact: it depended on 
the profits from its self-financing program to replace direct federal funding of the 
Olympics. To be clear, COJO did not obscure the fact that it needed these profits. Rather, 
it obscured the reason why it needed the money – it was not receiving direct funding from 
the federal government and hoped that income from consumer purchases of coins and 
stamps would replace this funding. Two letters that Rousseau and Drapeau wrote to 
Trudeau in February 1973 show their reliance on the coin and stamp programs. Both 
politicians wrote to the Prime Minister guaranteeing that COJO would not need money 
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from the federal government provided it received all the net profits from the sale of coins 
and stamps.56 Rousseau wrote:  
Provided that the federal government agrees to remit to COJO the net 
proceeds of the sale of special Olympic coins and stamps, the COJO also 
agrees that the federal government will not be called upon to make any 
special contribution towards the payment of any or all expenses incurred 
in connection with the Olympic Games of 1976.57 
Drapeau used almost identical language in his letter to Trudeau58 and the Prime 
Minister’s refusal to give any direct financial support to COJO meant that the main 
responsibility of funding the Olympics was shifted from federal taxpayers to Quebec 
taxpayers. (Montreal municipal taxes and provincial taxes helped pay the Olympic debt.) 
However, COJO’s coin and stamp programs, along with COJO’s other fundraising 
projects, helped reduce the money taxpayers had to contribute to the Olympics. 
Approximately $369 million from consumers, along with $1 billion from Quebec 
taxpayers, helped fund the Games. 59  
COJO’s efforts to minimize its reliance on public funding foreshadowed the reliance on 
consumers’ dollars to fund social causes and public services in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
However, in the early and mid 1970s, Canadians were unfamiliar with the idea that they 
could support a cause (the Olympics) by collecting stamps and coins. Although many 
foreign governments have imposed surcharges on stamps to fund charitable causes, the 
Olympic Action Stamps were the first stamps in Canada to have such a charge.60 The 
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first postage stamp in the U.S. to raise funds for charity was a stamp for breast cancer 
research. First Lady Hillary Clinton unveiled the stamp on July 29, 1998 and, by June 
2005, revenues had reached $45.6 million.61 As Samantha King observes, American 
politicians argued that the Stamp Out Breast Cancer Act (the legislation that made the 
stamp possible) opened up “new ethical and political possibilities for the buying of a 
stamp, for what was previously conceived as a straightforward act of consumption.”62 
King’s research on strategic philanthropy (discussed in Chapter 1) reveals that, by the 
time the breast cancer stamp was unveiled, corporate social responsibility campaigns 
were widespread in the U.S. Unlike the Montreal Olympics, the breast cancer cause was 
one of the most popular causes championed by companies. Corporations, ranging from 
BMW to KitchenAid, created cause-related marketing campaigns to raise money for the 
Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation; and marketing experts described breast 
cancer as a “dream cause.”63 
Avid coin collectors are not, in general, motivated to purchase coins out of a sense of 
national loyalty or social consciousness. Their top reasons for collecting are: to become 
an active part of the coin collecting community; to enhance their social standing and self-
image within this community; and to make sound financial investments.64 The Royal 
Canadian Mint could have addressed consumers’ reticence through clever marketing 
campaigns. However, the Mint had little experience with marketing coins to consumers, 
as seen in a 1982 meeting between Mint officials and organizers of the 1988 Calgary 
Olympics: 
When the Montreal Olympic Coin Program was initiated in 1971, there 
was no formal marketing structure in place; the Mint was a manufacturing 
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organization. A Vice President Marketing by the name of Garth McKye 
(now VP Marketing for VIA Rail) was installed, but not in time to change 
the Mint’s focus. The Montreal coins were ‘marketed on a crash basis 
through bad distribution.’ 65 
At this meeting, Mint representatives identified key mistakes they made with the 
Montreal program: “The coins were advertised as an investment rather than a 
commemorative collectable, they were manufactured according to the numbers legally 
authorized rather than to demand, and the Mint realizes there were far too many multiples 
made available.”66 In this meeting, Mint officials also revealed that its overproduction of 
Olympic coins had damaged its reputation and that it took the Mint at least two years 
after the 1976 Games to regain its credibility in the international coin market. This 
program also caused a global decline in interest for Olympic coins.67 
The findings of a 1974 consumer survey reveals that few individuals who purchased 
Series Two of Olympic coins did so to support the Montreal Olympics. A survey showed 
that only 21% of purchasers of a prestige set did so to support the Olympic Games. The 
most cited reason for buying coins was to build a coin collection. For consumers who did 
not buy a complete set, only 15% said that they had purchased the coins to support the 
Olympic Games; the most cited reason for purchasing the coins was to keep them as 
souvenirs.68  
The coin program suffered from two additional problems: inflation and labour unrest. 
Howell writes: “the oil crisis of 1973, half-hearted management of labour in Quebec, and 
the beginning of burgeoning inflation all increased [Olympic related] costs and reduced 
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scheduling options.”69 In 1973, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) implemented an oil embargo in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict. That same 
year, Canada experienced a dramatic rise in inflation, which boosted the price of many 
goods, including the steel used in the construction of Olympic facilities and the price of 
silver used to make the coins.70 Writing in 1975, Austin Page, the Director General of the 
Olympic Coin Program, argued that weak sales of Series Two coins were due, in part, to 
“the change in attitude of investors who were buying when the price of silver was rising 
but who have stopped buying as the price of silver stabilized [at a high price].”71 In 
January 1975, the Marketing Advisory Committee on the Olympic Coin Program reduced 
the number of Olympic silver coins the Mint produced by one third because sales were 
lower than expected. It revised forecasted sales of the coins downward from $250 million 
to $175 million, but even this forecast was optimistic as the coins would ultimately earn 
less than $100 million in profit.72  
In 1974, labour disputes between the government and unions representing construction 
workers stalled work on various Olympic sites.73 Union leaders were in a powerful 
position because work stoppages could delay construction of buildings that had to be 
ready by fixed deadlines.74 Unions used work disruptions to press their demands and the 
city compensated for lost time caused by these disruptions by increasing construction 
work to 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The official report notes that the cost of 
maintaining ceaseless labour was crippling: “overtime, the cost of heating sections of the 
site during the bitter Canadian winters, extended equipment rentals and the consequent 
effects on subcontractors, all pushed COJO's construction expenditure to record 
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heights.”75 In addition, workers at the Royal Canadian Mint went on strike in January 
1975, which delayed the release of the third series of Olympic coins. They wanted higher 
salaries and a provision that employees in Winnipeg receive the same benefits as those in 
Ontario and Quebec.76 In late January 1975, striking employees on Parliament Hill 
burned effigies of Treasury Board Chairman Jean Chrétien and Chief Administrator of 
the Royal Canadian Mint Geoffrey Ferguson.77 The strike lasted seven weeks and was 
only settled in March 1975.78 
“Quebec’s Olympics:” French Canadian Identity  
 
Richard Gareau, COJO’s director of licensing and legal affairs, argued that Olympic 
promotion and publicity must serve two roles. First, it must convince “Canada that our 
Games are a truly Canadian event.”79 Second, COJO must channel its energies “into the 
prime objective of translating the value of these Games into dollars.” 80 COJO was 
unable to achieve either of these goals because most Canadians viewed the Olympics as a 
regional project, not a national one. Howell writes: “When Montreal made its winning 
bid...it was clear to Canadians that the Montreal Games would be the Quebec Games.”81 
Ross MacNab, a Canadian who participated in the International Youth Camp, a program 
that brought Canadian and international youth together to experience the Olympics, 
echoed Howell’s sentiment. He wrote: “It appeared that it was not Canada’s Olympics, 
but Quebec’s Olympics.”82 Moreover, Drapeau viewed the Montreal Olympics as an 
opportunity to showcase the strength of French-Canadian culture. Discussing his plans 
for the Olympic Stadium, the Mayor said: “As French Canadians....the only way we’re 
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going to survive is to make our mark not only in this country, but on the entire continent. 
We must never be poor copies of others.”83 Bruce Kidd writes that Drapeau wanted to 
host the Games in order to dramatize “the will of French Canada to survive in the face of 
two centuries of English-Canadian attempts at assimilation.”84  
The Montreal Games were held after a series of dramatic events in Quebec. During the 
1960s, the province underwent a period of political and social modernization known as 
the “Quiet Revolution.”85 On June 22, 1960, the Liberals, led by Jean Lesage, won the 
provincial election. They replaced the socially conservative Union Nationale government, 
which had been in power from 1944 to 1960 and was led by Maurice Duplessis until his 
death in 1959.86 Under Lesage’s leadership, the power and influence of the Catholic 
Church in Quebec diminished and many Quebeckers moved from rural to urban areas. 87 
The major goals of the Quiet Revolution were to politically modernize the province, 
create new social and political opportunities for francophones, and give them control over 
the province’s economy. Quebeckers began to view Quebec as a national state that could 
spearhead the changes needed to achieve these goals.88 Under Lesage’s leadership, the 
Quebec legislature became increasingly involved in the administration of social services, 
including education and healthcare. Many Quebeckers supported this move, believing 
that the province should take over the development, administration, and funding of every 
key element of the Quebec society including its economy, education system, social 
welfare programs, and healthcare provision.89 In 1963, Lesage opposed Prime Minister 
Lester B. Pearson’s efforts to introduce a national pension plan. Lesage insisted that 
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Quebec develop a plan that was separate from, but compatible with, the federal pension 
plan.90 Pearson eventually acquiesced to Lesage’s demands and when Pearson left office 
in 1968 he was said to be “worn out by the demands of office and unsatisfied by his 
inability to strike a new balance within Canada between Canada and Quebec.”91  
The Quiet Revolution also led to changes aimed at addressing the income disparity 
between English and French Canadians. Beginning in the 1940s, French-Canadian 
authors like Gabrielle Roy and Roger Lemelin published novels depicting Montreal as a 
city divided into wealthy anglophone and poor francophone neighbourhoods. These 
anglophones lived in luxurious areas with paid servants, while disadvantaged 
francophones lived in slums and struggled to earn enough money to improve their living 
conditions.92 Sean Mills writes: “It was in Montreal, with scarcity and wealth inscribed 
upon the very geography of the city, that many French Canadians came to realize the 
extent of the cultural and material oppression they faced.”93 The dominance of English in 
professional environments was a major factor in the income disparity between 
anglophones and francophones. The finding of the federal government’s 1969 Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism highlighted such disparities.94 In 1961, 
56% of Montreal’s highest paid workers were anglophones, even though they comprised 
only 24% of the workforce. Although francophones made up the majority of Quebec’s 
population, they only controlled 20% of Quebec’s economy. Additionally, the infant 
mortality rate for low-income French speakers was higher than the overall rate in 
Canada.95 These findings illustrated that the linguistic and class disparities between 
French and English Canadians were interrelated and lay at the heart of francophones’ 
dissatisfaction.96  
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Many Quebeckers worried they would be forced to assimilate into English Canada and 
lose their distinct language and culture. Some began calling for the creation of a separate 
Quebec state.97 The nationalist movement in Quebec developed rapidly, seen first with 
the establishment in 1967 of a separatist party, the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association, 
led by René Lévesque.98 Quebeckers began organizing demonstrations around French-
language rights. For example, in 1969, students organized public demonstrations in 
opposition to the destruction of a computer centre at Sir George Williams University in 
Montreal. The Front de Libération du Québéc (FLQ), a militant Quebec separatist group 
began small-scale bombing campaigns in 1963 and, in the summer of 1970, nine 
members of the group held a meeting to discuss the possibility of escalating their 
campaign.99  
On October 5th, 1970, a group calling themselves the Liberation Cell of the FLQ 
kidnapped James Richard Cross, a British diplomat living in Montreal.100 In exchange for 
Cross’ release, the FLQ issued a list of demands, which included the release of political 
prisoners, rehiring postal workers that were laid off, and money and a piloted plane to 
Cuba or Algeria.101 The FLQ’s manifesto opposed the colonial and capitalistic elements 
of Quebec society, stating: “The Front de Liberation du Quebec wants the total 
independence of Quebeckers, united in a free society, purged forever of the clique of 
voracious sharks, the patronizing ‘big bosses’ and their henchmen who have made 
Quebec their hunting preserve for ‘cheap labour’ and unscrupulous exploitation.”102 On 
October 8th, a Radio-Canada announcer read the manifesto on-air and newspapers 
published it the next day.103 After hearing the manifesto, many Quebeckers supported the 
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ideas it expressed, but most condemned the FLQ’s violence.104 More than fifty per cent 
of callers to radio talk shows in Quebec endorsed the spirit of the FLQ’s manifesto.105 
On October 10th, the Chenier Cell of the FLQ kidnapped Pierre Laporte, a Quebec 
cabinet minister. As the crisis dragged on, support for the FLQ grew. Eight hundred 
Université du Québéc à Montréal students went on strike, hoping to pressure the 
government to negotiate seriously with the FLQ.106 Moreover, the situation drew 
attention to the issue of Quebec’s independence from Canada. When the Premier of 
Ontario commented on the FLQ crisis, sixteen influential Quebeckers issued a joint 
statement opposing the Premier’s comments, insisting that the kidnappings were an 
internal issue that “could only be resolved in Quebec, by Québécois.”107 On October 15th, 
eight thousand Canadian troops entered Montreal and, the following day, Prime Minister 
Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act.108 The act authorized the government to 
conduct searches and seizures without warrants, to arrest and detain individuals without 
charge for twenty-one days and to retroactively declare that the FLQ was an illegal 
organization.109 The majority of Canadians supported Trudeau’s decision to invoke the 
War Measures Act, but the act has subsequently been criticized for allowing the state to 
violate civil liberties.110 On October 17, news emerged that Pierre Laporte had been 
killed. Later, on December 3rd, approximately one thousand police and soldiers 
surrounded an apartment in Montreal North where Cross was being held and successfully 
negotiated his release by promising FLQ Liberation cell members safe passage to 
Cuba.111 The army left Montreal on January 4, 1971, and the government repealed the 
War Measures Act in April of that year.  
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This tumultuous recent past was reflected in COJO’s plan for the Olympic torch relay. 
The Olympic flame was transferred from Athens to Ottawa via an electronic signal on 
July 15th 1976.112 COJO initially considered lighting the flame at the tip of Gaspé and re-
tracing Jacques Cartier’s travels but reconsidered this plan. The torch relay of the 1968 
Mexico City Olympics, which retraced Christopher Columbus’ steps, “only served to 
reanimate long subdued ethno-cultural tensions” in Mexico113 and COJO did not want a 
similar situation to happen in Canada.114 When COJO planned the flame’s path from 
Ottawa to Montreal, it made sure that the flame stayed in Ontario for the longest time 
possible before crossing over into Quebec. Daniel Latouche writes that the federal 
authorities’ reaction to the idea of a Quebec-only torch relay “bordered on hysteria” 
because it brought up the memory of French President Charles De Gaulle’s 1967 visit to 
Quebec, when he declared “vive le Québec libre.” The President travelled across Quebec 
and, when he arrived in Montreal, delivered a speech declaring his support for the 
Quebec sovereignty movement.115  
Kidd recounts that organizers of the arts and culture program of the Montreal Games 
“had to contend with the politics of culture.”116 The Canada Council for the Arts  agreed 
to sponsor a set of Olympic posters, which would be distributed to schools, sports, clubs 
and libraries in Canada and abroad, but insisted that they contain the heading “Canada” 
rather than “Montreal.”117 The politics of culture also influenced Canadians’ perception 
of the Games. Gay Kirpatrick, a Torontonian, wrote a letter to the editor of the Globe and 
Mail complaining about the dominance of French in the Games’ opening ceremony:  
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Pierre Trudeau’s dream of a bilingual Canada is quite obviously going to 
be turned into a nightmare by the unilingual Québécois. I attended the 
opening ceremonies of Canada’s Olympics on July 17...and was simply 
astonished to hear each initial announcement in French, followed by an 
English translation. And to add fuel to the fire, the large electronic 
signboards flashed each country’s name during the walk-past, in French 
only.118 
In response to Kirpatrick’s letter, Peter Fletcher, writing from a suburb of Toronto, 
observed:    “Surely Mr. Kirpatrick is aware of the fact that French is the official 
language of the Province of Quebec....with the opinion of many Canadians that these 
Games were Quebec’s and not Canada’s, it is surprising to see that with the opening 
ceremonies [sic] on Saturday the Olympics are suddenly ‘ours’.”119  
During the Olympics, Canadians were most united during the high jump final when a 
Canadian, Greg Joy, competed against an American, Dwight Stones. Stones had 
previously offended Canadians by stating that he detested French Canadians because 
“they screwed up the whole Olympics.”120 This statement infuriated many Canadians and 
at the high jump final, they loudly booed Stones and enthusiastically cheered Joy. Joy 
won a silver medal, beating Stones who won the bronze medal.121 However, this small 
show of unity occurred on the second last day of the Games. Earlier, a spokesperson for 
COJO complained that Canadians were “getting out-cheered” and that the “Americans 
are wiping us out.”122 Lawrence Martin observed in the Globe and Mail that hardly any 
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Canadians at the Games brought flags to wave, lamenting that, although many souvenirs 
were sold at the Games, “Nobody came up with an idea for [selling] a flag.”123  
A “Voluntary Means of Public Participation:” The Olympic 
Lottery  
 
COJO viewed the lottery as another way to privately fundraise for the Olympics, writing 
that the lottery “was conceived as a voluntary means of public participation” in the 
Games.124 Indeed, the lottery was COJO’s most successful fundraising endeavour, 
ultimately raising $235 million to fund the Games. The results of the lottery draws were 
broadcast live on national television, which drew high ratings. A Nielsen TV Index 
Measurement found that the televised Olympic lottery draw on September 28, 1975 
attracted the largest number of CTV Television Network (CTV) viewers in that month 
and the third largest number of Télévision Associée (TVA) viewers.125 (The average 
network audience for the show was 3,485,000 on CTV and 1,803,000 on TVA.) 126 
However, there is no evidence that the lottery’s popularity was due to its association with 
the Montreal Games. Rather, it was the first national lottery scheme in Canada and it 
played an important role in integrating popular gambling practices into Canadian society 
and changing gambling from a criminal to a legal activity.127 
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Figure 7: Keychain of the Montreal Olympics lottery ticket for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
 
Beginning in the 1960s, Quebec politicians had pressured the federal government to 
legalize lotteries because the province needed money to fund the 1967 Montreal World’s 
Fair and later the Montreal Olympics.128 The federal government was sensitive to 
Quebec’s wishes in the wake of the Quiet Revolution and the Quebec separatist 
movement; so in May 1969 the Liberals passed an omnibus bill, which legalized 
gambling along with socially controversial practices like divorce, abortion, and the use of 
contraception.129 The omnibus bill gave federal and provincial governments the authority 
to manage and conduct “lottery schemes” and it allowed provinces to grant gambling 
licenses to charitable and religious organizations.130  
Through the Olympic lottery, COJO pioneered a practice that became increasingly 
popular in Canada after 1976: governments’ use of gambling proceeds to supplement 
income from taxation. In 1985, the Criminal Code of Canada was amended to give 
provinces exclusive control over gambling.131 Campbell argues that provinces now 
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depend heavily on revenues from gambling: “the Canadian public’s expectations of 
government services – alongside a corresponding disdain for increased taxes – have made 
lotteries and other forms of gambling an attractive alternate form of government 
revenue.”132According to Statistics Canada, in 2005, government-run gambling practices 
generated a net profit of $7.1 billion.133 Gambling constitutes 3.8% of provinces’ 
revenues.134 To be clear, the Montreal Olympic lottery is not analogous to post-1985 
gambling programs. While COJO relied on lotteries to raise money, provincial 
governments earn most of their money from electronic gambling machines like video 
lottery terminals (VLT) and casinos. This difference is significant because individuals 
who play lotteries and raffles have a lower chance of becoming addicted to gambling than 
those who gamble on VLTs and other electronic devices.135  
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I provided detailed information about COJO’s self-financing program. I 
showed that Olympic organizers, politicians, marketers, and consumers were not isolated 
actors operating independently of each other. Rather, their combined efforts can blur the 
line dividing the commercial and national dimensions of the Olympics and help invest 
consumption practices with symbolic meanings linked to national pride and civic 
engagement. However, the political, economic and socio-cultural conditions were not in 
place at the time of the Montreal Olympics to facilitate such a co-operation. A neo-liberal 
economic model that privileged private over public contributions to social endeavors was 
not yet established and Canada was divided over French Canadians’ wish for more 
cultural and political autonomy.  
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Chapter 3  
Haunted Beavers: The 1976 Montreal Olympics, French-
Canadian Identity, and the Fur Trade   
 
Official Olympic hostesses and guides who greeted visitors to the 1976 Montreal 
Olympics were trained to answer questions about the Olympics, Quebec, and Canada. As 
part of their preparation, they were given a handbook and quizzed on the material in it. 
One group of questions reveal that the Organizing Committee for the Montreal Olympic 
Games (COJO) emphasized Quebec’s unique position within Canada. Hostesses and 
guides were asked: “If we consider Quebec in relation to the rest of Canada, one can 
observe that it has unique qualities, can you list one?”; “In what year was French 
proclaimed the official language in Quebec and by whom?;” and “Quebec is a region rich 
in arts, name a Québécois artist you know that is a top Canadian artist and describe their 
form of art.”1 The hostesses wore pins containing the Montreal Games’ emblems on their 
lapels and Olympic commodities were all marked with the same emblem. This chapter 
examines the symbolism of the Games’ emblem and related commodities, showing that, 
like the hostesses and guides handbook, the emblem emphasized the idea that French 
Canadian identity was distinct from English Canadian identity. In fact the emblem and, 
by extension, commodities bearing the emblem, represented Montreal’s identity and 
helped convey the idea that the Olympics were Quebec’s Games, rather than Canada’s 
Games. 
The Olympic handbook also contained information about the mascot of the Games, a 
beaver named Amik. It noted that the beaver “occupies a distinctive place in Canadian 
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history” and that the mascot’s name means beaver in the Algonquin language.2 Amik was 
turned into numerous commodities, including stuffed animals and key chains. Thus, the 
mascot symbolized ideas about collective national identity, such as the importance of the 
fur trade to the Canadian economy in the 17th and 18th centuries, rather than focusing 
exclusively on French Canadian identity. However, because most commodities of the 
mascot contained the Montreal Olympics’ emblem, the idea that the mascot represented a 
shared Canadian identity was contradicted by the emblem’s emphasis on the 
distinctiveness of Québécois culture in relation to the rest of Canada. Thus, the mascot 
commodities symbolized irreconcilable ideas about Canada and highlighted, rather than 
resolved, conflicts between English- and French- Canadians.  
The mascot commodities, along with two Olympic coins that showed a canoeist and 
lacrosse players, represented a third less obvious idea about national identity: historically, 
Settler Canadians have relied on, and at times appropriated, Indigenous peoples’ 
knowledge and cultures to further their nation-building enterprise.  Knowledge of 
historical facts, such as the indispensible role that Indigenous peoples played in 
facilitating the fur trade, the history of European assimilation in Canada, and Settler 
Canadians’ adaptation of Indigenous games like bagataway or tewaarathon to create a 
unified Settler Canadian identity, haunted mascot and coin commodities. By haunting, I 
mean that these ideas were not explicitly articulated or associated with the commodities; 
equally importantly, however, the ideas were inextricably linked to the commodities. I 
rely on Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida’s conceptualization of haunting to buttress my 
analysis of representations of Indigenous peoples in the Games. Rather than simply 
identifying how Indigenous peoples were stereotyped or excluded from the Games, I use 
haunting theory to show how knowledge about Indigenous peoples’ cultures, that were 
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formally excluded from official narratives, were not completely erased. Rather, the 
absence of this information was a presence itself: a “seething absence.”3 Put another way, 
haunting theory draws attention to the fact that important information about the nation’s 
history can be obscured, but not completely expunged from public memory. 
My analysis of the symbolic significance of Olympic commodities contributes to existing 
literature on the relationship between commercialism and Canadian identity. This chapter 
complicates Catherine Carstairs’ argument that one reason why branded nationalism 
became prominent after 1980 is that events like the 1990 Oka-Mohawk Crisis, and the 
1995 Quebec referendum fragmented Canadians’ sense of national identity. 4 Some 
brands, like Roots, Tim Hortons, and Molson Canadian, capitalized on this fragmentation 
to fill a need within the nation and link ideas about national pride and unity to the 
consumption of everyday consumer goods like clothing, coffee and beer. Montreal 
Olympic organizers, however, were not able to capitalize on the fragmentation of national 
identity. Quite the opposite: commodities bearing the Montreal Games emblem and the 
mascot served as a reminder that Canadians were far from being united. Thus, these 
commodities are notable for their failure: unlike commodities like Roots clothing and 
Molson Canadian beer, the commodities of the emblem were unpopular and not 
embraced by consumers. Moreover, in contrast to commodities linked to the Calgary and 
Vancouver Olympics, the commodities of Amik, the Montreal Olympics mascot, did not 
help resolve a crisis in the meaning of Canadian identity.  Rather, they reflected the 
existence of this crisis by symbolizing the reality that, although they had a shared 
relationship to the land, French and English Canadians had more cultural differences than 
similarities. 
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As noted in Chapter One, most scholarship on the relationship between Canadian identity 
and commercialism focuses on the link between branding and national identity.5 A 
central focus in this literature is how Canadian companies like Roots, Molson Canadian, 
and Tim Hortons have successfully aligned their brand meanings with national identity 
and pride. This focus on marketing and brand identity, I argue, overlooks the importance 
of the symbolic meaning of commodities. In contrast, my analysis of Montreal Olympic 
commodities demonstrates how rich insights into the relationship between Canadian 
identity and commercialism are revealed when attention is paid to the design of 
commodities. The Olympic mascot commodities and canoe and lacrosse coins illustrate 
how recent and historical injustices facing Indigenous peoples haunt consumer objects. In 
other words, the symbolism of these commodities influences the ways in which Settlers 
remember the past. Thus, by applying the concept of ghostly hauntings to the meanings 
of Montreal Olympic commodities, I highlight ideas that were obscured but not 
completely invisible in the Montreal Games.  
Applying haunting theory to Montreal Olympic commodities also illustrates how these 
goods are not distinct from the cultural elements of the Olympics, such as the opening 
and closing ceremonies. Like these cultural events, Olympic commodities represent 
selective ideas about Indigenous peoples’ cultural and historical contribution to the 
nation. In so doing, they avoid addressing the ghosts that haunt the history of Indigenous 
-Settler relations in Canada. Moreover, considered in this light, the political implications 
of the Kahanawake Mohawk’s decision to stage an alternative cultural Olympiad by 
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inviting visitors to their reserve, located just outside of Montreal, becomes clear. 
Residents of Kahnawake sought to take control over representations of their culture, 
largely by selling locally made crafts not haunted by unacknowledged truths about 
Indigenous - Settler relations.  
“Living Together Is Not Easy:” French Canadian Identity  
Richard Gareau wrote a memo in 1973 arguing that legal protection of COJO’s licensable 
rights would allow it to “take advantage of the tremendous prestige associated with the 
1976 Olympic Games in order to realize the self-financing of the same.”6 One of COJO’s 
copyrighted images, the Games’ emblem, appeared on Olympic commodities, including 
coins, stamps, letter openers, necklaces, coloured fans, candle holders, clothing patches, 
glassware, ashtrays, thermoses, license plates, key rings, and cufflinks. However, the 
emblem did not connote prestige or help COJO raise substantial amounts of money. The 
emblem and, by extension, commodities bearing the emblem, represented Montreal’s 
identity and helped to convey the idea that the Olympics were Quebec’s Games, rather 
than Canada’s Games. Georges Huel, COJO’s Director General of Graphics and Design, 
created the emblem, which extended the top of the Olympic rings to form an “M,” 
representing Montreal. The extended rings also represented the Olympic podium.7 The 
emblem design explicitly emphasized Montreal rather than Canada: “This emblem,” 
noted the Official Report of the Games, “evoked the universal brotherhood of the 
Olympic ideal, the triumph of the winners, the spirit of fair play in their struggles, and the 
                                                 
6 Draft letter from Richard Gareau, Box 1981-06-009\2441, File: Revenu  Liste de licenciés officiels, 
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elevation of Montréal to the rank of Olympic City.”8 Apart from sharing the colours of 
the Canadian flag (red and white), the emblem did not connote national identity.  
 
Figure 8: Souvenirs of the Montreal Olympics, COJO, Official Report, 60.  
 
 
Figure 9: Souvenirs of the Montreal Olympics, COJO, Official Report, 353. 
                                                 
8 Comité d’Organisation des Jeux Olympique (COJO), The Official Report of the XXIst Olympiad Montréal 
1976. (Ottawa: Comité d’Organisation des Jeux Olympique, 1978), 314.  
79 
    
 
 
 
Figure 10: Souvenirs of the Montreal Olympics for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
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The fact that the emblem reflected the cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of French 
Canada was particularly noticeable in the design of the stamps and coins; the “M” in the 
emblem was juxtaposed against the word “Canada” that appeared on all national stamps 
and coins. In addition, the design of these coins and stamps were reproduced on 
numerous commodities. Canada Post produced Olympic stamps in precious metal as 
collectable artwork, along with images of the opening ceremony, Olympic flame, and 
medal ceremony. Its souvenir collection included companion stamp albums containing 21 
Olympic stamps, an Olympic stamp souvenir case with twelve stamps mounted on the 
lid, and a collection of colour posters of the stamps. The Royal Canadian Mint produced 
coin albums, coin cabinets, coin jewellery, lucite coins, and a combined 
philatelic/numismatic collection.9 One coin in particular, part of Series One, reinforced 
the emblem’s emphasis on the “elevation of Montréal to the rank of Olympic City” by 
depicting the city’s skyline. 10 
The primacy of French-Canadian identity in the Montreal Olympics was highlighted most 
dramatically by two clothing patches sold during the Games. One patch reproduced the 
Montreal Games’ emblem and the Quebec flag, which is white with four blue squares, 
each with a fleur de lis in the centre. The other patch reproduced a red flag with the 
Games’ emblem on it and the Quebec flag. These commodities aligned the Olympic 
emblem with prominent symbols of Québécois nationalism.  
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Figure 11: Clothing patches from the Montreal Olympics, for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
 
The symbolism of Québécois nationalism, reflected through the Olympic emblem, 
contrasted with the idea promoted by Queen Elizabeth II, Prime Minister Trudeau, and  
COJO that English and French Canadians can co-exist harmoniously. The Queen and 
Trudeau emphasized this idea in the speeches they delivered at a banquet dinner in July 
1976 during the Games. The Queen praised Montrealers, saying:  
The constant inter-action of two proud peoples living together in the 
shadow of Mont Royal has made this city the site of one of the most 
challenging, difficult, yet hopeful endeavours in human progress that the 
world has seen. Montreal is a living act of faith in the ideal which Canada 
represents to the world.11  
Trudeau acknowledged that “living together is not easy and is not without its moments of 
friction” but asserted that “Canada will continue to set an example for the whole world of 
unity in diversity and harmony in plurality.”12   
During the opening ceremony of the Games, two teenagers, Sandra Henderson, an 
anglophone, and Stéphane Préfontaine, a francophone, entered the stadium jointly 
carrying the Olympic Flame. The image of English and French Canadians sharing this 
honour conveyed the ideal of peaceful co-existence of French and English Canadians. 
                                                 
11 N.a, "Entente Cordiale foundation of Canada's personality," Globe and Mail, July 26, 1976, 7.  
12 Ibid. 
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Writing in the Globe and Mail, James Christie observed: “The two languages together – 
as they might exist in Canada – were a major part of the afternoon’s call for unity.13 
Journalist Christie Blatchford similarly wrote that the two torch bearers represented “the 
most poignant message of the Olympics – that the people of the world, with a little 
caution and sensitivity, can learn to be tolerant of each other.”14 In contrast to these 
sentiments, many of the Games’ commodities represented the fact that, for the time 
being, Canadians were not a unified group.  
“Emblematic of Canada:” The Olympic Mascot  
The official mascot of the Montreal Games symbolized a shared feature of French and 
English Canadian identity, the country’s settler colonial history and the early fur trade in 
Canada. The mascot was a black beaver named Amik, which according to the official 
report, is “a word meaning beaver in the Algonquin language, the most widespread 
among the Amerindians of Canada.”15 Huel designed the mascot wearing a red sash with 
the Games’ emblem.16 In contrast to the emblem’s emphasis on municipal and regional 
identity, COJO representatives explicitly linked the beaver to Canadian identity and 
history. On September 26, 1974, COJO held a press conference to announce that the 
beaver would be the official mascot of the Games, even bringing a live one to the event.17 
Roger Rousseau fed the animal apple pieces and described the beaver as “emblematic of 
Canada.”18 As the official emblem of Canada, the beaver is on the front of the Canadian 
nickel, and a beaver carved out of limestone sits atop an entrance to the Canadian 
Parliament buildings. In the late 19th century, many companies incorporated images of 
                                                 
13 James Christie, "Standing Ovation for Canadian athletes: Hope and harmony theme emphasized at 
Games opening," Globe and Mail, July 19, 1975, S1, italics added.  
14 Christie Blatchford, Daily Column, Globe and Mail, July 19, 1976, S1, italics added.  
15 COJO, Official Report, 354; as I discuss later in this chapter, this statement about the Algonquin 
language is not completely accurate.  
16 A few commodities of the mascot contained a rainbow coloured sash, representing the colour scheme of 
the Montreal Olympics. These commodities, lacking the Games’ logo, do not symbolize competing ideas 
about regional/national identity.  
17 Note de Service, Object: Official Launching of COJO Mascot, Box 1981-06-009\2441, File: Mascotte, 
FCOJO, BANQ; n.a, “This Will be One Busy Beaver,” Globe and Mail, Sept. 26, 1974, 44.  
18 Press Release: “Beaver Chosen as Montréal Games’ Mascot”, Sept. 25, 1974, Box 1981-06-009\2441, 
File: Mascotte, FCOJO, BANQ. 
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beavers into their logos, including the Canadian National Railway, Canadian Illustrated 
News, Sleeman’s Ale, Beaver Brand Chewing Tobacco and Crompton’s Corsets.19 More 
recently, the logo for the clothing company Roots features a beaver. In a famous 
nationalist ad by Molson in 2000, “Joe Canadian” describes the beaver as “a truly proud 
and noble animal.”20  
Even before COJO chose a beaver as the Games’ mascot, the organization focused on the 
commercial potential of a mascot. Gareau wrote in 1973: “it goes without saying that we 
could profit enormously from a mascot that could be easily adapted to all sorts of 
merchandises (comic strips, general publications, toys, puzzles, jewellery, scarves, ties, 
hats, etc.)”21 Similarly, Huel wrote in 1974: “We believe that the goal of creating a 
mascot is to give an opportunity to official licensees to produce souvenirs of it.”22 Many 
commodities bearing Amik’s image were sold during the Games: Gaby Pleau Inc. 
produced the mascot in leather and fur. Joca Inc. produced beaver puzzles and beaver 
banks (change holders similar to piggy banks) and Mighty Star Ltd. produced a plush 
beaver.23 Other Amik commodities included iron-on clothing patches, key chains, pins, 
and noise makers. Moreover, official Olympic supporters, donors who gave between 
$5,000 and $25,000 received a gold, silver or bronze beaver depending on the amount.24 
                                                 
19 Margot Francis. Creative Subversions: Whiteness, Indigeneity, and the National Imaginary. (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2011), 34. 
20 “I Am Canadian.” Molson Canadian advertisement. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRI-
A3vakVg  
21 Note de Service from Richard Gareau to Georges Huel, Subject: Mascotte, Nov. 21, 1973, Box: 1981-06-
009\2441, File: Mascotte, FCOJO, BANQ; The original memo is in French and the quotation is my 
translation. The original French reads: “Sure le côté commercial, il va sans dire que nous pouvons profiter 
énormément d’une mascotte qui peut s’adapter facilement à toutes sortes de marchandises (bandes 
desinées, publications générales, jouets, casse-tête, bijoux, foulards, cravats, chapeaux, etc.)”  
22 Note de Service from Georges Huel to Raymond Beauchemin, Subject: nom de la mascotte, Dec. 9, 
1974, Box 1981-06-009\2441, File: Mascotte, FCOJO, BANQ; The original memo is in French and the 
quotation is my translation. The original French reads:  “Nous croyons que le but premier de la création 
d’une mascotte est de donner l’occasion à des licenciés officiels de produire des souvenirs de celle-ci.”  
23 List of official licensees for the 1976 Games, Nov. 13, 1975, Box 1981-06-009\1968, FCOJO, BANQ. 
24 COJO, Official Report, 62; there were 3 levels of Olympic support – official promoters, supporters and 
sponsors. Official sponsors received gold, silver or bronze torches and official promoters received gold, 
silver or bronze plaques. In total, official sponsors donated $536, 000 to COJO (official promoters gave 
$144,000 and official sponsors gave $3.5 million).  
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Figure 12: Amik commodities, COJO, Official Report, 354. 
 
 
Figure 13: Amik commodities for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
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The graphic design of Amik was not particularly distinctive. Huel did not include much 
detail in his design. In fact, he did not initially give Amik eyes or teeth, leading journalist 
James Christie to observe wryly: “only recently has it come to anyone’s attention that 
poor Amik was born with neither eyes nor the characteristic teeth. Needless to say, a 
blind, toothless mascot does not reflect a flattering image of COJO.”25 Amik eventually 
received eyes but remained toothless. Although Huel’s design did not create a symbolic 
association between the beaver and the fur trade, this association was already established 
in Canada. Margot Francis writes: “The beaver was the first article of trade upon which 
European trade and exploration was based, and as such, it became a crucial medium 
through which early Europeans articulated an imagined relationship with commercial 
culture.”26  Two companies, the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), founded in 1670, and 
the North West Company (NWC), founded in 1783, were central to the fur trade in 
Canada.27 King Charles II of England created the HBC through a royal charter, which 
gave it the authority to trade, make treaties, and defend the territory of Ruptersland.28 In 
1783, independent Canadian fur traders founded the NWC, which competed with the 
HBC until 1824, when it was absorbed into the HBC.29 When Canada was established in 
1867, the beaver became a symbol of national identity and its ties to the HBC and NWC 
meant that it was already associated with trade and commerce.30 
The guidebook COJO gave to Olympic hostesses and guides explicitly linked the 
symbolism of Amik to the fur trade and, by extension, the nation’s history. It noted that 
the beaver “played an important role in the development of our country, demonstrating 
the extent to which the Canadian economy was originally based on the fur trade.31 Using 
                                                 
25 James Christie, “Plug on Quebec cars: Plates to carry Olympic logo,” Globe and Mail, Oct. 2, 1975, 60.  
26 Francis, Creative Subversions, 31.  
27 Francis, Creative Subversions, 32, Peter C. Newman, Company of Adventurers: How the Hudson's Bay 
Empire Determined the Destiny of a Continent (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2005), 243.  
28 Wesley R. Herber, “Aboriginal People and the Fur Trade,” in Hidden in Plain Sight: Contributions of 
Aboriginal Peoples to Canadian Identity and Culture, vol. 2, ed. Cora J. Voyageur, David R. Newhouse 
and Dan Beavon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 18-19. 
29 Newman, Company of Adventurer, 243, 429.  
30 Francis, Creative Subversions, 33. 
31 Centre D’Accueil, Manuel de base, 2-9, Box 1981-06-009/1297, FCOJO, BANQ; the handbook was 
written in French and the quotation is my translation. The original French reads:  The original reads: “Le 
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almost identical language to the handbook, the official report of the Montreal Olympics 
reads:  
Several reasons justified the choice of the beaver [as mascot]. Recognized 
for its patience and hard work, this animal has occupied an important 
place in the economic development of Canada from the time when the fur 
trade was the major activity in North America. It has been honored as the 
national symbol of Canadians and appears on coins and stamps.32  
Moreover, Rousseau explicitly associated the beaver mascot with the fur trade: “Any 
Canadian realizes that it was the beaver which opened up this country, which led several 
large European companies to open up Canada and led to the settlement of our ancestors 
here.”33  
The mascot and related commodities thus symbolized two different ideas about Canada. 
On one hand, by bearing the Games’ emblem, the mascot symbolized the regional 
dimension of the Montreal Games and emphasized French-Canadian identity over a 
unified national identity. On the other hand, because COJO members associated the 
mascot with the history of the fur trade and European settlement in Canada, the mascot 
symbolized Settler Canadians’ shared national identity and history. These competing 
ideas sat uneasily, next to one another. The unresolved nature of the mascot’s symbolism 
is significant in light of Anne McClintock’s theory of fetishism. According to 
McClintock, fetish objects represent “a crisis in social meaning as the embodiment of an 
impossible irresolution.”34 McClintock’s definition of fetish helps explain how objects 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
castor, mascotte des Jeux olympiques 1976, occupe une place toute particulière dans l’histoire du Canada. 
Cet animal, renommé pour son caractère industrieux et sa patience, a joué un rôle important dans le 
dévelopment de notre pays, dans la mesure où l’économie canadienne reposait à l’origine sur le commerce 
des fourrures.” 
32 COJO, Official Report, 354. 
33 Press Release: “Beaver Chosen as Montréal Games’ Mascot”, Sept. 25, Box 1981-06-009\2441, File: 
Mascotte, FCOJO, BANQ.  
34 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest (New York: 
Routledge, 1995),184. 
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have the capacity to hold together competing ideas, making it possible for irreconcilable 
ideas to co-exist without collapsing under the weight of this contradiction. I argue in 
future chapters that commodities from the Calgary and Vancouver Olympics were fetish 
objects, according to McClintock’s understanding of the term. However, the Montreal 
mascot and related commodities were not McClintock-esque fetishes because the 
competing ideas about national identity that they represented were very obvious. As 
opposed to the objects sold during the Calgary and Vancouver Games, which overtly 
represented some information and obscured other facts, the Montreal commodities drew 
attention to contradictions in meanings of national identity, exposing them for all too see. 
Symbolically, the mascot collapsed under the weight of the contradictions it held.   
To end an analysis of the mascot’s symbolism with a discussion of competing ideas of 
French- and English-Canadian identity would be incomplete. The mascot represented a 
third idea about national identity that was less obvious but not invisible. The mascot’s 
name, Amik, symbolized the fact that the fur traders who helped to establish Canada as a 
modern-day nation were early Canadian Settlers. Of course, the French and English 
explorers who first arrived in Canada did not happen upon land empty of inhabitants; it 
was already populated by Indigenous groups. In fact, the official report openly 
acknowledges this fact by noting: Amik “means beaver in Algonquian, the basic 
language spoken by the tribes who greeted the first Settlers in the country.”35  
The official report’s interpretation about the meaning of “amik” is not entirely accurate. 
Algonquian is not a language, but a language family, as Bill Janceqicz explains: “The 
analysis of Algonquian languages proposes a ‘parent’ language from which the various 
Algonquian languages and dialects are descended. Linguists refer to this parent language 
as Proto-Algonquian.”36 Moreover, it is unclear whether the authors of the Games’ 
official report were aware of this distinction, as they appear to use the terms Algonquin 
and Algonquian interchangeably. Another section of the report, about Montreal’s 
Olympic image, noted that amik is “a word meaning beaver in the Algonquin language, 
                                                 
35 COJO, Official Report, 49. 
36 Bill Jancequicz, "Related-Language Translation: Naskapi and East Cree," in Born in the Blood: On 
Native American Translation, ed. Brian Swann (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), n13, 136.  
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the most widespread among the Amerindians of Canada.”37 Yet even this statement is 
inaccurate, as the most widely spoken Indigenous languages in Canada are Cree 
dialects.38  
Perhaps even more troubling than the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the official 
report about the word “amik” is the fact that when Rousseau discussed the significance of 
the beaver to Canadian history he did not acknowledge the presence of Indigenous 
peoples in Canada prior to European settlement or their essential contributions to the fur 
trade. As noted earlier, Rousseau stated that “Any Canadian realizes that it was the 
beaver which opened up this country, which led several large European companies to 
open up Canada and led to the settlement of our ancestors here.”39 It is unclear if 
Rousseau was referring to French-Canadian ancestors or all Canadian ancestors. In either 
case, he excluded Indigenous peoples’ presence, and their corresponding involvement in 
the fur trade, from his account of early European settlement in Canada. However, the 
mascot’s name made two facts difficult to ignore. First, early European Settlers did not 
happen upon an empty land when they first arrived in Canada but, rather, encountered 
Indigenous peoples who have a rightful claim to the land. In other words, the mascot’s 
name illustrated the inaccuracy of the terra nullius (“empty lands”) myth. Second, 
Indigenous peoples’ contributions to the fur trade were essential to its success.  
The history of Canada’s involvement in the fur trade dates back to the 17th century. At 
that time, there was a high demand in Europe for Canadian beaver pelts, which were 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 354, italics added. 
38 Canada, Statistics Canada, Stéphanie Langlois and Annie Turner, "Aboriginal Languages and Selected 
Vitality Indicators in 2011" (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014). http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-
recensement/2011/as-sa/98-314-x/98-314-x2011003_3-eng.cfm; Canada, Statistics Canada, “Aboriginal 
Languages in Canada" (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014). http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-
recensement/2011/as-sa/98-314-x/98-314-x2011003_3-eng.cfm; As Langlois and Stéphanie make clear, 
numerous Cree dialects exist. They write: “Cree languages include the following categories: Cree not 
otherwise specified (which refers to those who reported 'Cree'), Swampy Cree, Plains Cree, Woods Cree, 
and a category labelled 'Cree not included elsewhere' (which includes Moose Cree, Northern East Cree and 
Southern East Cree”. 
39 Press Release: “Beaver Chosen as Montréal Games’ Mascot”, Sept. 25, 1974. Box 1981-06-009\2441, 
File: Mascotte, FCOJO, BANQ.  
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turned into the felt that milliners used to make fashionable broad-brimmed hats.40 
European fur traders depended on Indigenous peoples’ labour to obtain and process 
beaver pelts. Traders coveted the pelts that many Indigenous peoples wore as clothing 
because, after about eighteen months of wear, the beavers’ long hairs fell off, leaving 
only soft fur.41 J.R. Miller writes: “A trade in the beaver pelts that the furriers craved in 
the seventeenth century Europe was simply impossible without the cooperation of the 
Indigenous North Americans. Europeans who came in search of prime furs needed the 
native population’s knowledge, skills, and cooperation.”42 The 1996 Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) similarly notes: “Although some European traders 
obtained Aboriginal clothing, canoes, snowshoes and other items for themselves, the 
most sought after goods were beaver pelts.”43 Moreover, Sylvia Van Kirk documents the 
gendered dimension of the fur trade, noting that many European fur traders married 
Indigenous women in order to benefit from their knowledge of local food sources and 
clothing production.44  
The relationship between French fur traders and the Innu and Wendat illustrates the inter-
dependence of European traders and Indigenous peoples. Beginning in the early 17th 
century, the traders established close ties to the Innu nation, Algonquian speakers who 
lived north of the St. Lawrence and east of the Saguenay River. Many Innu trapped 
beavers for French traders and acted as middlemen between the traders and other 
trappers.45 Moreover, Samuel de Champlain established close ties with the Wendat 
Nation, Iroquoian speakers living in the area between Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe. 
                                                 
40 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1989), 32; Francis, Creative Subversions, 31. 
41 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), Highlights from the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples: People to People, Nation to Nation, (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, 1996). http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014597/1100100014637 
42 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 33.  
43 RCAP, Highlights from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 102.  
44 Sylvia van Kirk, “From ‘Marrying-in’ to ‘Marrying Out’: Changing patterns of Aboriginal/Non-
Aboriginal Marriage in Colonial Canada,”Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, 23 no. 3 (2002): 1-11.  
45 RCAP, Highlights from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 102.  
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Many Wendat exchanged beaver pelts for iron knives, awls, axes, brass kettles, and glass 
beads.46  
By trading with Europeans, Indigenous peoples gained access to valuable goods, but they 
were also introduced to deadly new diseases including small pox.47 By the 1630s, these 
diseases had caused a dramatic decline in the Innu population and were beginning to 
impact the Wendat.48 An estimated one third to half of the entire Wendat population had 
died from smallpox by 1640.49 Moreover, sustained efforts by European missionaries to 
convert Indigenous peoples to Christianity posed a serious threat to their traditional 
cultures. Missionaries tried to convert the Innu to Christianity and pressured them to start 
farming, build European-style dwellings, and abandon their so-called “uncivilized 
ways.”50 Moreover, by prohibiting Wendat converts from participating in their 
community’s traditional rituals, missionaries separated converts from non-converts and 
disrupted the community’s cohesiveness.51  
“Ghost(ed)” Objects: Haunting and the Olympic Mascot   
The fact that Indigenous peoples were central players in the fur trade in Canada haunted 
Rousseau’s statement that the beaver opened up the country. I use the term “haunted” 
deliberately, in accordance with Avery Gordon’s conceptualization of haunting as a 
“seething absence,”52 one that can be perceived and felt.53 Rousseau’s failure to 
acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ presence in Canada and their contribution to the fur 
trade was present in its absence, ignored but not erased.  The mascot was also haunted by 
the federal government’s historical efforts to assimilate Indigenous peoples into Settler 
society and the role that the Indian Residential School system played in this process. As 
the 2015 report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Canada (TRC) notes, “It 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 103.  
47 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 48; Herber, “Aboriginal People and the Fur Trade”, 26. 
48 RCAP, Highlights from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 103 
49 Herber, “Aboriginal People and the Fur Trade”, 26.  
50 Highlights from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 103. 
51 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 53. 
52 Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 17. 
53 Ibid.  
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was in keeping with this intent to assimilate Aboriginal peoples and, in the process, to 
eliminate its government-to-government relationship with First Nations that the federal 
government dramatically increased its involvement in residential schooling in the 
1880s.”54 Jointly run by the federal government and Christian churches, the architects of 
residential schools promoted the now discredited idea that Indigenous children were 
“savages” who needed to be “civilized.” For example, in 1883, Canada’s Public Works 
Minister, Hector Lengevin, discussed residential schools in the House of Commons, 
arguing: “if you wish to educate these [Indigenous ] children you must separate them 
from their parents during the time they are being educated. If you leave them in the 
family they may know how to read and write, but they still remain savages.”55 In fact, the 
TRC report described Canada’s historical policy towards Indigenous peoples as cultural 
genocide, defining the term as “the destruction of those structures and practices that allow 
the group to continue as a group.”56  
One feature of cultural genocide, according to the TRC, is the banning of a group’s 
language or languages. The fact that the mascot of the Montreal Games was given an 
Algonquin name (Amik) made the history of residential schooling in Canada, and its 
emphasis on language, impossible to completely disavow. The government’s intention to 
sever the bond between Indigenous children and their families through residential schools 
was clear from the beginning and one way it achieved this goal was by mandating that 
students only speak English or French.57 The Department of Indian Affairs’ “Program of 
Studies for Indian Schools,” issued in 1896, stated: “Every effort must be made to induce 
pupils to speak English and to teach them to understand it; unless they do, the whole 
work of the teacher is likely to be wasted.”58 The RCAP report uses strong language to 
describe the effect of this emphasis on English and French: “the entire residential school 
                                                 
54 Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for 
the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. 
(Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015), 58. http://www.trc.ca 
55 Langevin, quoted in TRC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 61.  
56 TRC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 1.  
57 Ibid., 10. 
58 Indian Affairs “Programme of Studies for Indian Schools” of 1893, qtd in TRC, Honouring the Truth, 
Reconciling for the Future, 83. 
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project was balanced on the proposition that the gate to assimilation was unlocked only 
by the progressive destruction of Aboriginal languages. With that growing silence would 
come the dying whisper of Aboriginal cultures.”59 
Students were harshly punished for speaking their native languages. For example, 
residential school survivor Raphael Ironstand recalled that teachers would discipline 
students for speaking Cree by shaving their heads, a practice that made them feel 
ashamed:  “Even though they wore scarves and toques to hide their heads, the tears were 
streaming down their faces. They were so embarrassed, they kept their heads bowed and 
eyes looking at the floor.”60 Another student, Mary Carpenter, “was beaten, forced to go 
hungry, stand in a corridor on one leg and walk in the snow with no shoes as punishment 
for speaking Inuvialuktum.”61 Pierrette Benjamin, who attended the La Tuque school, 
was forced to eat soap after she was caught speaking her native language.62 Agnes Mills, 
who attended the All Saints residential school in Saskatchewan, told the TRC that losing 
her language deeply affected her identity and relationship with her family: “one of things 
that residential school did for me, I really regret, is that it made me ashamed of who I 
was.”63 She added: “the worst thing I ever did was I was ashamed of my mother, that 
honourable woman, because she couldn’t speak English. She never went to school, and 
they told us that, when we used to go home to her on Saturdays, and they told us that we 
couldn’t talk Gwinch’in to her, and she couldn’t, like couldn’t communicate.”64  
The conditions in residential schools were appalling and many students died while 
attending these schools. The TRC, which established a National Residential School 
Student Death Register in order to uncover the exact number of deaths, recorded 3,201 
                                                 
59 RCAP, Highlights from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 317. 
60 Raphael Ironstand, qtd in TRC, Canada, Aboriginal Peoples, and Residential Schools: They Came for 
the Children (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2012), 39. 
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62 TRC Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 85. 
63 Agnes Mills, qtd in TRC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 201.  
64 Ibid.  
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reported deaths of residential school students.65 The commission points out that the death 
rates for Indigenous children enrolled in residential schools were much higher than those 
for the general Canadian population. Tuberculosis cases in these schools, which peaked 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were responsible for many of these deaths.66 
Residential school students were badly fed and were required to perform onerous tasks to 
keep the schools running, including farming, cooking, and cleaning. Moreover, they 
experienced cruel physical punishments and rarely received encouragement or affection. 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of residential schools was the sexual and physical 
abuse experienced by many students.67 Most residential schools were closed by the 
1980s, but a few remained open until the mid-1990s. 
The trauma of residential schools left an inter-generational impact on Indigenous 
communities. The TRC report, which discusses this impact, is worth quoting at length:  
The legacy of the [residential] schools remains. One can see the impact of 
a system that disrupts families in the high number of Aboriginal children 
who have been removed by their families by child-welfare agencies. An 
education system that degraded Aboriginal culture and subjected students 
to humiliating disciplines must bear a portion of responsibility for the 
current gap between the educational success of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadians…The over-incarceration and over-victimization of 
Aboriginal people also have links to a system that subjected Aboriginal 
children to punitive discipline and exposed them to physical and sexual 
abuse.68 
In 2008 Prime Minister Stephen Harper publicly apologized for residential schools in 
Canada. He declared: “The government now recognizes that the consequences of the 
Indian Residential Schools policy were profoundly negative and that this policy has had a 
                                                 
65 TRC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 93. 
66 Ibid., 93-4. 
67 For a detailed account of the conditions in residential schools, see: TRC, Honouring the Truth, 
Reconciling for the Future.  
68 TRC, Canada, Aboriginal Peoples, and Residential Schools, 77-78. 
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lasting and damaging impact on Aboriginal culture, heritage and language.”69 It is 
important to recognize, however, that the federal government did not ultimately succeed 
in assimilating Indigenous peoples into Settler society. The TRC report tells readers: 
“Although Aboriginal peoples and cultures have been badly damaged, they continue to 
exist. Aboriginal people have refused to surrender their identity.”70  
Amik was, to borrow a word from Sharon Rosenberg, Amber Dean, and Kara Granzow, a 
“ghost(ed)” object. Rosenberg et al. argue that a photograph linked to Alberta’s 2005 
Centenary Celebrations was a “ghost(ed) image.”71 The picture, included in a handbook 
about the centenary celebrations ostensibly showed a single Indigenous settlement. The 
authors discovered that it was actually a composite of four or five photographs. Their 
description of the image applies equally to Amik. A “ghost(ed)” object, the mascot was 
“a representation of a repressed yet haunting presence repeatedly disavowed” by COJO’s 
narratives about the past.72 Characterizing Amik commodities as haunted illustrates that 
certain consumer goods are animated by unacknowledged truths involving the federal 
government’s colonial policy toward Indigenous peoples.73  
Jennifer Henderson and Pauline Wakeham make the important point that residential 
schools are not a “discrete historical problem of educational malpractice” but, rather, 
“one devastating prong of an overarching and multifaceted system of colonial oppression 
that persists in the present.”74 The 1969 “Statement of the Government of Canada on 
Indian Policy” (commonly referred to as the White Paper) illustrates that federal 
                                                 
69 Canada, Statement of Apology (Ottawa, 2008). https://www.aadnc-
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70 TRC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 6.  
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government policies aimed at assimilating indigenous peoples into settler society were 
proposed well into the mid-1900s. Thus, in addition to being haunted by the colonial 
policies that led to the establishment of residential schools in Canada, the mascot was 
haunted by a more recent, if equally troubling, proposed federal policy. The White Paper 
argued that the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs and the Indian Act should be 
abolished because Indigenous peoples’ rights were protected by federal multicultural 
policies.75 Indigenous groups, most notably the Indian Association of Alberta (IAA) and 
the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB), objected strongly to this proposal, asserting that, 
as the country’s first inhabitants, they had unique status in Canada.76 Harold Cardinal, the 
president of the IAA, described the White paper as “a thinly disguised programme of 
extermination through assimilation.”77  
In 1969, the IAA secured permission and funding from the federal government to study 
the White Paper and offer a formal response. The NIB revised and adopted the IAA’s 
report, which was called Citizens Plus. Laurie Meijer Drees describes the report as “a 
blistering attack by Indian leaders on Ottawa’s lack of respect for, and interest in, Indian 
peoples in Canada.” 78 The report successfully prevented the government from instituting 
the White Paper’s recommendations and positioned treaty rights “as foundational to 
Indian peoples’ participation in Canadian society.”79 The NIB made policy 
recommendations about issues such as on-reserve educational programs and the 
economic development of Indigenous communities.80  
In 1920, the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott told a 
parliamentary committee that the government’s objective was to “continue until there is 
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not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic.”81 As 
noted in the TRC report: “These goals were reiterated in 1969 in the federal 
government’s Statement on Indian Policy…which sought to end Indian status and 
terminate the Treaties that the federal government had negotiated with First Nations.”82 
Even though the government never implemented the White Paper’s recommendations, it 
had a lasting impact on Indigenous-Settler relations. Christine O’Bonsawin argues that 
this impact was still felt in 1976 when Montreal hosted the Olympics.83  I take this 
argument even further, arguing that the mascot was haunted by the unacknowledged but 
present fact that, in 1976, efforts to assimilate Indigenous peoples were not relegated to a 
distant past but were relatively recent.  
“We Now Claim Their Field Games:” Haunting and Olympic 
Coins  
The design of most of the Montreal Olympic coins was unrelated to national identity or 
history. Rather, they depicted symbols of the ancient Olympic Games, sporting activities, 
or geography. In contrast to the other coins, Series Three of COJO’s commemorative 
coin program depicted the early Canadian sports of lacrosse, canoeing, rowing, and 
cycling. The lacrosse and canoe coins showed muscular men wearing little clothing with 
a stereotypical signifier of indigeneity, feathers in their hair. Like Amik, these two coins 
were ghost(ed) objects marked by disavowed truths. While Amik was haunted by the 
unacknowledged contributions of Indigenous peoples to the fur trade, the canoe coin was 
haunted by the unacknowledged contributions Indigenous peoples made to European 
Settlers’ exploration in Canada. Miller writes: “without the Indian, the canoe, maize, and 
other products of the Indigenous society, none of the great exploratory trips [taken by 
Europeans] would have got much further than Lachine.”84 
                                                 
81 Duncan Campbell Scott, qtd in TRC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 2. 
82 Ibid., 2-3.  
83 O’Bonsawin, "Indigenous peoples and Canadian-hosted Olympic Games," 37. 
84 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heaven., 42. 
97 
 
Figure 14: Montreal Olympic coins, COJO, Official Report, 69-70.  
   
The lacrosse coin was haunted by the history of Settlers’ appropriation of Indigenous 
peoples’ cultures in Canada. Specifically, Settler Canadians adapted Indigenous sporting 
practices to create lacrosse as Canada’s national sport. Many Iroquoian-speaking 
Indigenous nations, including the Mohawk, Cayuga, and Onondaga Nations, played ball 
games similar to modern-day lacrosse. Some Indigenous nations called the game 
baggataway while others called it tewaarathon. Lacrosse was a French word for any game 
played by Indigenous peoples using a curved stick.85 These ball games had practical and 
symbolic purposes: they helped groups prepare for military battle, engage in diplomatic 
exchanges, and build social coherence and religious continuity.86 In the 1830s, Settlers 
from Montreal began playing a version of the game against Mohawks living in the nearby 
Caughnawaga which they later called lacrosse.  
The Montreal Lacrosse Club was formed in 1856 and two lacrosse games were staged for 
the Prince of Wales during his visit to Montreal in 1860. The first game was held 
between Indigenous teams, while the second pitted an Indigenous team against a Settler 
Canadian one.87 Following Confederation in 1867, William Beers, an Anglophone living 
in Montreal, successfully campaigned for lacrosse to be named Canada’s national game, 
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believing that the sport could help Settlers establish a unique national identity. He wrote a 
pamphlet of rules and instructions on lacrosse, contributed articles about the game to 
newspapers, and even published a book on the sport in 1869. 88 
Between 1867 and 1883, Canada sent three separate groups of lacrosse players to the 
British Isles.89 Gillian Poulter writes that the Indigenous teams participating in these 
exhibition games “were present as colourful, nostalgic reminders of the pre-historic 
existence of Indigenous peoples in Canada, an essential part of its myth of origin.”90 In 
other words, the Indigenous athletes helped Settlers promote the problematic idea that 
Canada was built upon, but ultimately supplanted, Indigenous peoples’ cultures and ways 
of life. Indeed, Beers eliminated many aspects of the game that linked it to Indigenous 
cultures. Indigenous versions of baggataway/tewaarathon did not have standardized 
playing fields and the number of players on teams and the duration of games varied.91 
Poulter notes that, by developing and publishing lacrosse rules, Beers “not only provided 
the necessary elements of discipline and fair play, but also brought the game under 
colonial control, and affirmed the importance of punctuality, standardization and private 
property.”92  
Beers explicitly linked his efforts to develop lacrosse as Canada’s national game to 
Settlers appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ land. He said: “just as we claim as 
Canadian the rivers and lakes and land once owned exclusively by Indians, so we now 
claim their field games as the national field game of our dominion.”93 Moreover, he 
viewed the Settlers version of the game as more “civilized” than that of Indigenous 
peoples’ versions; he observed: “The white game differs from the red, in being restricted 
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by that mark of civilization and respect, the fence.”94 The number of Settler Canadians 
who began playing lacrosse was initially very small and they frequently played against 
Indigenous teams. However, when the popularity of lacrosse grew, Indigenous 
participation waned. In 1880, the National Lacrosse Association mandated that all 
lacrosse players had to be amateurs. By the late 1800s, debates about the increasing 
professionalism of lacrosse caused major divisions between players and coaches. These 
divisions, in addition to the fact that few young people were taking up the sport, led to the 
decline of lacrosse and subsequent rise of hockey as Canada’s most popular sport.95 
The cultural and ceremonial elements of the Montreal Olympics were also haunted, this 
time by the palpable absence of meaningful Indigenous participation in the Games. 
Gordon’s haunting theory draws attention to the fact that ideas, knowledge and people do 
not fully disappear, even if they are excluded from representational and commemorative 
practices. Paradoxically, the existence of suppressed ideas, knowledge, and people 
becomes evident through the practices that exclude them. The absence of meaningful 
Indigenous participation in the Olympics was seen especially in the closing ceremony of 
the Montreal Olympics. During the ceremony, 75 Indigenous persons dressed in colourful 
outfits entered the stage to the sound of “a symphonic suite performed on traditional 
instruments augmented by Amerindian folk instruments such as tom-toms, rattles, and 
small bells.”96 They moved in an arrowhead formation and then escorted Olympic 
athletes to the stage.97 Significantly, non-Indigenous members of the Fédération de Danse 
du Québec accompanied the Indigenous dancers in the closing ceremony, wearing 
costumes and make-up to blend in with them.98 COJO reported that all the “Indian tribes 
of Canada” were represented in the closing ceremony and it provided the media with an 
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official closing ceremony program guide, which contained the same information.99 
However, this information was incorrect: not all Indigenous nations were represented in 
the ceremony. In fact, only nine First Nations, all from Quebec, participated: the 
Abenaki, Algonquin, Atikamekw, Cree, Huron, Mi’gmaq, Mohawk, Montagnais, and 
Naskapi.100 The non-Indigenous dancers in the closing ceremony enacted a haunting: 
they physically represented what was not present, namely, Indigenous dancers from 
across Canada. The lack of meaningful Indigenous participation in the Games was also 
reflected in COJO’s rejection of the proposal by the Indians of Quebec Association to 
showcase their cultures through an Indian Days Celebration.101 Despite rejecting this 
proposal, COJO approved an exhibit showcasing Inuit art. The Inuit Art collection, 
displayed in the International Centre of the Olympic Village, featured 39 sculptures and 2 
tapestries created by Inuit artists.102  
Chief Poking Fire: Resistance  
After COJO rejected the Indians of Quebec Association’s proposal, the Mohawk of 
Kahnawake staged their own Indian Days Celebration, inviting Olympic visitors to learn 
about Mohawk culture in their reserve, located across the St. Lawrence river from 
Montreal.103 This event challenged the problematic representations and exclusions of 
Indigenous peoples’ history and cultures in the Montreal Olympics. Forsyth writes: 
“While the Olympics organizers drew on their own, white understanding of ‘the Indian’ 
to sell a particular version of Canada and the Olympic Games, the Mohawk of 
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Kahnawake constructed their own symbols to show the richness and diversity of 
Aboriginal lives in Canada.”104  
The Kahnawake sold locally-made crafts including necklaces, medallions, bracelets, and 
watchbands in order to raise funds for the construction of a new wing of the local 
hospital.105 Unlike Amik, the canoe and lacrosse coins and related commodities, these 
objects were not haunted by disavowed truths about Indigenous peoples’ culture and 
history. These objects illustrate that consumer goods are not always, or inherently, 
haunted by unacknowledged ideas about the past and served as a tangible representation 
of the failure of assimilative practices in Canada, as they represented the continuation of 
their distinct culture. However, some members of the community were concerned that 
visitors would not buy these products but instead the spoof products sold by a member of 
the community who went by the satirical name of “Chief Poking Fire.” He offered 
visitors snake oil made in Pakistan, t-shirts made in India, and rubber arrowheads made in 
Japan.106 As Forsyth writes, these commodities, and the debates within the Mohawk 
community that they inspired, highlight “the varied and complex ways Kahnawake 
residents understood themselves as twentieth century Indians.”107 Unfortunately, 
community members were disappointed when far fewer than the expected 125, 000 
people visited their reserve.108 Despite these low numbers, the Kahnawake’s Indian Days 
Celebration and the issues they raised about the representation of Indigenous cultures in 
contemporary Canada pioneered a practice that became more widespread in the Calgary 
and Vancouver Olympics, namely, using the Games as a platform to confront crucial 
questions about and issues related to Indigenous peoples’ interests and rights.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that the symbolic meanings of Montreal Olympic 
commodities are inextricably tied to the cultural and political dimensions of the Games. 
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The commodities sold during the Montreal Olympics did not reflect the hopeful ideas that 
COJO, the Queen, and Pierre Trudeau articulated about the potential for French and 
English Canadians to co-exist harmoniously. They also did not symbolize positive ideas 
about Canadian identity. Rather, they drew attention to pre-existing conflicts between 
English- and French-Canadians and were haunted by traumatic events in Canada’s past 
related to Indigenous -Settler relations in Canada. Moreover, the closing ceremony of the 
Montreal Olympics was haunted by the fact that Indigenous peoples were not given the 
opportunity to participate in a meaningful way in the cultural elements of the Games. 
Thus, I demonstrated that the representational practices which occur in the commercial, 
cultural, and ceremonial elements of the Olympics should not be treated as distinct 
elements of the Olympics that exist independent of one another. In the case of the 
Montreal Olympics, these aspects of the Olympics were, collectively, haunted by 
disavowed information about historical and contemporary relations between Settler 
Canadians and Indigenous peoples.  
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Chapter 4  
“Our Unique Western Heritage is Interesting to People:” 
City, Region, and Corporate Branding in the 1988 
Calgary Olympics  
 
In 1980, one year before leading Calgary’s bid for the 1988 Winter Olympics, Frank 
King attended an International Olympic Committee (IOC) meeting in Moscow. As a gift, 
he presented IOC members with containers filled with samples of Alberta tar sands. 
King, who was the chair of the Calgary Olympic Development Association (CODA) and 
the vice-president of the petroleum company Turbo Resources, wrote in his memoir: “I 
will never forget the look of total surprise on [IOC Director] Madame Berlioux’s face 
when these fresh-faced oilmen from Calgary presented her with a sample of Alberta tar 
sands as we departed. This was literally a tacky gift.”1 In addition to the samples of tar 
sands, King gave away cowboy hats and, as he described it, “an Indian tomahawk.” 2 
When, in 1981, CODA members travelled to Baden-Baden to present Calgary’s bid for 
the 1988 Games, they wore “dignified Western attire”: blue sports jackets with a western 
cut, grey pants, white shirts, and navy striped ties.3 They were joined by two uniformed 
Canadian Mounted Police officers (Mounties), the Chief of the Kainai (Blood) First 
Nation Lambert Fox and his wife, Yvette. According to King, “when Chief Fox and his 
wife danced to the beat of Native tomtoms, people crowded into our area, leaving the 
other bid displays virtually empty.”4 Calgary won the bid after Cortina d’Ampezzo, Italy 
was eliminated in the first round and Falun, Sweden lost in the second round.5  
King wrote that the bid team “learned that our unique Western heritage is interesting to 
people from other parts of the world.”6 His statement is perhaps misleading, as he 
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anticipated and cultivated this interest by strategically using material goods and cultural 
performances to create a favourable image of Alberta. In this chapter, I argue that King 
and his colleagues ran the bid and, subsequently, the Calgary Olympics, the same way 
they would run a business. In keeping with market fundamentalism, Olympic organizers 
commodified regional identity and engaged in city/region branding by treating Calgary 
and, more broadly, Western Canada as commodifiable resources. City/region branding 
treats geographical locations “as ‘products’ to be marketed, through tourism development 
and branding activities.”7 Understood in this way, the gifts that King gave to IOC 
members represented Alberta’s material wealth and cultural value. Moreover, they 
symbolized the drive of Olympic organizers to convert regional identity into a profit-
generating resource.  
The practice of linking city, region or nation branding campaigns with the Olympics is 
well documented, but scholars do not consider how these campaigns overlap with 
corporate sponsorship of the Games.8 I argue that three factors made possible the 
intersection of city, region, and corporate branding in the Calgary Olympics: the rise of 
neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism in the 1980s; the increasing commercialism of 
the Olympic movement; and the strong relationship between Alberta and the federal 
government. Collectively, city/region and corporate branding practices depicted Calgary 
and Western Canadian cultures as rooted in, but not constrained by, the region’s pioneer 
history. They also positioned the petroleum industry as central to Alberta’s modern 
prosperity and growth. Commodities of the Calgary Olympics, like cowboy hats, plush 
toys of the Games’ mascots, and lapel pins with corporate logos, contributed to these 
branding practices by showcasing prominent symbols of Alberta’s cultural identity and 
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economic prosperity. Furthermore, Calgary Olympic Education Kits exposed Canadian 
children and youth to these ideas and worked alongside commercial and cultural practices 
to construct a coherent narrative about local and regional identity.  
However, opposition to the Calgary Olympics by the Lubicon Cree undermined the 
coherence of these region and corporate branding messages and, correspondingly, the 
symbolism of Olympic commodities. An Indigenous community located in northern 
Alberta, the Lubicon’s anti-Olympic campaign exposed the human cost of oil extraction 
practices in Alberta, undermining the image of Western Canada as a friendly and 
welcoming place. Moreover, their actions called into question the connection between 
Canadian identity and the land, a connection that was central to the meaning of Olympic 
commodities. Understood in this context, Olympic commodities were fetish objects that, 
in Anne McClintock’s words, represented an “impossible irresolution”9 related to land, 
belonging and identity in Canada. This chapter explores how commercial practices shape 
narratives about who has the right to own, and profit from, an area’s natural and cultural 
resources. What was at stake extended far beyond profits. The survival of the Lubicon 
Cree as a distinct cultural group depended on the answer to the question: who has 
jurisdiction over the petroleum found in Northern Alberta and, correspondingly, the land?  
“Survival-of-the-Fittest:” Organizing and Financing the 
Games 
 
The Calgary Olympics occurred during the rise of neo-liberalism. David Harvey 
identifies what he calls “the first experiment with neoliberal state formation” as occurring 
in Chile in 1973, when Augusto Pinochet ousted the democratically elected Salvadore 
Allende in a coup.10 Pinochet invited a group of American economists influenced by 
Milton Friedman, a prominent economist and proponent of neo-liberalism, to help the 
Chilean government re-structure its economy. Chile took out loans from the International 
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Monetary Fund and brought its economy in line with neo-liberal policies.11 Around the 
same time, many countries began experiencing “stagflation”: economic growth declined, 
unemployment rates rose and inflation increased. Governments began implementing neo-
liberal policies in response to this economic crisis.12  
In May 1979, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party won the federal election in Britain 
with a mandate to reform the country’s struggling economy. That October, Paul Volcker, 
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, began reforming American monetary policy 
by abandoning the Keynesian principles that underpinned the New Deal. Ronald Reagan, 
who was elected President in the U.S. the following year, embraced Volcker’s neo-liberal 
economic policies. As Harvey writes, “the dramatic consolidation of neoliberalism as a 
new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy at the state level in the advanced 
capitalist world occurred in the United States and Britain in 1979.”13  
In Canada, Brian Mulroney, who served as Prime Minister from 1984 to 1993, was 
sympathetic to Thatcher and Reagan’s conservative agenda. He sought to shift the 
country away from social welfare and towards neo-liberalism.14 During his first mandate, 
Mulroney cut back on inter-governmental fiscal transfers, partially de-indexed tax credits, 
and reduced both family allowances and old age security benefits.15 However, he was 
bound by his election promise to maintain the “sacred trust” of universal income benefits 
for families with children and seniors, restricting his ability to impose broad-based 
changes to the nation’s economy.16 After Mulroney was re-elected in November 1988, he 
introduced more neo-liberal policies in Canada and restructured key elements of 
Canada’s social security system. For example, his government restricted Canadians’ 
eligibility for family income and old age benefits and stopped directly financing 
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unemployment insurance.17 Thus, the 1988 Calgary Olympics occurred at a time when 
Canada was becoming more oriented towards neo-liberalism.  
As the head of CODA and, later, Chairman of OCO’88,18 Frank King ran the Calgary 
Olympics as a business venture and favoured minimal government involvement in the 
Games. At a February 1979 press conference, King said:  
Sports and businesses have to be combined if the Games are going to be 
successful. I believe the people of Calgary want the Games but there will 
be tremendous resistance to any additional tax burdens. For that reason 
the Games will be organized by people with a business background 
combined with a love of sport.19  
King’s early relationship with the Canadian Olympic Association (COA) reflects his 
market-oriented approach to organizing the Games. Calgary needed to secure the COA’s 
endorsement in order to submit an Olympic bid to the IOC, but the COA was considering 
endorsing Vancouver instead Calgary. In his book, Kings described COA members as 
“customers” whose trust he had to earn.20 Moreover, King compared the Calgary Games 
to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, which were financed entirely through private funds 
and commercialized to an unprecedented degree.21 King wrote: “Los Angeles and 
Calgary had Games controlled by business people using a survival-of-the-fittest 
management style. In our case, that style was adopted during the early bid years.”22  
The board of directors for OCO’88 included businesspeople like King, IOC and COA 
members, and representatives from the federal, provincial and municipal governments. 
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King celebrated the highly commercial nature of the 1988 Calgary Olympics, arguing 
that:  
In a free-enterprise economy like Canada’s, the government isn’t needed 
to act as a laundry service for revenues that are used for sport. 
Businesses that want to support sport and the Olympic aims can do so 
efficiently...the alternative is to fund Games by increasing taxation, 
which affects everyone, including those who don’t want their money 
spent on sport.23 
Although this view is consistent with a neo-liberal economic model that supports the 
privatization of public services and events, it is not entirely accurate. The federal and 
provincial governments gave a total of $52 million to OCO’88, its third largest source of 
revenue.24 Moreover, the federal government contributed an additional $200 million from 
the sales of Olympic coins and stamps, along with contributions from the provinces taken 
from their lottery proceeds.25  
The way King and his colleagues managed TV rights negotiations exemplifies this drive 
to run the Olympics as a profit-driven endeavour. After consulting with experts, they took 
steps to make the Olympics more attractive to broadcasters.26 For example, OCO’88 re-
scheduled the dates of the Calgary Games to coincide with American broadcaster sweeps 
(the yearly calculation of network ratings, which influence the value of a network’s 
advertising rates).27 As King described: “For the first time the Winter Games were being 
packaged as a marketable product. We developed clear specifications for what we were 
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offering. We added every possible feature so that the networks would bid higher than 
ever before.”28 A pin with the words “Calgary ‘88” and the Olympic rings, spelling out 
the letters ABC (the eventual winner of the American broadcast rights to the Games), 
symbolized OCO’88’s marketization of the Games.  In fact, an article in the Globe and 
Mail described ABC pins as the “hot items” for pin traders.29 When Dave Bellingham 
tried to initiate a trade for an ABC pin, he was told by Trevor Pelachuk that it would take 
“an arm and a leg and a pint of blood, plus your first born child” to get it.30 
 
Figure 15: Calgary Olympics pin available on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
 
 
Figure 16: ABC sign, OCO’88, Official Report, 86.  
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The IOC, OCO’88, and a sports marketing firm, Trans World International ran the 
American TV rights negotiations. Barney et al. argue that these negotiations marked the 
first time that the IOC and a local organizing committee cooperated as equal partners.31 
The joint team led the negotiations in rounds and networks had to submit their bids 
confidentially, so they never knew if they had been outbid by their competition. The team 
raised the minimum price that networks could bid on the rights in every round, until ABC 
ultimately won the rights by agreeing to pay $326 million. This was the highest amount 
any network had ever paid for broadcast rights to the Olympic Games. In fact, for ABC, 
it proved too high since the network would later lose $40 million broadcasting the 
Games.32  
In addition to co-operating with OCO’88 to negotiate broadcast rights, the IOC had 
recently implemented The Olympic Partner (TOP) Program in 1988. TOP gave 
companies Olympic marketing rights, category exclusivity, and permission to use 
licensed Olympic symbols and logos.33 At an IOC meeting in Lisbon in 1985, IOC 
President Juan Antonio Samaranch underscored the importance of TOP, saying that “it 
was extremely dangerous for the IOC and NOCs [National Olympic Committees] to be 
reliant on television money alone.”34 Twenty-one companies, including Canada Safeway 
Limited, General Motors of Canada, Labatt’s, and the Royal Bank of Canada, each gave a 
minimum donation of $2 million to become official Olympic sponsors.35 TOP proved 
attractive to companies because of its exclusivity: only one company within each 
particular industry category could have this official Olympic sponsor designation. 
However, OCO’88 members had deep ties to the petroleum industry and they did not 
want to restrict companies within that industry from sponsoring the Games. As an 
alternative, they permitted a group of 40 petroleum companies to sponsor, collectively, 
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the Olympics for $4.8 million. Known as Team Petroleum ’88, it “served to unite the 
petroleum community behind the Games.”36 In addition, some oil companies supported 
specific Olympic events. Petro Canada sponsored and organized the Torch Relay. Shell 
Canada sponsored the Glenbow Museum’s Olympic exhibit The Spirit Sings: Artistic 
Traditions of Canada’s First People. Texaco sponsored the musical Porgy and Bess 
(which was part of the Olympic art festival show).37  
 
 
Figure 17: Team Petroleum symbol, OCO’88, Official Report, 650.  
 
 “Marketing for Success”: Olympic Education Resource Kits  
 
Members of OCO’88’s Youth and Education Department created Olympic Education 
Resource Kits, “designed to increase the awareness of young people about the aims and 
ideals of the Olympic Movement and about the XV Olympic Winter Games.”38 
Education resource kits were available for elementary (grades 1-6), junior high (grades 7-
9) and senior high (grades 10-12) school students.39 OCO’88 distributed these kits to 
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schools in Alberta and they proved so popular that the federal government paid for the 
nationwide printing and distribution of the elementary school education kit.40 
The goal of the Youth Committee was to create “opportunities for young people from all 
walks of life, in Calgary, Alberta, across Canada and internationally (where possible) to 
experience the magic and the spirit of the XV Olympic Winter Games.”41 The kits did 
more than spread the Olympic spirit and promote Olympic sponsors. They also exposed 
Canadian youth to market fundamentalist values, including the marketization of public 
goods and services. For example, the elementary school resource kit included a statement 
from OCO’88’s General Manager of Corporate Relations, David Shanks, who wrote: 
“These Games will cost a lot of money to be the best-ever Winter Olympics. Many 
companies can help us by providing money, goods and services as our official partners. It 
is a good partnership because the Olympics are very special and being involved helps 
companies promote their business.”42  
One activity in the junior high education kit encouraged students to consider how 
Olympic broadcasts are, in King’s words, “packaged as a marketable product.”43 In fact, 
the activity was likely based on the fact that ABC had paid $326 million for the Games’ 
broadcast rights. Students were asked to imagine themselves as “the president of XYZ 
Television Network. Your network has just spent $300 million for the right to broadcast 
an Olympic Games. List the requests you intend to make of the Organizing Committee so 
that your network gets maximum benefit from your investment.”44 Another activity 
educated students on the importance of copyrighting original work. After creating their 
own personal symbols, students were asked to consider the following scenario: “A 
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student walks into the classroom wearing your symbol. Describe your feelings and what 
you would say to that person. How would you decide who gets to keep it?” The next 
question was: “Why would the Olympic Movement copyright its symbols?”45 Notably, 
this activity coincided with the recent introduction of the TOP Program, a program that 
increased the value of copyrighted Olympic symbols.  
The information in the senior high school resource kit about the commercial aspects of 
the Olympics was more nuanced than the information in the elementary and junior high 
school kits. For example, one activity asked senior high school students to debate the 
question: “Do the Olympic Games justify the money and effort spent to stage them and 
produce athletes to compete in them?” The kit encouraged students to consider both sides 
of the debate, including the statement: “Athletes become pawns in a game of corporate 
and political Olympic one-upmanship.”46 However, another section, called “Marketing 
For Success,” unabashedly celebrated the commercialism of the Calgary Olympics. 
Teachers were encouraged to discuss “specific examples of a good marketing strategy” 
with their students, such as “Calgary’s bid for the 1998 Olympic Games and OCO’88’s 
ongoing sales strategy.”47 This activity taught students about the market fundamentalist 
practices that underpinned OCO’88’s operations and introduced them to region branding, 
a commercial practice I discuss in the proceeding section.  
Adding to “the Prosperity of its People:” City and Region 
Branding  
 
City and region branding practices treat geographic locations like commodities whose 
meanings can be shaped by marketing and promotional campaigns.48 They became linked 
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to international sporting events in Canada as early as 1954, when Vancouver hosted the 
British Empire and Commonwealth (BEC) Games. For example, Canadian cities and 
corporations sponsored full page ads in the Vancouver BEC Games’ joint Souvenir 
Book/Program of Events, highlighting the strength of Western Canada’s economy. A 
message articulated in these ads was that the region’s natural resources and industries 
greatly contributed to the country’s economic strength. Significantly, Canadian 
industries, alongside municipal and provincial governments, promoted this message. 
Sponsored pages contained images of wheat fields in Saskatchewan, skyscrapers in 
Edmonton and Calgary, an oil refinery tower in Alberta, and an electricity generating 
station in British Columbia.49 A number of pages in this program advertised Western 
Canada’s thriving oil and gas industry. In February 1947, Imperial Oil discovered oil in 
Leduc, Alberta, an area 13 miles southeast of Edmonton.50 Although petroleum and its 
derivatives had already been discovered in Western Canada, the Leduc discovery made 
an easily accessible source of carbon-based fuel available to Canadians for the first 
time.51 Imperial Oil’s sponsored page in the Victoria BEC Games’ book characterized its 
discovery of oil at Leduc as “Canada’s most important oil discovery.”52 The company 
told readers that Canada produced almost half of its oil requirements and roughly half of 
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the British Commonwealth’s total oil production.53 Edmonton presented itself as the 
“centre of Canada’s vast multi-million dollar oil, gas and petrochemical development”54 
while Calgary’s page noted that the city’s energy industry “adds to the prosperity of its 
people.”55  
Michael Dawson uses the example of the 1954 BEC Games to argue that “many of the 
aims pursued by cities hosting sporting mega-events over the past 30 years were also 
pursued by cities eager to host the Commonwealth Games as early as the 1950s.”56 For 
example, Vancouverites hoped that hosting the Games would boost their city’s 
reputation. Additionally, organizers of Vancouver’s bid predicted that the event would 
put the city on the map (they did not specify whether this was a national or international 
map).57 An article in the Vancouver Sun noted that the Games offered the city “a tangible 
opportunity to show ‘Eastern’ Canadians what Vancouver could do.”58 However, the 
1954 BEC Games boosted more than the city’s reputation. Taken collectively, the 
sponsored pages in the souvenir book/program of events helped to improve Western 
Canada’s reputation by advertising the region’s economic growth and social 
development. Moreover, the pages helped convey the message that Western Canada’s 
natural resources significantly contributed to Canada’s economic strength. The nation’s 
economy had grown significantly following the Second World War. During the war, 
Canadians found themselves unable to rely on Britain or the US for economic support. As 
Donald Creighton writes, the “leaders of the Canadian economy were compelled to 
cultivate the virtues of self-reliance, initiative, and daring more than they had ever done 
in the past.”59 The government supported industrial production by granting large 
contracts and capital cost allowances (tax benefits) to national and international 
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companies.60 After the war, these changes had lasting effects on the economy. For 
example, American direct investment in Canadian petroleum and natural gas resources 
rose from $141 million in 1945 to $635 million in 1951.61 
Cagliari or Calgary?: Branding Western Canada  
 
The mayor of Cagliari, Italy received several messages from well-wishers who, confusing 
his city with Calgary, congratulated him for winning the 1988 Winter Olympics bid.62 
This mix-up reveals that Calgary was not a globally recognized city in 1981 when it won 
the bid to host the Olympics. However, the Games helped the city remedy this situation. 
In fact, in their foreword to the Official Report of the Calgary Olympics, Frank King and 
Bill Pratt wrote that cities around the world want to host the Games because they “are a 
huge media event” that attracts a large audience and promotes “the host city in large 
population areas.”63 Similarly, Calgary Mayor Ralph Klein remarked in 1988 that hosting 
the Olympics offered Calgarians a chance tell a global audience that Calgary is “a major 
player in North America.”64 A section on the legacy of the Olympic Games in the senior 
school education kit described the “intangible spinoffs” from the Olympic Games, which 
included a “widened public exposure to sport and western Canada as a result of media 
coverage. The perceptions of Calgary and Western Canada will be altered 
significantly.”65 
Olympic organizers and municipal politicians used the Games to improve Calgary’s 
global image and to brand Western Canada as a place that honoured its frontier history, 
while not being stuck in the past. Kevin Wamsley and Michael Heine argue that 
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Calgary’s Olympic bid highlighted both modern facilities in Calgary and “the images of 
Western hospitality projected as historical tradition.”66 CODA and OCO’88 members 
used white cowboy hats to symbolize the region’s historical ties to ranching and farming. 
These hats underscored how OCO’88 members commodified local identity and culture. 
King made white cowboy hats a part of CODA’s signature look, handing them out as 
gifts to IOC members.67 During the opening ceremony of the Games, the Canadian 
Olympians marching in the Parade of Nations wore red and white coats with Western-
style leather fringe and white cowboy hats.68 Smithbilt Hats, a Calgary company said to 
have created the first white cowboy hat, was an official licensee of the Calgary 
Olympics.69 It produced and sold white cowboy hats branded with the Calgary Olympic 
Games’ emblem.   
 
 
Figure 18: Smithbilt hat with the Calgary Olympics emblem available on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
  
The fact that these hats connoted Western Canadian culture and identity was made 
explicit in OCO’88’s description of the Games’ mascots, two polar bears named Hidy 
and Howdy. Hidy donned a blue dress while Howdy wore a blue vest,. Both mascots 
sported red scarves around their necks which matched the red band on their white 
cowboy hats. The official report of the Calgary Games noted that the mascots’ “colorful 
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costumes portrayed the Western hospitality of Calgary.”70 Their names, chosen by public 
contest, also reflected “Calgary’s Western heritage.”71 An exercise in the junior school 
education kit highlighted the mascots’ Western attire by asking students: “What symbols 
did the artist include in her drawing of Hidy and Howdy?”72 Although Hidy and Howdy 
were meant to symbolize friendliness, OCO’88 member Van Wheeler, dressed as Hidy, 
accidentally hit IOC President Samaranch with the mascot’s protruding nose.73 
 
Figure 19: Hidy and Howdy, OCO’88, XV Olympic Winter Games, 57. 
 
These mascots exemplify organizers’ attempts to appeal to and profit from regional and 
national identity, as seen in OCO’88’s general guidelines for choosing a mascot:   
A mascot is selected by an Olympic Organizing Committee for two 
key purposes – promotion and marketing...The mascot is an integral 
part of any advertising or promotional activity. A mascot is also an 
invaluable marketing tool. For the 1988 Olympic Winter Games, 
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the sponsorship and licensing programs are essential to our 
financial operations.74 
Before deciding on the design of the mascots, OCO’88 asked experts from four major 
department stores in Canada to provide input. The group suggested that the mascot 
should be a bear.75 OCO’88 members also identified desirable characteristics of a 
commercially appealing mascot. These included: wide appeal, especially with children, 
being non-political, unique, identifiable with winter and Canada, easy to reproduce in 
print, and the ability to be turned into souvenir merchandise.76 Hasbro Canada produced 
plush toys of Hidy and Howdy and the mascots appeared on Olympic pins, license plates, 
and spoons.77 
 
                                                 
74 General guidelines for choosing a mascot, 1983, Box 1, File: Mascot, 1983-1984, Governing Boards and 
Executive Group, XII, Executive Group, President W. Pratt, Committee Liaison, Correspondence, Minutes 
and Reference Material, XVWGI, CCA. 
75 December 16 1983, Press Release: “OCO’88 Official Mascots Make Olympic History,” Box 1, File: 
Mascot 1983-1984, Governing Boards and Executive Group XII, Executive Group, President W. Pratt, 
Committee Liaison, Correspondence, Minutes and Reference Material, XVWGI, CCA. 
76 General guidelines for choosing a mascot, 1983, Box 1, File: Mascot, 1983-1984, Governing Boards and 
Executive Group, XII, Executive Group, President W. Pratt, Committee Liaison, Correspondence, Minutes 
and Reference Material, XVWGI, CCA. 
77 Official licensees, July 1 1987, Box 21, File: Marketing Licenses, 1987, Communications I, Group X: PR 
Division, Youth and Education, XVWGI, CCA. 
120 
 
Figure 20: Hidy and Howdy commodities available on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
 
Some 9,000 volunteers with the Calgary Olympics were also trained to convey Western 
Canadian friendliness. The Volunteer Training Manual noted that  “Calgary is famous for 
its hospitality and true western warmth.” It instructed volunteers to “smile and be 
friendly” while on duty.78 They were also told to be “well groomed and aware of overall 
appearance” and “have a genuine interest in people from diverse cultures.”79 This 
training, I argue, taught Calgarians how to “live the brand.” Aronczyk uses this term to 
describe “a concerted and comprehensive strategy by national citizens of all strata of 
society to assimilate and communicate” a nation branding message.80 Thus, the 
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information in the Volunteer Training Manual helped construct the brand image of 
Western Canada that Olympic volunteers were expected to embody.  
Olympic organizers represented Western Canada as a place that was rooted in tradition, 
but not stuck in the past. For example, the information book produced by International 
Sports and Leisure Marketing to attract Olympic corporate sponsors described Calgary as 
a “centre for traditional grain and livestock production” that recently “added a vast petro-
chemical industry to that ‘rodeo’ heritage.”81 Similarly, the Volunteer Training Manual 
depicted Calgary’s corporate and ranching cultures as complementary: 
Calgary is a Western city, unique in Canada. It was founded by rugged 
pioneers who valued the warmth and friendliness of humans meeting in 
the wide and vast expanses of the west. Our city grew, fuelled by 
industries that thrived on risk and vitality. Today we are a modern city, 
culturally rich, technologically fruitful, and future oriented. But in our best 
tradition we still retain the qualities that distinguished the pioneers.82 
This idea was also represented visually through a hot air balloon festival that coincided 
with the Calgary Games. Kodak sponsored the festival, which included balloons in the 
shape of propane tanks, gasoline pumps, and cowboys.83 Likewise, an ad for the Calgary 
Tourist and Convention Bureau showed a man in a cowboy hat extending his hand to the 
viewer, as if to shake that person’s hand. He was surrounded by images of mountains, 
skiers, grazing cows, and horses pulling a cart. The same man appeared in another frame 
of the poster, also extending his hand to the viewer. This time, he was dressed in a suit 
and stood next to a woman wearing a fur coat. OCO’88’s Youth Committee included this 
ad in a section of the senior school education kit, called “Selling Calgary.” Students were 
asked to identify the audience for this poster and draw a parallel between the way 
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Calgary sells itself and the way OCO’88 sells the Olympic Games.84 Thus, the Calgary 
Tourist and Convention Bureau used the ad to brand Calgary while the Olympic Youth 
Committee used it to teach Canadian students that cities and Olympic Games are just like 
any other commodity whose meaning can be shaped through branding practices.  
The Volunteer Training Manual also advised that, “in spite of its reputation,” Calgary 
was not “a cowboy town.”85 For Wamsley and Heine, this point underscores the fact that 
OCO’88 instructed volunteers to represent Calgary as a modern and advanced city.86 
David Whitson supports this interpretation, noting: “Burdened, in some ways, by the 
city’s history as a ‘cowboy town’, civic and provincial leaders (like [Alberta Premier 
Peter] Lougheed) saw the Olympics as a perfect stage on which to demonstrate that 
Calgary was a vibrant and forward-looking metropolis, and not stuck in its agricultural 
past.”87 OCO’88 certainly depicted Calgary as modern and business-friendly, but 
Whitson’s argument that the city was burdened by its history as a frontier town is 
unsubstantiated. OCO’88 did not hide Calgary’s identity as a “cowboy town.” Rather, it 
asserted that the city’s more recent petroleum wealth complemented its traditional 
cowboy identity.  
Championed in the Volunteer Training Manual was the view that Calgary was no longer 
just a cowboy town; it had also become a vibrant oil and gas town. This emphasis on 
Calgary’s energy economy added value to that industry’s sponsorship of the 1988 
Olympics. As well, through Team Petroleum, the oil and gas industry reinforced the 
brand association between Calgary and oil and gas wealth established by OCO’88. John 
Fisher, Senior Vice President and General Manager of the Canadian Western Natural Gas 
Company, affirmed how the industry benefitted from sponsoring the Olympics along with 
Calgary when he said: “The flame on the Calgary Tower and flames at the venue sites 
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will do Calgary proud before the eyes of the world. As well as being a showcase for 
Calgary and the Olympics, the flame will remind everyone of the central role of the 
energy industry in Alberta’s development.”88  
“Let the Eastern Bastards Freeze in the Dark:” Provincial-
Federal Relations  
 
The region branding practices of the Calgary Olympics, in conjunction with the energy 
industry’s sponsorship of the Games, helped shape public perceptions of Alberta’s 
relationship with the federal government. They also highlighted the fact that, although 
Ottawa had tried to retain control over the province’s petroleum resources in the past, 
Alberta now maintained jurisdiction over these resources. Significantly, Olympic 
commodities reflected the fact that Alberta was the country’s centre of petroleum 
production and that its relationship with the federal government was no longer 
antagonistic. Most significantly, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had dismantled the 
controversial National Energy Policy. When Peter Lougheed was elected Premier of 
Alberta in 1971, he argued that the province, not Ottawa, had jurisdiction over the 
region’s natural resources. Lougheed resisted Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s efforts to 
regulate the petroleum industry and energy companies based in Alberta became caught in 
the middle of this conflict. Paul Chastko argues that “with the possible exception of 
Trudeau’s struggle to patriate Canada’s constitution, no issue received more attention, or 
was waged as ruthlessly, as the energy battles between Edmonton and Ottawa.”89  
On the night he was elected premier, Lougheed told his wife Jeanne that he was 
determined to “take control of our [Alberta’s] own resources.” 90 David Wood writes 
that, once oil was discovered in Alberta, many Albertans realized that “they had 
something the rest of the family [Canada] wanted...‘Now,’ felt Albertans, ‘you need 
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something we have, we control, and damn it, you’re going to acknowledge, at the least, 
that we’re an important part of Canada.’ It would be hard to exaggerate the intensity and 
extent of this largely unspoken feeling.”91 As Premier, Lougheed depicted the 
relationship between Alberta and other Canadian provinces in adversarial terms, arguing 
in 1973: “We have to try to protect Alberta’s public interest – not from the public interest 
of Canada as a whole – but from central and eastern Canadian domination of the West.”92 
The first serious disagreement between Lougheed and Trudeau occurred in September 
1973 when Trudeau asserted control over the price of Canadian oil in response to rising 
global oil prices.93 He froze the price of domestic petroleum products, reduced the 
depletion allowance companies could claim by 8%, and, most troubling to Lougheed, 
announced an export tax of 40¢ per barrel of oil.94 In a speech to the Canadian Club in 
Calgary on September 14 1973, Lougheed said that the tax:  
appears to be the most discriminatory action taken by a federal 
government against a particular province in the entire history of 
Confederation. The natural resources of the provinces are owned by 
the provinces under the terms of Confederation. The action taken 
by Ottawa strikes at the very roots of confederation.95  
On October 4 1973, Lougheed responded to the export tax by announcing plans to 
eliminate the cap the province had previously placed on the amount of money oil 
companies must pay the province for the right to extract oil from the land (known as 
royalties).96  
Shortly after Lougheed’s announcement, in November 1973, the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), placed an embargo on oil supplies in response to 
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the Yom Kippur War, shutting out countries (including Canada) that had pro-Israeli 
foreign policies.97 In response to the embargo, Trudeau developed a new energy policy 
aiming to increase Canada’s oil self-sufficiency. John Erik Fossum argues that this policy 
reflected Ottawa’s belief that Canada’s oil was a strategic, rather than ordinary, 
commodity.98  Trudeau announced plans to create a national oil company, Petro Canada, 
construct a pipeline to Montreal, and decrease exports of crude oil to the United States by 
10%.99   
In March 1974, Alberta announced that it would increase the amount of money petroleum 
companies had to pay the province in royalties. 100 That November, the Liberals 
announced that petroleum companies could no longer consider these provincial royalties 
a business expense and would therefore have to start paying more federal taxes.101 Wood 
argues that this policy “put a barrier between the citizens of Alberta and their primary 
industry.”102 Lougheed called it “probably the biggest ripoff of any province that’s ever 
occurred in Confederation’s history.”103 The biggest conflict between Trudeau and 
Lougheed came in October 1980 when the Liberals released their federal budget. The 
budget focused heavily on Canada’s energy policy and introduced the National Energy 
Policy (NEP), which signalled Ottawa’s intention to increase its control over the 
country’s petroleum resources. The NEP introduced new taxes on the petrochemical 
industry, including a Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax, which took the form of a wellhead 
tax on petroleum products.104 Lougheed reacted to the policy by saying: “I think what’s 
happened is that the Ottawa government has, without negotiation, without agreement, 
simply walked into our home and occupied the living room.”105 
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Chastko argues that the NEP “inaugurated a new era in federal-provincial relations and 
made a comprehensive energy policy that aimed a dagger right at the heart of the oil 
industry.”106 After the federal policy was announced, the TSE oil and gas index dropped 
more than eight hundred points and stock owners sold so many shares of Canadian 
petroleum companies that the TSE temporarily suspended trading on these stocks.107 The 
Canadian Petroleum Association (CPA) claimed that the NEP caused drilling activity in 
Canada to decline by 22% and led to the loss of fifteen thousand jobs.108 Some Albertans 
who opposed the NEP brandished bumper stickers with the phrase: “Let the Eastern 
Bastards Freeze in the Dark!” 109 In response to the NEP, Lougheed “turned down the 
taps” and reduced crude oil production by 15%, or about 180,000 barrels a day. 110  
Relations between Edmonton and Ottawa improved in 1984 when Brian Mulroney’s 
Progressive Conservative Party came to power. In his first term as Prime Minister, 
Mulroney dismantled the NEP in a series of accords reached with oil producing 
provinces, in effect decreasing federal involvement in the industry.111 Even before Petro 
Canada was privatized in 1991, Mulroney directed it to operate like any other private 
sector oil company, rather than as an instrument of public policy (which was Trudeau’s 
approach to Petro Canada).112  
The fact that the Calgary Olympics occurred at a time when relations between the 
Alberta and federal government were improving helps, in part, to explain why the 
symbols of regional and national identity complemented rather than clashed with one 
another. The most prominent example of these complementary symbols was the Calgary 
Games’ emblem. Designed entirely in red, it featured five interlocking “c”s that 
combined to create a snowflake and maple leaf. The official report described the 
symbolism of the emblem in their words: “The small C’s were designed to represent 
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Calgary and the large C’s to represent Canada. The five interlocking C’s represented the 
theme ‘Coming Together in Calgary,’ the stylized Maple Leaf represented Canada and 
the snowflake design represented the Olympic Winter Games.”113 The official report 
noted that the snowflake emblem, when used in conjunction with the five ring Olympic 
emblem, “became the cornerstone of marketing and communications programs.”114  
 
Figure 21: Calgary Olympics emblem, OCO’88, XV Olympic Winter Games, 5. 
 
 
Figure 22: Calgary Olympics emblem pins available on eBay, www.ebay.com 
 
 
                                                 
113 OCO’88, XV Olympic Winter Games, 53. 
114 Ibid., 53.  
128 
I discussed earlier in this chapter that Hidy and Howdy represented Western Canadian 
hospitality, but that these mascots were also “chosen as uniquely Canadian 
representatives of the Organizing Committee.”115 COA member Bruce Kidd wrote a 
report for OCO’88 arguing that the committee could attract Canadians’ interest and 
involvement in the Calgary Games by drawing on the theme of “winter.” He wrote: 
“Canada, and the Canadians, are defined by their winter. Its joys – and its terrors – are 
shared by the native peoples, the two founding peoples, and inhabitants in every 
province, territory and region.” 116 Because polar bears thrive in northern Canada, they 
helped promote this message. Furthermore, by using the Calgary Games to increase 
Canadians’ participation in winter sports, OCO’88 could “reinforce national unity by 
focusing on activities common to all peoples and regions and which culturally distinguish 
Canadians from Americans.”117  
Pins containing the Games’ emblem alongside prominent symbols of Western Canadian 
identity were available for sale. The easy co-existence of symbols of regional and 
national identity of these commodities contrasts with the Montreal Games’ commodities, 
where symbols of local and national identity drew attention to pre-existing conflicts 
between French and English Canadians. For example, a pin in the shape of a white 
cowboy hat branded with the Calgary Games’ emblem was for sale. Other pins for sale 
contained symbols of national and regional identity alongside corporate brands, like 
Coca-Cola and Team Petroleum’88’s logos. These logos did not eclipse the symbols of 
regional and national identity, but instead complemented one another.   
                                                 
115 Ibi., 259.   
116 Bruce Kidd, National Involvement in the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, Box 31, Youth Games 
Committee, 1985-1988, Communications I, Group X: PR Division, Youth and Education, XVWGI, CCA. 
117 Ibid.   
129 
 
 
Figure 23: Calgary Olympics pins available on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
 
“Forget Not My World:” The Lubicon Cree’s Anti-Olympic 
Campaign   
 
Thus far, I have shown how the regional and corporate branding practices in the Calgary 
Olympics mutually informed and reinforced one another. The alignment of these 
messages takes on greater significance when considered in relation to the Lubicon Cree’s 
boycott of the Games. An Indigenous community living in northwestern Alberta, the 
Lubicon used the Games to draw attention to the devastating impact oil extraction 
practices were having on their community. By highlighting this fact, the Lubicon made it 
difficult to ignore the human cost of the commoditization of the land by the province and 
petroleum companies. Thus, the political dimensions of region and corporate branding in 
the Calgary Olympics takes on a different meaning when contextualized within the 
Lubicon’s anti-Olympic campaign. Specifically, these practices helped the province and 
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energy companies to promote their interests over Lubicon interests. This argument 
illustrates that Melissa Aronczyk’s claim that nation branding affects the “moral basis of 
national citizenship”118 also applies to region branding. She argues that these branding 
campaigns come “at the cost of recognizing internal differentiation, resistance or 
conflict.”119 Indeed, the Calgary Games celebrated Western Canada’s oil wealth and 
sidelined the Lubicon’s opposition to oil and gas drilling. These practices downplayed 
but did not silence the Lubicon’s concerns, illustrating that Olympic commodities did not 
perfectly represent region and corporate branding messages. Rather, they were fetish 
objects that symbolized conflicting ideas about the meaning of Alberta’s land and the 
resources contained within it.  
 In 1986, the Chief of the Lubicon Cree, Bernard Ominayak, called for an international 
boycott of the Games. “The Calgary Olympic Games are being organized by basically 
the same interests that are committing genocide against the Lubicon Lake Indian people,” 
he announced in a news release.120 Companies had been extracting oil in Lubicon 
territory since the 1950s, but these practices had accelerated in the late 1970s. By 1984, 
more than 400 oil and gas wells existed within a fifteen mile radius of Little Buffalo, the 
main Lubicon town; more than 100 oil and gas companies operated in the area.121 These 
practices impeded the Lubicon community’s ability to hunt and trap animals, which were 
its primary sources of food and income. Company bulldozers pushed snow and debris 
into piles that blocked animal trails and buried traps and snares. The Lubicon accused oil 
workers of intentionally destroying trapping lines. The environmental damage of oil and 
gas extraction caused wildlife population numbers to decline dramatically. 122 In the 
winter of 1979-1980, the average Lubicon family earned more than $5, 000 from 
trapping. A year later, earnings dropped to $4,000. By the winter of 1983-84, earnings 
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had sunk to $400 and more than 90% of Lubicon people were on social assistance 
compared to 10% in 1978.123  
The Mohawk anthropologist Dawn Martin-Hill conducted interviews with members of 
the Lubicon community which revealed the extent to which their cultural identity and 
material livelihood were tied to the land. “We survived off this land for many years, and 
everything that we do surrounds the land. For example, through our prayers and the 
ceremonies that we have, everything is tied back to the land,”124 said Bernard Ominayak. 
“Our ways are disappearing fast.... once we lose that connection with the earth and the 
animals, this land around us, whatever we have survived off of for these many years, it’s 
weakening us.” The first suicide in memory in Little Buffalo occurred in 1985 when a 
father of six, who could no longer hunt and trap, fell into a depression and took his own 
life.125 Six months before Calgary hosted the Olympics, the Lubicon community 
experienced an outbreak of tuberculosis. A total of 27 people had active tuberculosis and 
107 were infected and at risk of developing symptoms. John Goddard argues that the 
tuberculosis outbreak reflected the declining socio-economic conditions in the 
community caused by oil company activity in the region: “Tuberculosis is a lung disease 
that usually spreads through coughing and thrives among people whose physical 
resistance is low from substandard living conditions, poor diet and stress.”126 
A museum exhibit affiliated with the Calgary Olympics, The Spirit Sings: Artistic 
Traditions of Canada’s First People, became the focal point for the Lubicon’s anti-
Olympic campaign. The flagship cultural event of the Games, this exhibit at the Glenbow 
Museum in Calgary showcased artifacts from Indigenous cultures that had been taken 
from Canada and were exhibited in museums around the world. A 1986 press release 
from Glenbow Museum described the exhibit as having:   
                                                 
123 Report by Kenneth Bodden, qtd in Goddard Last Stand of the Lubicon Cree, 77.  
124 Bernard Ominayak, qtd in Dawn Martin-Hill, The Lubicon Lake Nation: Indigenous Knowledge and 
Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 90.  
125 Goddard, Last Stand of the Lubicon Cree, 132.  
126 Ibid., 154.  
132 
an estimated 500 of the rarest and most revealing artifacts of 
early Canadian Indian and Inuit culture. What is surprising is 
that almost all of these works of art and artifacts will be 
borrowed from more than forty institutions and private 
collectors in twenty-one countries. Few are in Canadian 
collections. They left Canada from the 17th to 19th centuries as 
souvenirs or gifts from native peoples to explorers, traders, 
missionaries, and colonial officials.127 
Shell Canada paid $1.1 million to become the exclusive sponsor of the exhibit. The 
Glenbow Museum also had deep ties to the petroleum industry. Eric Harvie, a Calgary-
based millionaire who earned his fortune in the oil industry, founded the museum. 
Executives from Gulf Oil, Rozsa Petroleum, British Petroleum Canada and Wellore 
Resources sat on the museum’s Board of Governors.128 Fred Lennarson, a close advisor 
to Ominayak, wrote that the irony of The Spirit Sings exhibit was obvious: “A display of 
North American Indian artifacts to attract people to the Winter Olympics is being 
organized by interests who are still actively seeking to destroy Indian people: namely, the 
Alberta Government and its oil-company allies.”129  
The original title of the exhibit, Forget Not My World, was a strong, if unintentional, 
reminder of the struggles the Lubicon were facing. Their opposition to the exhibit 
challenged the veracity of Shell Canada President Jack M. MacLeod’s statement that the 
exhibit “will give us all a chance to expand our understanding of Canadian native 
heritage, and will add an exciting dimension to the Olympic Arts Festival...Shell’s 
participation in this project is consistent with our commitment to Canada.”130 Glenbow 
Museum Director Duncan Cameron was initially reluctant to change the name of the 
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exhibit; but in 1986, he met with the exhibit’s curators, who argued that the title “would 
be offensive to native people” because it gave the appearance that they no longer existed 
in Canada. 131 The committee urged Cameron “in the strongest possible terms” to change 
the title.132 He ultimately agreed to ask OCO’88 and Shell Canada to approve a new title 
as long as it was one Cameral felt “would be marketable.”133 Cameron’s emphasis on 
marketability contradicts a statement by Julia Harrison, one of the curators of The Spirit 
Sings, about Shell’s sponsorship of the exhibit. In an article in Anthropology Today 
defending the exhibit, she wrote:  
In this era of declining government support, cultural institutions 
(including universities) have no option but to seek outside support 
for projects they undertake. This does not mean that corporate 
sponsors play editorial roles in the theme and focus of the projects 
they fund. Nor is there any evidence that the public confuses 
corporate support for a museum’s support for corporate policy.134 
Harrison further wrote that the campaign had attracted a great deal of media attention that 
depicted the federal and provincial governments, the energy industry, Glenbow Museum 
and the Olympics in a negative light.135 In 1986, Ominayak travelled to Europe to request 
that museums withhold artifacts requested for The Spirit Sings exhibit. Many curators 
agreed to his request, but the exact number of museums which refused to lend material to 
the Glenbow Museum is disputed (Cameron claimed 12 museums boycotted the exhibit 
but Lennarson said there were 23).136 James Smith, Curator of the Museum of the 
American Indian, was the first curator to express support for the exhibition boycott, 
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noting: “To cover up injustices with an art exhibit I think is inadequate.”137 Felix Valk, of 
the Museum voor Volkenkunde in Rotterdam, articulating a similar criticism, observing 
that The Spirit Sings risked being seen “as a kind of cover-up, a nice facade hiding the 
real world of today’s native peoples.”138  
Considered in light of the Lubicon’s opposition to the Olympics, the commodities sold 
during the Olympics such as cowboy hats, stuffed animals, and pins, contained 
ambivalent meanings. These commodities were, I argue, fetish objects embodying an 
“impossible irresolution.”139 As discussed in Chapter One, McClintock argues that 
fetishes are “the displacement onto an object (or person) of contradictions that the 
individual cannot resolve at a personal level.”140 Olympic commodities represented 
competing ideas about land and resource ownership in Alberta. On one hand, they 
symbolized the wealth of the region’s petroleum reserves, largely under the province’s 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, they symbolized the threat petroleum extraction in 
northern Alberta posed to the Lubicon’s cultural and physical survival.  
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has contextualized the Calgary Olympics within the following historical 
developments: the emergence of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, the increasing 
commercialization of the Olympic movement, the end of energy politics between 
Edmonton and Ottawa, and the rise of oil extraction practices in northern Alberta. 
Ultimately, this chapter has highlighted the extent to which region and corporate 
branding campaigns shaped the meaning and significance of natural and cultural 
resources. Cultural identity was treated as a resource that is subject to market forces 
while material goods symbolized contradictory ideas about regional identity and 
belonging.  
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Chapter 5  
Haunted Spirits: the 1988 Calgary Olympics and the 
Contractualization of Citizenship  
 
In the lead up to the 1988 Calgary Winter Games, the official sponsor and organizer of 
the Olympic torch relay, Petro Canada, released an ad showing Canadians waiting on a 
snow-covered sidewalk to watch the Olympic torch relay pass through their city. The 
narrator observed: “There’s something special happening in Canada, in big cities and 
small towns all across this country of ours.”1 As the crowd of people grew, the narrator 
continued: “People are getting ready to share in the experience of a lifetime. As the 
Olympic torch is passed from hand to hand on its glorious 18, 000 kilometre route to 
Calgary for the Olympic Winter Games, don’t miss the opportunity to be part of this. 
Because this is ours, and it’s ours to share.”2 When a smiling blonde woman holding the 
torch came into view, a man in the audience who was wearing a stylish coat over a suit 
became teary-eyed. He was initially reluctant to leave his house to join the group that had 
gathered along the relay route, but once he saw the torch, his eyes filled with tears. The 
man shared a meaningful look with a person in a plaid flannel shirt and the pair was 
clearly moved by the emotional intensity of the event. The message of the ad was clear: 
the torch relay unites all Canadians, regardless of age, class or gender. As the ad ended, a 
song with the following lyrics played: “Share the spirit, share the glory, share the moment 
in this never ending story, come together heart to heart, everybody has a part, share the 
flame Canada, share the flame, share the flame.”3 
Protestors opposing Petro Canada’s sponsorship of the torch relay lined the route in every 
province except Prince Edward Island, promoting ideas that contrasted sharply with those 
in the ad. Protestors held up signs that changed Petro Canada’s slogan from “share the 
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flame” to “share the blame.”4 They did this to highlight the plight of the Lubicon Cree, an 
Indigenous group in northern Alberta whose unresolved land claim was discussed briefly 
in Chapter Four. Many Canadians criticized the activists for dampening the joy of the 
torch relay and, in Calgary, Olympic supporters threw snowballs at protestors. This 
confrontation highlights the fact that the torch relay united some Canadians while 
excluding others. 
I begin this chapter by analyzing prominent narratives about the spirit of the Calgary 
Games. Olympic organizers and sponsors used the phrase “Olympic spirit” to describe 
how the values of the Olympic movement were represented in the Calgary Olympics. 
Additionally, they used the phrase “Canadian spirit” to describe how Canadians’ 
activities during the Games reflected national values. Representations of the Olympic 
torch relay brought these two ideas together and, for many Canadians, the torch 
symbolized the Olympic and Canadian spirits. However, anti-Olympic protestors rejected 
these narratives and argued that the reality of the Lubicon Cree’s unresolved land claim 
contradicted the positive traits associated with the torch relay and the Calgary Olympics 
more generally. I rely on Margaret Somers’ theory of the contractualization of citizenship 
to examine the significance of these competing narratives. Somers argues that, under 
market fundamentalism, only individuals who contribute to the nation in economically 
profitable ways receive full rights as citizens.5 The spirit of the Olympics was linked to 
the contractualization of citizens because Canadians could share in the spirit by making 
them more profitable. Thus, the Olympic/Canadian spirit was created, in part, by 
individuals who were in the process of fulfilling their contractual obligations as citizens.  
Arguments that the actions of anti-Olympic protestors ran counter to the spirit of the 
Games helped establish a division between those who did and did not increase the 
profitability of the Games. By excluding the protestors’ message from official 
representations of the Olympics, Olympic organizers and sponsors hid the fact that the 
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Lubicon did not have the same rights as other people in Canada. This argument draws on 
Somers’ claim that individuals who do not fulfil their contractual obligations as citizens 
lack the “right to have rights”6. In the language of Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida, 
the Lubicon’s rightlessness haunted the Canadian and Olympic spirits, creating spirited 
Canadian/Olympic spirits. Commodities that symbolized the Olympic/Canadian spirit, 
like replica Olympic torches, were fetish objects. In keeping with Anne McClintock’s 
understanding of fetish as an embodiment of an unresolved contradiction, I argue that 
Olympic objects embodied a contradiction about the meaning of citizenship in Canada. 
Specifically, they represented and repudiated the idea that Canadians were united through 
a shared sense of national pride and civic duty. Openly acknowledging this contradiction 
would have created an uncanny experience because, as Sigmund Freud argues, the 
uncanny emerges when something that was meant to be hidden becomes visible.7   
This chapter contributes to existing scholarship on the political implications of the 
commercial dimensions of the Calgary Olympics by focusing on the relationship between 
commercialism and citizenship rights in Canada. Kevin Wamsley and Michael Heine 
argue that when individuals criticized anti-Olympic protestors they relied on the idea that 
the Olympics are not political.8 Oil companies’ sponsorship of the Games, Wamsley and 
Heine contend, was inherently political.9 However, Wamsley and Heine do not examine 
the political implications of these sponsorship practices. I show that, when citizenship 
becomes contractualized, support for corporate sponsored events and the consumption of 
material goods become ways to earn citizenship rights. Importantly, the individuals who 
have been denied these rights are not completely invisible and consumer goods are 
haunted by the social exclusion of rightless citizens.  
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“Catch the Spirit:” Canadian Spirits in the Games  
 
Olympic organizers and sponsors used the word spirit to discuss two distinct, but 
interrelated, ideas. First, they used it to describe how the Calgary Games represented the 
values of the Olympic movement. The authors of an education kit for high school 
students defined Olympism as “an overall philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a 
balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Olympism sets out to create a way 
of life based on the joy of effort, the educational values of good examples and a respect 
for universal fundamental ethical principles.” 10 They further noted: “the spirit and 
excitement of Olympism, as represented by the celebration in Calgary of the 1988 
Olympic Winter Games, will remain as memories.”11 James C. Corkery, President and 
Master of the Royal Canadian Mint, said that the slogan for coins commemorating the 
Calgary Olympics, “The Pursuit of Excellence,” encapsulated Olympic ideals by 
capturing “both the exceptional realism of the Olympic coins and the essence of the 
Olympic spirit.”12  
According to OCO’88, the Olympic torch relay spread the Olympic spirit. The relay 
began on November 17, 1987, 88 days prior to the opening ceremony. The torch travelled 
across Canada, coming within a two hour drive of 90% of the Canadian population.13 The 
official report of the Games stated that the Olympic flame spread the Games’ message to 
800 villages, towns and cities.”14 James Davidson shared this sentiment in December 
1987, describing in the Globe and Mail how the torch relay brought the Olympic spirit to 
eastern Canada. He wrote: “Maritimers have responded to its [the torch’s] mystique, 
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braving the month’s bluster in impressive numbers to feel the storied Olympic spirit as it 
visits their village or town or city.”15 According to some reports, the flame had “magical” 
qualities. OCO’88 Chairman Frank King wrote: “The Olympic flame had a magical 
effect on people of all ages. All along the roadside people reached out seeking to touch 
the handle of the torch, as if to receive some form of spiritual nourishment. It was like a 
blessing.”16 Davidson also described the flame as magical: “On the back roads of New 
Brunswick, people are responding to the magic of the flame.”17  
In Share the Flame, the official retrospective book of the Olympic torch relay, Calgary 
resident Michael Farber wrote that torch bearers internalized the Olympic spirit. He 
observed: all of the torch bearers “had their own kilometer of Canada and six or seven 
proud minutes when the Olympic flame and the Olympic spirit rested with them.”18 
Similar to Farber, the official report described Canadians embodying the Olympic spirit: 
“like the huge flame burning atop the landmark Calgary Tower, the Olympic spirit burned 
brightly in the hearts of people everywhere.”19 King, whose memoir about the Games is 
filled with metaphors about the Olympic spirit, compared the spirit to a flame that 
Canadians could catch and spread, writing: “The Olympic spirit chooses sport as its 
model, but it really applies to all of life. When you catch the spirit, you know you’ve got 
it. And once you’ve got it, others catch it from you. It’s contagious.”20  
Canadians experienced the Olympic spirit by participating in and supporting the torch 
relay. Alan Hobson, author of Share the Flame, wrote that the residents of Airdrie, 
Alberta “showed the Olympic spirit” by hosting relay staff in their homes. Staff usually 
stayed in hotels, but their hotel reservations in Airdrie fell through at the last minute.21 
According to King, Canadians made the Olympic Spirit come alive in Canada: “The 
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Calgary Olympic Winter Games will be remembered for the spirit of the people, a true 
reflection of Olympic spirit. There were many who participated, and there were no losers. 
That spirit is still alive and well and living in Calgary, looking for a chance to show itself 
again”22 In fact, King argued that the level of support that Canadians showed for the 
Olympics enhanced the existing Olympic spirit. He wrote: “The people of Calgary, 
Alberta, and Canada felt excited, proud, and grateful for the opportunity they received to 
host the ‘best-ever’ Olympic Winter Games. The spirit of Calgary will become part of the 
new Olympic spirit and the next Games will benefit from that.”23  
King and other OCO’88 members also used the word spirit to describe how Canadians 
reflected local and national (rather than Olympic) values through their support of the 
Games. Upon learning that Glenbow Museum Director Duncan Cameron had secured a 
sponsor for the Spirit Sings exhibit in 1986, King wrote him an appreciative letter: “Your 
tireless energy and positive attitude over the past 39 months of developing this project is 
exemplary of the Calgary community spirit in helping make the XV Olympic Winter 
Games the success they are going to be.”24 David Ting, an Ottawa resident, sent a letter 
to OCO’88 praising the community spirit that Calgarians demonstrated during the 
Games:   
I, for one, was deeply touched by the spirit of Calgary – the 
western hospitality, volunteerism, and the way they 
welcomed the world. The pictures of ubiquitous volunteers, 
the cheers at Saddledome and the enthusiastic crowds at 
Olympic Plaza which was like Times Square on New Year’s 
Eve, form a kaleidoscope that revolves before me.25 
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In a section entitled “After the Games the Spirit Lives On,” the senior high school 
education kit noted that the dedication to volunteer work by Calgarians during the 
Olympics will have a lasting impact on the city: “the policy of OCO’88, to make these 
Games the ‘Volunteer Games’ will contribute to a growing spirit of volunteerism in the 
city.”26  
Petro Canada representatives described the Olympic torch relay as a conduit for the 
expression of Olympic and Canadian spirits. The joint statement that Petro Canada 
executives W.H. Hopper and E.M. Lakusta provided in Share the Flame reflects this 
perspective: “The Olympic torch symbolizes the Games’ objectives: peace, friendship 
and sportsmanship.”27 Moreover, the Canadians who participated in the relay 
demonstrated distinctly Canadian traits, like dedication and persistence: “For those who 
struggled against the bitter wind, whether you carried the torch in your hands or in your 
hearts, you have been part of a journey that showed that the Canadian spirit is as eternal 
as the Olympic flame.”28 Similarly, Hobson wrote: “On its journey across the country, 
the torch had ignited the Canadian spirit, and on that Saturday in February [when the 
torch arrived in Calgary], it was joined with that of the Olympics.”29 The narrator of a 
Petro Canada ad that aired after the completion of the torch relay told viewers: “For 
eighty eight days the Olympic torch relay brought us together in a celebration of the 
Canadian spirit.”30  
“Won’t you feel it?” The Contractualization of Citizenship 
 
The lyrics of the official song of the Calgary Games, “Can’t You Feel It,” written by 
David Foster and Tommy Banks implored Canadians to feel the spirit of the Games. The 
                                                 
26 Senior High Resource Kit (10-12), ed. Deanna Binder (Calgary: XVOWGOC, 1985), Educational 
Resources, Come Together: The Olympics and You, Box 43, "Come Together: The Olympics and 
You./Rassemblez-vous a Calgary, 1988, Communications I, Group X: PR Division, Youth and Education, 
XVWGI, CCA, italics added.   
27 W.H. Hopper and E.M. Lakusta, qtd in Hobson, Share the Flame, 1.  
28 Ibid., 1.  
29 Hobson, Catch the Flame, 214.  
30 “Olympic Torch Relay Launch,” Petro-Canada advertisement, YouTube. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BqzO9zhfWDQ 
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song went: “Can’t you feel it? The spirit surrounds you!/Don’t you feel it? And now that 
it’s found in you/ Won’t you feel it? The feeling’s everywhere/Can’t you feel it here?”31 
The lyrics of this song are significant because Canadians, I argue, had to make material 
contributions to the Games in order to “feel” the spirit. Making these contributions, in 
turn, helped Canadians earn the privilege of citizenship. This argument relies on Somers’ 
concept of the contractualization of citizenship. She argues that the relationship between 
the state and citizens under market fundamentalism has been reorganized and “the right 
of recognition, inclusion, and membership in both political and civil society”32 has 
become a privilege that citizens must earn by contributing to the nation in economically 
profitable ways. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s work on the right to have rights (discussed 
in greater detail later in this chapter), Somers asserts that citizens cannot exercise their 
citizenship rights (i.e. right to vote, right to free speech) without first being guaranteed a 
basic right: the right of recognition, inclusion and membership into society.33 The ways 
in which Canadians “felt” the spirit provide salient examples of how individuals earn 
citizenship rights. To be clear, I am not arguing that participation in the Games was the 
only in which Canadians earned such rights; they must be consistently and continuously 
earned.  
 
One way Canadians added value to the Calgary Olympics was by volunteering for the 
Games, and the unpaid labour they invested in the Games allowed OCO’88 to save 
money on employees’ salaries. OCO’88 relied primarily on volunteers: a total of 11, 680 
volunteers, comprising 97% of the organizations’ total “workforce.” Paid staff members 
co-ordinated various projects and managed the Games’ budget. 34 By contrast, 
approximately 10% of the Montreal Olympics’ workforce were volunteers.35 An article in 
                                                 
31 Script of the opening ceremonies, Box 1, File: Opening/Closing, Communications II, Sub-series XVI, 
Communications Group, Culture Division, Ceremonies Department, General Files, 1981-1988, XVWGI, 
CCA; a recording of the song is available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rf0-ltRXAC4. 
32 Ibid., 25. 
33 Ibid. 57.  
34 King, It’s How You Play the Game, 197. 
35 Comité d’Organisation des Jeux Olympique. The Official Report of the XXIst Olympiad Montréal 1976. 
(Ottawa: Comité d’Organisation des Jeux Olympique, 1978), 545; out of a total of 23, 925 people working 
for the Montreal Olympics, 2, 398 were volunteers.  
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the Globe and Mail drew attention to the unpaid labour of Olympic volunteers, noting 
with amazement that, in Calgary, “20, 000 people will work for nothing to host the world 
for 16 days.”36 The demands that OCO’88 placed on Olympic volunteers were similar to 
those that employers place on employees. Volunteers were required to commit to a 
minimum of 120 hours during the Games and had to attend training sessions for at least 
one year.37 If performers in the opening and closing ceremonies missed a practice 
session, they were let go. Additionally, OCO’88 member Brian Murphy resigned when 
the executive board refused his request for funds to pay senior volunteers a salary of $50, 
000 a year.38  
Many volunteers added value to companies’ sponsorship of the Calgary Olympics by 
strengthening the affiliation between their brands and the Olympics. For example, 140 
volunteer high school students performed the roles of Games’ mascots Hidy and Howdy 
in public appearances.39 The mascots made frequent appearances at corporate functions 
hosted by such Olympic sponsors as Petro Canada, Kodak, General Motors, Royal Bank 
and Coca-Cola.40 Organizers bought numerous Hidy and Howdy costumes, which 
allowed the mascots to attend multiple functions at the same time.41 In the fourteen 
months leading up to the Olympics, Hidy and Howdy made 2, 800 appearances.42 In the 
book Share the Flame, Hobson celebrated the “commitment to the public and to the 
Olympics” displayed by the student volunteers.43 Another Olympic sponsor, Labatt’s, 
wrote favourably about the Canadians who participated in its Olympic Parent’s Program. 
Labatt’s provided free plane fare and Olympic tickets to parents of Canadian Olympians 
and locals hosted these parents in Calgary. More than one thousand Calgarians offered to 
                                                 
36 N.a., “And now the...turns to: CALGARY,” Globe and Mail, Feb. 5, 1988, 12.  
37 OCO’88, Official Report, 441; King, It’s How You Play the Game, 198.  
38 King, It’s How You Play the Game,198.  
39 OCO’88, XV Olympic Winter Games, 259.  
40 Hidy and Howdy Corporate Appearances, Box 10, File: Mascots, Hidy & Howdy, 1987-1988, Marketing 
Section I: OCO’88 Marketing Group, Corporate Relations, Administrative Files, XVWGI, CCA. 
41 King, It’s How You Play the Game, 247.  
42 OCO’88, XV Olympic Winter Games, 259.  
43 Hobson, Share the Flame, 100.  
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be hosts, though only three hundred houses were needed.44 The Labatt’s Olympic Parents 
Program application form told parents that, by participating in the program, they would 
get the “opportunity to sample true western-style hospitality,” because Calgarians were 
“generously opening their homes to parents of Canada’s Olympic Winter Team 
members.”45 Using language that was very similar to Petro Canada’s “Share the Flame!” 
mantra, Labatt’s representatives encouraged Olympian parents to “Share The Pride!” by 
participating in the program.46  
The involvement of Canadians in the Olympic torch relay exemplified how Canadians 
enhanced the value of an Olympic sponsors’ brands. The torch relay aligned the Petro 
Canada brand with national identity and contributed to branded nationalism, a type of 
Canadian nationalism linked to consumption and branding, rather than cultural or 
economic factors.47 During the torch relay, the Petro Canada brand became integrated 
into the way that Canadians experienced and expressed national pride, resulting in “Petro 
Canada nationalism.” Petro Canada executive Ed Lakusta expressed this idea when he 
said: “We’re a Canadian company, and Canadians expect us to do things which enrich 
our national life. The enthusiasm the Relay has generated in communities across the 
country is simply amazing. We’re proud to be associated with an event that is creating 
memories that will last a lifetime for so many Canadians.”48 Petro Canada conducted 
consumer research prior to the start of the relay that found that 79% of Canadians were 
aware that Petro Canada was its sponsor.49 
Canadians’ participation in the torch relay helped make it a nationally significant and 
emotionally resonant event. Canadians sent seven million entries to the nationwide lottery 
                                                 
44 King, It’s How You Play the Game, 251. 
45 Labatt’s, Olympic Parents Program Application form, Box 23, Folder: Labatt’s, 1986-1987, 
Communications Group, Series XV, Box 23, Folder: Labatt’s, 1986-1987, XVWGI, CCA.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Catherine Carstairs, "Roots Nationalism: Branding English Canada Cool in the 1980s and 1990s," 
Histoire sociale/Social History 39, no. 77 (2006): 235-255. 
48 The Olympic Torch Relay Media Guide, Box 4, File: Petro Canada, 1987, Communications Group, XIII. 
XVWGI, CCA.  
49 Letter from Jim Hunter to Jerry Joynt, subject: Positive position of OCO on O.T.R. [Olympic Torch 
Relay], Aug. 27, 1987, Box 2, File: Petro Canada, 1986-1987, Communications Group I, Sub-Series II, 
Vice President Jared Joynt, Correspondence and Reference Material 1984-1988, XVWGI, CCA. 
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used to select torch bearers. (Many people submitted multiple entries).50 Canadians’ 
response to the torch relay was, in King’s words, “overwhelming. Thousands of people 
had stood in the bitter cold for hours just to get a chance to see the flame, to hold it, to 
take a little bit of it away with them.”51 He conceptualized this response in material 
terms, saying: “You can’t invent ways to bring people together like this [torch] relay. You 
can’t buy the pride it has unleashed. It gives all Canadians a chance to participate in 
some way.”52 Shawna Richer later wrote that “the 1988 Calgary Olympics set a new 
standard for a Winter Games.”53 According to King, Canadians along the route 
spontaneously sang O Canada,54 as Richer also noted: “Spontaneous roadside cheers, 
tears and outbursts of the national anthem, even on the darkest, most frigid nights, were 
routine occurrences [along the torch relay route].”55 Hobson described Canadians running 
out of their houses to shout “We love you Canada” as the torch relay passed through their 
area and standing in public spaces singing the national anthem “with newly glowing 
hearts.”56  
While there is no evidence suggesting that the national pride Canadians expressed was 
insincere, Petro Canada told Canadians what to expect and how to act during the torch 
relay. For example, a Petro Canada ad that showed Canadians coming together to watch 
the torch pass through their community anticipated the national unity and pride the event 
would inspire in these spectators. The narrator described the relay as an “experience of a 
lifetime” and advised viewers: “Don’t miss the opportunity to be part of this.”57 Another 
ad told viewers: “When the Olympic torch is proudly carried through your community, 
                                                 
50 OCO’88, XV Olympic Winter Games, 241; In addition to the Canadians selected through the lottery, three 
hundred individuals who had made outstanding contributions to the nation were selected as torch bearers.  
51 King, It’s How You Play the Game, 3.  
52 King, qtd in Catch the Flame, 9, italics added.  
53 Shawna Richer, “Now and then how great was ’88?” Globe and Mail, Oct. 30, 2009, O12.  
54 King, It’s How You Play the Game, 3, italics added.  
55 Richer, “Now and then how great was ’88?”.   
56 Hobson, Share the Flame, 14.  
57 “Share the Flame.” Petro Canada advertisement. YouTube.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zOANKlwdJyk 
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it’s an experience you won’t want to miss.”58 Some torch bearers and spectators even 
sang the lyrics of the jingle, “Share the Flame,” that played during these ads while a 
young woman, Elsa Hon, from Fort McMurray held a home-made sign with the words, 
“Share the Flame Canada.”59 Donalda Garner, who lived in Regina, raised the money to 
travel to Quebec, where she had been selected to run as a torch bearer, by selling seven 
goats. While in Quebec, Garner and her parents stayed at the home of Pierre Fafard, 
another torch bearer. Hobson wrote that the Garners and Fafard “forged bonds that will 
endure long after the flame has reached its destination. For Garner it epitomized the true 
meaning of ‘share the flame.’”60  
In addition to volunteering for the Games and supporting the torch relay, Canadians could 
fulfill their metaphorical contracts as citizens by purchasing Olympic goods and 
supporting Petro Canada’s cause-related marketing campaign. A portion of the profits 
from sales of commemorative torch relay glassware and Olympic coins helped fund 
Canadian athletes. Petro Canada and OCO’88 fetishized these products by suggesting that 
when Canadians bought Olympic glassware they received a material good (the object) but 
also something immaterial: the chance to support Canadian athletes and create the legacy 
of the Games in Canada. The narrator in an ad about the Torch Relay Legacy Fund told 
viewers:  
Every time you bought an Olympic torch relay glass, you 
contributed to this awards program, which allow our promising 
athletes and coaches to continue their education and training. The 
Petro Canada Olympic Torch Relay Legacy Fund: the pride we 
shared leaves a promise for the future.61  
                                                 
58 “Share the Flame (version #2).” Petro Canada advertisement. YouTube.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T6kcgZMKGVg 
59 Hobson, Share the Flame, 207. 
60 Ibid., 163-164.  
61“Olympic Torch Relay Legacy Fund.” Petro-Canada advertisement. YouTube.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TcO-rda-qj0  
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The final scene of the ad showed the torch relay emblem, a torch with a maple leaf 
emerging from its flame, and the slogan: “Olympic Torch Relay Legacy Fund: Sustaining 
the Olympic Spirit.”62 Similarly, the senior high education kit told students that buying 
Olympic commodities contributed to the legacy of the Olympics: “As an integral part of 
the Torch Relay, a legacy for amateur sport organizations will be provided through the 
sale of limited-edition products licensed by OCO’88’s Marketing Department.”63 By 
purchasing the glassware, Canadians were fulfilling their contractual obligations as 
citizens by showing support for the torch relay. However, they were also fulfilling this 
obligation by contributing money to a nationally significant endeavour: the training of 
future Canadian Olympians.  
Otto Jelinek, the Federal Minister of State, Fitness and Amateur Sport and 
Multiculturalism, said in 1986 that Canadians who purchased Olympic coins supported 
Olympic athletes in symbolic and material ways: “Every time a Canadian buys an 
Olympic coin, they are making a positive statement of support for Canada’s Olympic 
athletes and ideals. With three percent of the face value of each coin going to the 
Canadian Olympic Association, the purchase is also making a positive financial statement 
of support” for Canadian athletes.64 At the launch of the Olympic coin series in 
September 1985, King said: OCO’88 is confident that Canadians will “embrace this 
vehicle for supporting the Games.”65 Thus, the coin program is an example of a cause-
related marketing (CRM) campaign. However, unlike other CRM-related purchases, 
buying Petro Canada mugs helped Canadians earn citizenship rights.  
                                                 
62Ibid.   
63 Senior High Resource Kit (10-12), ed. Deanna Binder (Calgary: XVOWGOC, 1985), Educational 
Resources, Come Together: The Olympics and You, Box 43, "Come Together: The Olympics and 
You./Rassemblez-vous a Calgary, 1988, Communications I, Group X: PR Division, Youth and Education. 
XVWGI, CCA.   
64 Remarks by Otto Jelinek, Federal Minister of State, Fitness and amateur sport and multiculturalism on 
the unveiling of the coins, Sept. 16, 1985, Box 5, File: Royal Canadian Mint, The Pursuit of Excellence, 
Olympic Coin Program, Group: Communications III, Sub-Group: XXIII Communications Group, Artificial 
Series, Printed Material, Ephemera and Cultural Historic Items. 
65 Remarks by Frank King, Chairman of OCO, at the Launch of the Mint’s 1988 Olympic coin series, Sept. 
16, 1985, Box 5, File: Royal Canadian Mint, The Pursuit of Excellence, Olympic Coin Program, Group: 
Communications III, Subgroup: XXIII: Communications Group, Artificial Series, Printed Material, 
Ephemera and Cultural Historic Items, XVWGI, CCA, italics added.  
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“Share the Blame:” Anti-Olympic Protests   
 
The Lubicon and their allies rejected the dominant narrative of OCO’88 and Petro 
Canada about the Canadian and Olympic spirits. The torch relay was a focal point for the 
Lubicon’s anti-Olympic campaign because Petro Canada was actively drilling for oil in 
Lubicon territory in the 1980s. Chief Bernard Ominayak asked Canadians to protest 
along the torch relay route and people in every province except Prince Edward Island 
obliged him.66 The Canadian Alliance in Solidarity with Native Peoples published a flyer 
rejecting the idea that the Olympic torch symbolized values like friendship, harmony, and 
national unity. The authors re-interpreted Petro Canada’s jingle “Share the Flame,” 
writing that share the flame does not “mean watching while forest fire incinerates the 
animals, birds, fish and plant life of the land.” The flyer continued: “Everybody has a part 
- What part can Natives have when their artifacts and culture from the past are being 
exploited by the very forces who are annihilating that way of life – today?”67 A number 
of protestors lining the torch relay held up signs that changed Petro Canada’s slogan 
“Share the Flame” to “Share the Blame.”68 Matthew Coon-Come, Grand Chief of the 
Quebec Cree, articulated this sentiment at a protest: “I say if we share the flame, we 
should share the blame, and we should share the shame.”69 A protestor in Fredericton 
held up a sign that read: “Don’t share the nightmare of the genocide of Indians.”70 A 
couple from Red Deer, Alberta, wrote a letter to the Globe and Mail, criticizing the 
federal and provincial governments’ treatment of the Lubicon: “it is our shame that we 
                                                 
66 John Goddard, Last Stand of the Lubicon Cree (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd, 1991), 156.   
67 Canadian Alliance in Solidarity with Native Peoples, “Support the Lubicon – Defend Native Rights,” 
Box 4, Folder: “Natives, 1985-1987, Communications Group, Series II, XVWGI, CCA, underline in 
original.  
68 See, for example, a picture in the Globe and Mail on January 15, 1988, A4; Rudy Platiel, “Native leaders 
see glimmer of hope on self-rule,” Globe and Mail, Dec. 29 ,1987: 3.  
69 Matthew Coon-Come, qtd in Goddard, Last Stand of the Lubicon Cree, 158.  
70 Davidson, “Canada’s Torch Song”. 
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care more for the grand Olympic show glorifying the human spirit than we do for real 
suffering human beings.”71  
City officials in Calgary prohibited Lubicon supporters from handing out leaflets on 
Stephen Avenue Mall, where Olympic supporters gathered each night of the Games. The 
Calgary Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) criticized the city’s action and journalist 
Michael Valpy noted: “The CCLA suggested aloud to anyone wanting to listen that 
freedom of expression was thought not to be compatible in Calgary with the Olympic 
spirit.”72 In Toronto in December 1987, policed forced more than one hundred protestors 
who had gathered in Nathan Phillips Square prior to the flame’s arrival, to disperse. The 
protestors left the square and gathered at a nearby intersection, but police made them 
leave that area too, because they were blocking pedestrian crosswalks.73 John Duncanson 
conveyed the protestors’ perspective: they “said they feel the spirit of the Olympics is 
being doused by the ugly reality of what the oil companies and governments are doing to 
the Lubicon Cree.”74 
Wamsley and Heine argue that OCO’88 developed a “Native participation plan” in order 
to divert attention away from the Lubicon’s anti-Olympic campaign: “The program was 
structured to channel Native involvement into less controversial areas, and it was 
explicitly designed to counter the international publicity generated by the boycott of The 
Spirit Sings.”75 In 1985, OCO’88 partnered with the federal government to establish a 
“Natives and the Olympics Committee,” which was led by Sykes F. Powderface, an 
Indigenous activists and the official representative of Treaty 7 Nations.76 The committee 
organized a cultural exhibition, a Pow Wow, a fashion show and a National Youth 
                                                 
71 Ted Williamson and Beverly Williamson, “Letter: Hard life for Indians,” Globe and Mail, Dec. 10, 1987, 
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72 Michael Valpy, “Bits and pieces from Alberta,” Globe and Mail, March 2, 1988: A8, italics added. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid., italics added. 
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Conference in connection with the Calgary Olympics.77 During the opening ceremony of 
the Games, a 10-story Teepee surrounded the Olympic Cauldron and David Tlen sang the 
national anthem in Cree.78  
 
 
Figure 24: Calgary Olympics opening ceremony, OCO’88, Official Report, 14. 
 
In addition to diverting attention from the anti-Olympic boycott, the inclusion of 
Indigenous peoples in the Calgary Games enhanced its spirit. In fact, organizers planned 
to involve Indigenous peoples in the Games years before Ominayak called for an anti-
Olympic boycott. In 1982, OCO’88 members concluded that the cultural events 
associated with the Games offered them a “way to bring our native people and ethnic 
groups into the ‘spirit’ of the Games.”79 Olympic supporters dismissed anti-Olympic 
                                                 
77 Letter to Mr. Joynt and Ms. Jackson-Dover from W.A. Calder, Director, Social Policy coordination, 
constitutional affairs and social policy coordination, Alberta Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, Oct. 
13, 1985, Box 25, File: NativeeAd Hoc Committee 1985-1986, Communications II, XV, Communications 
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79 Memo “Notes from a meeting between the XVOWGOC (OCO’88) and the Devonian Foundation,” 
Wednesday, Sept. 1, 1982, Box 18, File: The Glenbow Museum, Devonian Group, 1982, Communications 
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protestors because their actions were inconsistent with the spirit of the Games and did not 
add value to the Games. A 1988 article by Kevin Cox praised the celebration of the 
Olympic spirit during the Games. 80 He argued that a ceremony in the Olympic Plaza 
where OCO’88 thanked 3,500 oil industry workers who volunteered for the Games 
brought the Olympic spirit to life. Amid this atmosphere, “The threat of the Lubicon 
Indian band disrupting the Games to publicize their land claims is generally scoffed at.”81 
Like Cox, King compared anti-Olympic activists unfavourably with Canadians who 
embraced the Olympic spirit, writing: “the negative placards of Lubicon supporters along 
the torch relay route seemed out of place and ineffective...Under the glow from the 
ubiquitous Olympic-torch candles, people hugged and shook hands in friendship. There 
was no room for defiance or confrontation here, and the protesters’ message was 
overwhelmed.”82  
“Man With No Land:” The Right to Have Rights  
 
Gordon argues that there is a double haunting in Toni Morrison’s book Beloved because 
Beloved the ghost, who haunts her family, is haunted by traumatic experiences and 
memories.83 Similarly, the Olympic and Canadian spirits were haunted by accounts of the 
Lubcon’s plight which anti-Olympic protestors sought to publicize, becoming spirited 
spirits. In 1899 and 1900, federal government representatives travelled to northern 
Alberta to negotiate a treaty, Treaty 8, with Indigenous peoples living in the area. 
Representatives tried to make contact with all the Indigenous groups living on the land 
covered by the treaty, but they did not penetrate the wilderness far enough to reach the 
Lubicons.84 In August 1933, the Lubicons petitioned the federal government to establish 
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81 Ibid. 
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84 Ibid., 7-14.  
152 
a reserve for them and Ottawa approved the request in 1939. However, the outbreak of 
World War II preoccupied the government’s attention and the reserve was never formally 
created. In 1942, Malcolm McCrimmon, a senior accountant at Indian Affairs, changed 
the criteria used to decide Indigenous peoples’ eligibility for treaty status. This change 
reduced the number of official Lubicon members so dramatically that, one year later, 
McCrimmon concluded: “the number of Indians remaining on the membership list at 
Lubicon Lake would hardly warrant the establishment of a Reserve.”85 However, the 
Lubicon disagree with the government’s eligibility requirements and asserted that, in 
Ominayak’s words,” To be a Lubicon member, a person must be of Aboriginal ancestry 
linked by historic and family ties to the traditional Lubicon area.”86 The fact that the 
federal government did not recognize that individuals with kinship ties to the Lubicon 
were part of the Lubicon community exemplifies the fact that many Lubicon were 
excluded from their political and social community. Moreover, by not establishing a 
reserve for the Lubicon, the federal government made it difficult for the Lubicon to 
preserve this community.  
The Lubicon were also excluded from mainstream Canadian society, a fact that became 
clear in 1977, when the Alberta government passed a bill changing the wording of the 
Alberta Land Titles Act to prohibit caveats on unpatented Crown land.87 At that time, the 
Lubicon were members of the Isolated Communities Board, a group that had filed a legal 
caveat asserting their ownership over land in northern Alberta. By changing the Alberta 
Land Titles Act midway through the Isolated Community Board’s legal proceedings, the 
Alberta legislature placed the Lubicon outside the protection of the law. In January 1981, 
the province changed the official status of Little Buffalo from “unorganized Indian 
settlement” to “provincial hamlet,” transforming it into a legally occupied provincial 
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municipality.88 Subsequently, officials began describing the Lubicons as trespassers and 
squatters on Crown land. 
A 1982 legal case that the Lubicon mounted against companies drilling for oil in their 
area also demonstrated that the Lubicon’s interests were not protected by the law. In fact, 
this case exemplifies the contractualization of citizenship in Canada because the judge, 
Gregory Forsyth, privileged the financial interests of oil companies over the social 
interests of the Lubicon. The Lubicon’s lawyer, James O’Reilly, asked the court to order 
an injunction prohibiting companies from extracting oil from Lubicon territory until the 
Lubicon’s land claim was settled.89 Justice Forsyth did not accept O’Reilly’s argument 
that the Lubicon’s way of life was being destroyed by the oil company’s activities.90 
Furthermore, he concluded that preventing companies from drilling for oil in Northern 
Alberta would weaken their position in the oil industry. He wrote: “I am more than 
satisfied that the respondents [oil companies] would suffer large and significant damages 
if injunctive relief in any of the forms sought by the applicants were granted. 
Additionally, the respondents would suffer a loss of competitive positions in the industry 
vis a vis the position of other companies not parties to this action.”91 Perhaps the clearest 
example of the judge’s adherence to the logic that underpins the contractualization of 
citizenship is reflected in his argument that, if the Lubicon’s land claim was 
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unsuccessful, they would not be able to compensate oil companies for their financial 
losses.92 
The federal government re-visited the possibility of establishing a Lubicon reserve in 
1983 when Indian Affairs Minister John Munro urged Alberta Native Affairs Minister 
Milton Pahl to establish a reserve and a wildlife conservation regime on Lubicon 
territory. He made this suggestion after Prime Minister Trudeau received a letter from 
Anwar Barker, the head of the Global Assembly of the World Council of Churches. 
Barker wrote that “The situation of the [Lubicon] Band and Band members is thus 
desperate...Those who try to pursue a different lifestyle will both deny their heritage and 
break their traditional bonds with the land, an essential legal requirement of their 
Aboriginal claim.”93 When Pahl did not accept Munro’s recommendations to establish a 
reserve, the federal minister wrote to him in February 1984 urging him to reconsider. 
Like Barker, Munro asserted that the Lubicon’s cultural survival was tied to their land: 
“If this Band is to survive as a group and is to preserve its identity, a reserve is urgently 
needed.”94 When the Tories were elected, David Crombie became Minister of Indian 
Affairs and assigned David Fulton, a former federal Justice Minister, as a special envoy 
to the Lubicon.95  
In 1985, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld Justice Forsyth’s ruling on the Lubicon’s 
injunction request. Like Justice Forsyth, Justice J.A. Kerans believed that citizens’ 
interests could be measured and expressed in economic terms.  The judge compared the 
damages oil companies would suffer if they could no longer drill for oil on Lubicon land 
with the damages the Lubicon would suffer if drilling continued unabated. He concluded: 
“the balance of convenience favours the defendants, because to abandon the area to the 
animals would require abandoning producing fields.”96 Justice Kerans also concluded 
that, if the Lubicon’s land claim was successful, oil companies could financially 
                                                 
92 Ibid.   
93 Anwar Barkat, qtd in Goddard, Last stand of the Lubicon Cree, 86-87.  
94 John Munro qtd in Gdodard, Last Stand of the Lubicon Cree, 87.  
95 Goddard, Last Stand of the Lubicon Cree, 118-119.  
96 Ominayak et al. v. Norcen energy, Alberta Court of Appeal, 1985. http://www.canlii.org/en/. 
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compensate them for damages. He wrote: “the time-span here is sufficiently short that the 
plaintiffs could, if successful at trial, gain through damages sufficient moneys to restore 
the wilderness and compensate themselves any interim losses.”97 The rulings by Justices 
Forsyth and Kerans illustrate that the Lubicon’s cultural survival was not protected by 
Canadian law.   
In 1986, after consulting extensively with the Lubicon and provincial officials, Fulton 
recommended that the federal government establish a Lubicon reserve based on the 
current number of community members.98 Because they were not signatories of Treaty 8, 
the Lubicon’s land rights, Fulton argues, were never extinguished. Moreover, the losses 
the Lubicon suffered were profound and irreversible. He wrote: the land “upon which 
they have depended for their livelihood, has been seriously diminished by the 
unrestricted development which has been allowed to take place without their consent and 
before they have had time to adjust.”99 In contrast to Justices Forsyth and Kerans, Fulton 
recognized the importance of the Lubicon’s right to maintain a distinct social and 
economic community, arguing that they should be given “the widest powers of self-
determination and self-government to enable its members to realize the concept of the 
preservation and continuance of their way of life as an Indian community in a manner 
that is compatible with a balance between their rights and interests and those of others 
whom they must live in harmony.”100 The federal government, however, did not act upon 
any of Fulton’s recommendations.  
Dawn Martin-Hill writes that the Lubicon’s experience “reveals the Canadian 
government’s hollow commitment to human rights and democracy.”101 Her argument is 
supported by a 1987 United Nations Human Rights Commission ruling that Canada had 
violated article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by putting 
                                                 
97 Ibid.   
98 The amount of land the federal government sets aside for an Indigenous community’s reserve is based on 
the number of people belonging to the community. Fulton argued that the size of the Lubicon reserve 
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99 Fulton, John. “Fulton Report (1986).” Native Studies Review 4, no. 1&2 (1988): 196.  
100 Ibid., 200.   
101 Martin-Hill,  The Lubicon Lake Nation, 155.  
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the Lubicon’s culture and way of life in jeopardy.102 In response, the Canadian 
government informed the Commission that it was prepared to settle the Lubicon’s land 
claims. But, even today, the Lubicon still do not have a reserve. In 2010, Amnesty 
International released a report expressing concern “that 20 years after the Committee 
adopted its views on the case, the Lubicon Cree continue to suffer serious human rights 
violations. Canada’s failure to act in a timely and just manner to address these violations 
is unacceptable.”103 In light of this situation, the honorary name Ominayak received 
when he visited the Blood reserve southeast of Calgary is apt. The name, Gaday-
skoughkh-omee, means “man with no land.’”104 
Wamsley and Heine argue that by criticizing anti-Olympic protesters for politicizing the 
Olympics, supporters of the Olympics turned a blind eye to the political ramifications of 
Shell and Petro Canada’s sponsorship of the Games.105 For Wamsley and Heine, at issue 
was “the discursive delimitation of the ‘proper’ politics in the context of the 1988 
Olympics.”106 The substance of the protestors’ message, and the fact that many 
Canadians tried to sideline this message, have political implications not addressed by 
Wamsley and Heine. Protestors drew attention to the fact that the Lubicon no longer had 
rights as citizens in Canada because they opposed the profit-generating activities of oil 
companies in northern Alberta. Thus, protestors exposed the fact that a practice occurring 
during the Games, the inclusion and exclusion of citizens based on their contributions to 
the nation, was occurring on a much larger scale outside of the Olympics. The negative 
effects of the Lubicon’s social exclusion were more serious than the protestors’ exclusion 
                                                 
102 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, (Communication No. 
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from the Olympics; the Lubicon were not included in civic and political communities in 
Canada.  
The argument that the Lubicon were socially excluded relies on Hanna Arendt’s 
conceptualization of human rights and statelessness. Arendt wrote that, in the interwar 
years, European Jews and other groups who were expelled from their home countries 
became stateless. When these groups sought asylum in new countries, they became 
unwanted refugees who could not be deported (no country would take them) or 
naturalized (there were too many of them). In other words, they lost their homes and 
could not find new ones. Once they became stateless, they also became rightless.107 
These individuals lost government protection, both in their country of origin and 
elsewhere. International treaties and agreements guarantee the rights of citizens even 
outside their own country, but stateless individuals were not citizens of any country.108 
Arendt wrote: once individuals who had been expelled from their country “had left their 
homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; 
once they had become deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the 
earth.”109 When the rights of stateless individuals were no longer guaranteed by an 
authority or institution, these rights disappeared altogether. This situation illustrated that 
the concept of the Rights of Man, the notion that all individuals possess inalienable 
human rights, was a fallacy. The “loss of national rights,” Arendt observed, “was 
identical with the loss of human rights.”110 
Arendt used the term the “right to have rights” to describe the fact that, in order to 
exercise any civil or juridical right, individuals must first belong to a community that 
recognizes them as rights bearing individuals. She wrote: “Not the loss of specific rights, 
then, but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever, 
has been the calamity which has befallen ever-increasing numbers of people.”111 
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Drawing on Arendt’s work, Somers argues that citizenship rights and human rights are 
inextricably linked because they both rely on a prior guarantee, the guarantee of inclusion 
in a social and political community.112 However, Somers departs from Arendt when she 
argues that individuals become internally stateless when they are excluded from their 
national community. These individuals still reside in their country of origin and are, 
nominally, citizens of that country. However, they have lost the rights that their fellow 
citizens possess. Somers uses the metaphor of interior borders to describe this situation: 
“the borders and boundaries once used solely as external demarcations designed to 
exclude people from nation-state entry are increasingly expanding to the center of our 
politics, creating sharp interior borders of internal social and political exclusion.”113  
Somers argues that the contractualization of citizenship creates internally stateless people 
because, in a society governed by market fundamentalism, individuals must earn the right 
to have rights. For example, when Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, many inhabitants of 
New Orleans were trapped in the city. These individuals could have been evacuated by 
the federal government if it had invested in and harnessed sufficient manpower and 
resources. For Somers, the fact that certain members of society, including the elderly, 
infirm, disabled and unemployed, were not evacuated reflected the extent of their social 
exclusion. After the hurricane, these individuals were described as refugees or 
immigrants seeking asylum in their own country. Somers argues that they were internally 
stateless even before the hurricane. Hurricane Katrina, Somers writes, exposed “what is 
entailed when an entire segment of civil society has so disintegrated that its people have 
been robbed of their ontological rights to membership and inclusion, and with it their 
recognizable humanity – without which no other rights are possible.”114 The people left 
behind in New Orleans were excluded from American society because they had not 
contributed to the nation in economically profitable ways. In the language of the 
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contractualization of citizenship, they had not fulfilled their contractual obligations as 
citizens.115   
In Canada, the Lubicon were already internally stateless, and lacked citizenship rights, 
when Calgary hosted the Olympics in 1988. Of course, any discussion of the Lubicon’s 
status as Canadian citizens must acknowledge that, historically, Indigenous peoples could 
only become citizens by assimilating into Settler society. After 1867, public officials 
argued that Indigenous peoples had to be “civilized” in order to obtain Canadian 
citizenship and could not keep their official status as Indians if they wanted to vote.116 In 
1960, changes to the Canadian Elections Act gave all status Indians the right to vote in 
federal elections, but Indigenous peoples still maintain a different relationship to 
Canadian citizenship than non-Indigenous Canadians. Section 35(1) of the 1983 
Constitution Act recognizes that, as self-governing peoples who lived on the land before 
Europeans settled in Canada, Indigenous peoples have a unique set of rights. These 
include the right to access and occupy their own land and to preserve their language, 
economy and culture.117 Indigenous peoples, therefore, are distinguished from other 
Canadians by their right to self-determination, illustrating that not all Canadian citizens 
have equal rights.118 Rather, Indigenous peoples belong to nations that have the 
additional right to exercise political autonomy within Canada.119 
The Lubicon were denied the “right to have rights” when their ability to maintain their 
sovereignty, preserve their culture, and practice their traditional way of life became 
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jeopardized. They literally lost their land, becoming internally stateless people. Dwight 
Gladue, a Lubicon living in Little Buffalo, said in 1991: “We have no rights up here, 
nothing. They can come up here, take our land, destroy us, our lives, and get rich doing 
it.”120 John Goddard writes that the Lubicon band did not understand “how the 
government could sell exploration and drilling rights to people newly arrived in Lubicon 
territory while granting no rights at all to the people who had used and occupied the land 
since recorded time.”121 The Lubicon’s rightless status was based, in part, on the fact that 
they did not have jurisdiction over their land. Like stateless Europeans who lost their 
homes, the loss of the Lubicon’s land meant the loss of “the entire social texture into 
which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the 
world.”122 The Lubicon developed plans for a reserve in 1985 and, although they were 
never put in place, these plans illustrate that having a reserve would have made it possible 
for the Lubicon to maintain a distinctive social and political community within Canada. 
They intended to build a school, band office and other public buildings on the reserve and 
establish homes spread out along the lakeshore. Additionally, the Lubicon would have set 
aside land to cultivate agricultural crops and herd cattle. In fact, some individuals took 
courses on how to start and run small businesses, anticipating that they would be able to 
start their own businesses once the reserve was built.123  
“Uncanny Experiences:” Fetish Objects  
 
The Olympic torch and related commodities were fetish objects in McClintock’s 
understanding of fetish as “the embodiment of an impossible irresolution.”124 These 
objects embodied an impossible irresolution in the meaning of citizenship and belonging 
in Canada. On one hand, they represented the idea that Canadian citizens are included 
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within the nation’s civil and political community. On the other hand, they represented the 
fact that Canadians must earn their citizenship rights and that some Canadians, like the 
Lubicon, are excluded from local and national communities. In other words, these objects 
represented and repudiated the idea that internal borders of inclusion and exclusion exist 
within Canada. Significantly, these fetish objects were often used as symbols of national 
unity and pride. Prime Minister Mulroney said in 1988 that the torch relay was “a great 
unifying strand across this country. Unity requires a lot more than political speeches. It 
requires symbols, and the Olympic torch relay is a symbol and reality of unity.”125 Many 
Canadians standing along the relay route held candles that looked like replica torches. 
These long, white candles had red covers that protected the flame from wind and were 
marked with the torch relay emblem, the Olympic rings and the Petro Canada logo. By 
purchasing and holding replica torches, Canadians conspicuously demonstrated their 
identity as Canadians who, having fulfilled their contractual obligations as citizens, were 
now full members of a national community. 
 
Figure 25: Replica Calgary Olympics torches, www.calgaryisawesome.com. 
 
Anti-Olympic protestors holding signs with messages like “Share the Shame” made the 
plight of the Lubicon difficult to ignore. As such, they drew attention to the ghosts that 
haunted the Olympic/Canadian spirit and, in doing so, produced an uncanny effect. For 
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Freud, the uncanny describes something that was meant to be hidden but has become 
visible.126 Gordon argues that “uncanny experiences are haunting experiences”127 
because to confront a ghostly haunting is to come face to face with things or information 
that have been hidden from view. In the case of the Calgary Olympics, the haunting 
experience would involve acknowledging the fact that the Lubicon are excluded from 
Canadian society. Freud wrote: “an uncanny effect often arises when....a symbol takes on 
the full function and significance of what is symbolizes.”128 In the case of the Calgary 
Olympics, the uncanny effect arises when the full meaning of the Olympic torch, as a 
symbol of a haunted Olympic/Canadian spirit, became overt. In other words, the uncanny 
emerges in the face of the reality that some citizens have been denied the rights and 
privileges of citizenship. In this context, statements like King’s argument that there was 
no room for anti-Olympic protestors in the torch relay helped to keep the uncanny out of 
the Olympics. Likewise, the Olympic supporters who threw snowballs at anti-Olympic 
protestors in Calgary helped ensure that the protestors, and their message, hovered at the 
margins of the Games, neither fully recognized nor fully hidden.  
Like the Olympic torch, the glassware that Petro Canada sold as souvenirs of the torch 
relay were fetish objects.  Petro Canada sold 50 million glasses, more than double the 
population of Canada at the time, and the company marketed these objects as 
commemorative items.129 For example, the narrator of a Petro Canada ad said: “Each 
purchase of a glass secures you a lasting memento of the relay and helps build a legacy 
for our future Olympians.” 130 Petro Canada intended for the glassware to commemorate 
the positive memories that Canadians associated with the torch relay, but these memories 
are fractured and incomplete. As a lasting symbol of the torch relay, the glassware 
represented and repudiated the memory of anti-Olympic protestors lining the torch relay 
trying to publicize the Lubicon’s unresolved land claim. Thus, the prevalence and 
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permanence of these objects in Canada made the ghosts that haunted the Calgary 
Olympics live on, lingering in the rooms where Canadians placed the glassware. In fact, 
Petro Canada released an ad in the lead up to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics that depicted 
the glasses as lasting symbols of the Calgary Games. The narrator said: “It was 1988, the 
Calgary Winter Games, when the country came together to support Olympic athletes with 
glasses from Petro Canada. Isn’t it time to do it again? Buy the glass. Support Canadian 
athletes. Only at Petro Canada.”131 The ad showed the objects in unremarkable places in 
a home: on a shelf in the kitchen, on a table holding paint brushes, on a ledge filled with 
loose change, etc. These places, I argue, are haunted by the memory of the anti-Olympic 
protests staged during the Calgary Olympics and by the fact that the Lubicon’s land claim 
remains unsettled.  
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I argued that commodities linked to the Calgary Olympics were haunted 
by the rightless status of the Lubicon in Canada. I illustrated the significance of official 
narratives about the Olympic and Canadian spirits by showing that these narratives 
encouraged Canadians to engage in practices that added value to the Games. As such, 
participating in the Olympics offered Canadians the opportunity to earn their citizenship 
rights. Moreover, a key criticism of anti-Olympic protestors focused on the fact that their 
actions were incompatible with the spirit of the Games. What was at stake in these 
narratives about spirit was the visibility of the protestors and the open acknowledgment 
that the Lubicon Cree no longer had the “right to have rights” in Canada. Thus, in this 
chapter, I related the concepts of fetish and haunting to the contractualization of 
citizenship, showing that Olympic commodities represented competing ideas about 
Canadian citizenship and inclusion. I also discussed Freud’s work on the uncanny by 
arguing that an open acknowledgment of the Lubicon’s rightlessness in Canada would 
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have caused an uncanny experience for Canadians who viewed Olympic commodities as 
symbols of national pride and unity.   
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Chapter 6  
  “A Living Embodiment of the Olympic Ideal:” The 
Four Host First Nations, Sustainable Legacies, and 
Aboriginal Title in the 2010 Vancouver Olympics   
 
In December 2009, a few months before the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games, 
the Crying Room gallery installed an outdoor mural by the artist Jesse Corcoran. 
Depicting the Olympic rings as four sad faces and one happy face, the mural was placed 
outside the gallery for the public to view. It reflected Corcoran’s belief that the Olympics 
benefit a small group of people and, conversely, disadvantage many more. The artist 
worked at a homeless shelter in Vancouver’s downtown eastside neighborhood and held 
that the coming Games would not benefit the marginalized people living in the area. He 
was particularly grieved that public spaces where homeless people often gathered, such 
as Oppenheimer Park, had been shut down for Olympic-related renovations. Corcoran 
told the Globe and Mail: “The oppressive nature of the Games is what I wanted to 
capture and how the majority is suffering for the minority.”1 Vancouver city officials 
demanded that the gallery take down the mural, claiming that it was graffiti. Although it 
was painted on wood in an unpolished style, Corcoran argued that his work was not 
graffiti and that that the city really wanted the mural gone because it reflected an anti-
Olympic sentiment.2 After the Crying Room took down Corcoran’s mural, the public 
outcry was so great that the city relented and allowed the gallery to reinstall it.  
                                                 
1 Marsha Lederman, “Vancouver orders removal of anti-Olympic mural,” Globe and Mail, Dec. 11, 2009, 
A4.  
2 Ibid; the controversy over the mural occurred after Vancouver City Council passed a bylaw making it 
illegal for people to put up Olympic-related signage that did not celebrate the 2010 Winter Games or create 
a festive environment. The British Columbia (B.C.) Civil Liberties Association successfully pressured City 
Council to amend the law so that it only applied to commercial signs that impinged on Olympic sponsors’ 
exclusive advertising rights.    
166 
 
Figure 26: Mural by Jessie Corcoran, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 11 2009, A4.  
 
In contrast to Corcoran, the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games (VANOC)3 argued that the Games would benefit the broader public. 
VANOC was committed to sustainability, a practice it defined as “striving to manage the 
social, environmental, and economic impact and opportunities of the Games in ways that 
would create lasting benefits, locally and globally.”4 The organization’s sustainability 
plan included a partnership with the First Nations upon whose land the Games were held, 
the Lil’wat, Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh Nations. Known collectively as 
the Four Host First Nations (FHFN), they were the first Indigenous groups to officially 
partner with an Olympic organizing committee.5 Debates about how much, if at all, the 
2010 Games benefitted Indigenous communities reflected the central question Corcoran’s 
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mural raised: who benefitted from the Games? Shawn Atleo, Chief of the Assembly of 
First Nations, argued: “The [Vancouver] Winter Olympics demonstrated that the 
principles of recognition and respect create the right foundation for real partnerships that 
produce innovation and shared benefits for everyone involved.”6 However, Seislom, a 
Lil’wat Elder, said: “An overwhelming number of Indigenous people in these territories 
and in the interior are opposed to the Olympics because of the long-term impact including 
destruction of the land, [and] commodification of Native art and culture.”7  
In this chapter, I argue that the Vancouver Bid Corporation (VBC) and VANOC’s 
partnerships with the FHFN were primarily profit-generating endeavours. These 
partnerships helped the VBC and VANOC demonstrate their commitment to the 
sustainable development goals of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This, in 
turn, strengthened Vancouver’s Olympic bid and enhanced the value of the Olympic and 
corporate sponsors’ brands. The FHFN’s involvement in the Games contributed to the 
B.C. government’s effort to restore economic stability to the province. Few First Nations 
in B.C. have signed treaties with the Crown and Indigenous peoples argue they have 
jurisdiction over the land (and its subsurface minerals) not covered by treaties. When 
Indigenous nations began asserting their land rights, foreign companies became wary of 
investing in B.C.’s natural resources. Some public officials used the term “economic 
uncertainty” to describe the threat these land claims posed to the economy and the 
government tried to contain this threat through various means. Because the 2010 Games 
were held on the FHFN land, there was a risk the nations would challenge the province’s 
authority to host the Games in Vancouver and surrounding areas. Partnering with the 
FHFN offered the VBC and VANOC a way to mitigate this risk. While the organizations 
promised the Games would positively impact Indigenous communities throughout the 
province, this promise went largely unfulfilled.   
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Valuable scholarship has been written about representations of Indigenous peoples in the 
modern Olympic Games. A recurring theme in these works is that Olympic organizers 
often appropriate or exploit Indigenous peoples’ cultures.8 I contribute to this literature 
by showing how the inclusion of the FHFN in the Vancouver Olympics was part of a 
broader set of political and marketing practices aimed at strengthening the economy of 
British Columbia and making the Olympics a profitable endeavour. Further, I discuss and 
analyze how, similar to Calgary in 1988, jurisdiction over land emerged as a key issue in 
Vancouver during the Games.  
“Creating a Larger Economic Pie:” The Olympic Bid  
 
After Vancouver won its bid to host the 2010 Olympic Games in July 2003, VBC 
Chairman Jack Poole declared: “If it hadn’t been for the full support of the Four Host 
First Nations in our bid, we likely wouldn’t be talking about Vancouver 2010 today.”9 
The VBC established an “Aboriginal Participation Strategy and Secretariat” and gave a 
representative from each of the FHFN a seat on its board of directors.10 A letter of 
support from the Squamish National Council was included in Vancouver’s Olympic Bid 
Book. The book noted: “planning is underway for extensive involvement of Aboriginal 
people in the 2010 Games.”11 Furthermore, the VBC wrote that the strong relationship 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians reflected Olympic values: “Canada 
brings together the cultures of the world, as well as an ancient and rich First Nations 
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culture, in one harmonious society: a living embodiment of the Olympic ideal.”12 The 
VBC also highlighted Canada’s official policy on Indigenous rights, noting that, “in 
1982, Canada became the first country in the world to constitutionally entrench the rights 
of Aboriginal peoples” through Section 35 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.13  
The VBC’s partnership with the FHFN enhanced Vancouver’s Olympic bid by affirming 
its commitment to the IOC’s sustainable development goals.14 In 1999, the IOC adopted 
Agenda 21: Sport for Sustainable Development, which included the following statement:  
The starting point of sustainable development is the idea that the 
long-term preservation of our environment, our habitat as well as 
its biodiversity and natural resources and the environment will 
only be possible if combined simultaneously with economic, social 
and political development particularly geared to the benefit of the 
poorest members of society.15  
Although Agenda 21 is primarily concerned with environmental preservation, it also 
contains sections about strengthening the involvement of women, youth, and Indigenous 
peoples in sport. The document affirmed Indigenous peoples’ “strong historical ties to 
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Olympism.  
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their environment” and “important role in ecological preservation.” 16 Further, it called 
for Indigenous peoples to play a greater role in the Olympic Movement.  
When Vancouver was first considering an Olympic bid, the value that the IOC placed on 
sustainability was very high. In April 2000, an unnamed VBC member wrote a discussion 
paper about changes to the bid procedure, which is worth quoting at length:  
The format for Olympic Bids is changing dramatically, as the 
IOC moves to an evaluation approach that is more focused on the 
substance of the Bid, rather than the relationships developed 
through the bidding process. At the same time, the IOC has taken 
a far more active role in promoting societal issues in conjunction 
with sport, including the environment, anti-doping, inclusiveness, 
etc. While the need to have a technically flawless bid is apparent, 
it is also evident that bids must appeal to the priorities of the 
decision makers even more than before.17 
The changes to the bid process were likely influenced by the fact that, in 1998, the IOC 
had become embroiled in a bribery scandal over Salt Lake City’s bid for the 2002 Winter 
Olympics. In November 1998, news broke that the Salt Lake Olympic Organizing 
Committee had paid for Sonia Essomba, daughter of IOC member René Essomba, to 
attend American University in Washington (they paid her tuition and living expenses).18 
Further investigation found that Salt Lake City bid officials had bribed numerous IOC 
members in exchange for awarding them the 2002 Games.19 IOC member Dick Pound led 
an investigation into the matter, later recommending the organization expel six members 
and adopt a Code of Ethics.  
                                                 
16 Ibid., 4; for more on the Olympic Movement and sustainable development, see: John Gold and Margaret 
Gold, “‘Bring it Under the Legacy Umbrella’: Olympic Host Cities and the Changing Fortunes of the 
Sustainability Agenda,” Sustainability, 5 (2013): 3529-3530. 
17 Strategy and Positioning Development Discussion Paper (Draft), April 10, 2000, File: Fundraising Plan, 
Series S10: Fundraising Sales and Services, Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation Fonds: AM1581 (VBCF), 
CVA.  
18 Bill Mallon, “The Olympic Bribery Scandal,” Journal of Olympic History May (2000): 11.  
19 Ibid.,11.  
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As well, the VBC was preparing its Olympic bid at a time when the IOC was increasing 
its emphasis on the legacy of Olympic Games. In 2003, the organization amended its 
charter and introduced the requirement that all Olympic Games leave a positive legacy on 
the host city and country.20 As John and Margaret Gold point out, the IOC defines this 
concept loosely, which makes it easy for host nations to align their priorities with 
Olympic legacies. They argue that, for the IOC, legacy is “something passed down from 
one generation to the next although not necessarily purposefully (as with a bequest in a 
will).”21 In 1999, even before the IOC amended its charter, the VBC launched its 
“Legacies Now” initiative, which funds sport and physical activity programs in Canada. 
The VBC even committed to carrying out its legacy program regardless of the outcome of 
its Olympic bid. It was the first Olympic bid organization to make such a commitment.22  
The FHFN’s involvement in the Vancouver Olympic bid also helped to elevate public 
support for the bid. Gaining this support was especially important because, previously, 
the Bread Not Circuses Coalition (BNCC) in Toronto had mounted strong opposition to 
that city’s 2008 Olympic bid. The BNCC, which was endorsed by about 50 community 
groups, argued that the city should use public resources to address social issues like 
poverty and not spend them on the Olympics.23 As early as 1998, VBC members raised 
concerns about anti-Olympic organizations developing in Vancouver. The minutes of a 
1998 board of directors meeting mention the BNCC by name: “To date we have not 
received any correspondence from any groups opposing the games i.e. the ‘Bread not 
Circuses’ group that is actively opposing the Toronto 2008 bid.”24 However, organizers 
believed that this silence would not last and decided to “develop a strategy to handle the 
                                                 
20 Gold and Gold, ‘Bring it Under the Legacy Umbrella’, 3530.  
21Ibid., 3530. 
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23 Lenskyj, “When Winners are Losers”, 400. 
24 Vancouver/Whistler 2010 Bid Society, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, June 1, 1998, Series 5: 
Board Secretariat, Sub-Series 2: Board of Directors, File: General, VBCF, VBC; The Vancouver/Whistler 
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from its name in order to adhere to rules 33 and 34 of the IOC’s Olympic charter, which mandates that only 
one city per country can bid for the Games: VANOC, Bid Report, 19.   
172 
potential opposition groups.”25 In 2002, Poole identified another reason why public 
support was essential: the IOC required it. He said: “The importance of broad-based 
support for our Bid cannot be over-estimated. This is a very important factor to the IOC 
when they make their decision about the city selected to host the Games. The support that 
British Columbians are prepared to show can make the difference for our Canadian 
Bid.”26 
In 2002, the VBC hired Ipsos Reid to conduct focus groups with Vancouver area 
residents who supported and opposed the city’s Olympic bid. The survey research firm 
concluded that the VBC should develop ad campaigns that would “appeal to the hearts as 
well as the minds of residents in Lower Mainland.”27 Significantly, a potential ad for the 
Olympic bid that Ipsos Reid showed focus groups included the Indigenous artist Roy 
Vickers. This ad resonated emotionally with participants, with one person saying: “I have 
a passion for First Nations culture and I got goose bumps watching the ad with Roy 
Vickers. It really appeals to me.”28 Ipsos Reid also advised the VBC to target opponents 
with advertorials that addressed “the social concerns among this group (i.e. the perception 
that money is diverted away from healthcare and education to support the Olympics, as 
well as the environment and social housing aspects of the Bid).”29  
The VBC partnered with CIBC to establish an official youth ambassador program, which 
enlisted 20 youths (aged 14 to 17) to build awareness and enthusiasm for the bid.30 The 
program included ambassadors from the Musqueam and Squamish Nations. Fourteen-
year-old Rebecca Campbell said: “I think it is very exciting that Vancouver is making a 
bid for the Olympics due to the fact that Vancouver sits on the traditional territory of the 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Alcan Spirit of 2010 Tour Final Report, Prepared by Optimum PR, Nov. 1, 2002, Series 6: 
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Committees, File: Executive Committee – Agenda package, VBC, CVA.  
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Musqueam First Nation. What a great way to represent my people and city by being a 
CIBC 20 for 10 Youth Bid Ambassador!”31 In 2002, five B.C. athletes travelled across 
the province with the Alcan Spirit of 2010 Tour. The athletes, all of whom were 
sponsored by RBC, gave presentations in schools, shopping malls, seniors’ residences 
and Indigenous communities across the country to raise support for the bid.32  
Despite the above efforts, many B.C. citizens did not want the Olympics to come to 
Vancouver. During the city’s 2002 mayoral election, Larry Campbell promised to hold a 
vote on Vancouver’s upcoming Olympic bid if he was elected. As mayor, he delivered on 
his promise and held a non-binding plebiscite on February 22, 2003. Residents voted on 
the following question: “Do you support or do you oppose the City of Vancouver’s 
participation in hosting the 2010 Olympic Winter Games and Paralympic Games?”33 
Opponents of the bid argued that the Olympics would divert public funds from important 
social services. The “No Games 2010 Coalition,” endorsed by community groups like the 
Anti Poverty Coalition, Lower Mainland Social Justice Coalition and Vancouver Status 
of Women, encouraged citizens to vote “No.” Activist Chris Shaw, for example, argued 
that instead of devoting money to the Olympics, governments should invest in areas like 
forestry renewal, sustainable fisheries, health care, education and alterative energy 
resources.34 The B.C. chapter of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives argued that 
British Columbians should ask themselves how much public spending on hospitals, 
schools, or other services they were willing to sacrifice in order to host the Games.35 
Finally, the B.C. Green Party distributed a flyer that reversed the conventional 
association between the Olympics and nationalism. The party argued that it was “patriotic 
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and smart” to oppose the Games since public money “spent on Olympics is money not 
spent on essential services like hospitals, schools and seniors’ care homes.”36  
The VBC addressed opposition to the Olympics by emphasizing their economic benefits. 
Whereas anti-Olympic activists argued that the Games would economically advantage a 
select group of individuals and socially disadvantage many more, the bid corporation 
argued that economic growth benefits all of society. The VBC promised that the Games 
would “result in a significant investment of federal funds into the BC economy. This is 
what the investment is all about: creating a healthier economy that will allow government 
to support the programs its citizens choose. It is about creating a larger economic pie, 
permanently.”37 Articulating conventional arguments about the merits of region branding, 
the bid corporation asserted that, as hosts of the Olympic Games, “international attention 
will be riveted on British Columbia in the years leading up to 2010 and beyond. Business 
and travel media from around the world will focus on B.C. as never before.”38 Postcards 
and posters featured working class people (like construction workers and hotel 
employees) who would benefit economically from the Games. They all held signs saying: 
“I’ll be voting YES on February 22nd.”39 One poster told readers that, by voting in favour 
of the Olympic bid, citizens were saying “Yes” to “strengthening our economy so we can 
support world-class social programs and public services.” They were also supporting 
“social equity through economic and employment opportunities which will be actively 
targeted to youth, women, Aboriginal and low-income groups.”40  
This poster also advertised the value of Olympic-related sustainability and legacy 
projects. It promised that the Games would provide a “better future for our children and 
for generations to come” and that the facilities built or upgraded for the Games would 
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remain in Vancouver “as lasting legacies to families, students and competitive athletes.”41 
Additionally, the Olympic host city would showcase “world-leading environmental 
innovation through a Games that achieve zero net emissions, zero net waste, and 
minimum energy use.”42 For bid supporters, the Shared Legacies Agreement between 
local First Nations, the VBC, and the province was “an excellent example of the 
Olympics helping to improve the economic and social sustainability of the affected First 
Nations.”43 On February 22, 2003, 64% of Vancouver citizens voted in favour of the city 
hosting the 2010 Olympics.44 
The “Most Important Issue Facing the Province:” Aboriginal 
Title in B.C.  
 
The VBC’s partnership with the FHFN helped foster what some government officials 
described as “economic certainty” to the region. Unlike other parts of Canada, few 
treaties were signed between First Nations in B.C. and the Crown. In the early 1850s, the 
Governor of Vancouver Island, James Douglas, signed 14 purchase treaties with 
participating First Nations. However, when Joseph Trutch took over from Douglas as 
governor in 1867, he refused to recognize Indigenous peoples’ right to land, arguing that 
all of B.C. belonged to the Crown and no further treaties were negotiated. In 1973, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, ruled 
on a landmark case about Aboriginal title. This is a legal term that describes Indigenous 
peoples’ inherent right to land in Canada. In this case, the Nisga’a Nation (located in the 
Nass Valley of B.C.) asserted that they still had Aboriginal title because they never 
signed a treaty with the Crown. The Justices agreed that the Nisga’a had Aboriginal title 
prior to European settlement in the province, but were divided over the following 
question: do the Nisga’a still possess this title?45 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was 
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surprised by the ruling, commenting that the Nisga’a may have more rights than the 
government had previously thought.46 In 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on 
another Aboriginal title case, this time concerning the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Nations 
(in northern B.C.). In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the court clarified the definition 
of Aboriginal title and the ways it could (and could not) be extinguished.47 The Justices 
argued that Indigenous nations who possessed Aboriginal title have exclusive authority 
over their ancestral land. They made it clear that, at the very least, Indigenous nations 
which hold Aboriginal title must be consulted about any resource extraction practices on 
their land.48   
The Supreme Court rulings raised questions about the province’s authority over natural 
resources in B.C. Many foreign companies who invested in these resources became 
concerned that the government would not be able to protect their investments. Thus, the 
uncertain status of Indigenous peoples’ Aboriginal title affected the region’s economy. In 
1998, Premier Glen Clark argued that the uncertainty over Indigenous peoples’ land 
rights was the most important issue facing the province because of its far-reaching 
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economic implications.49 Additionally, anti-logging protests by environmentalists and 
First Nations that took place in the 1990s, known as the “wars in the woods,” disrupted 
on-going economic projects in the province and made companies wary of starting new 
projects.50 
Earlier, in 1990, the B.C. government began exploring treaty options with First Nations 
by establishing a B.C. Claims Task Force and subsequently creating the B.C. Treaty 
Commission in 1992.51 Andrew Woolford argues: “It was the economic consequences of 
uncertainty, as much as anything else, that at least brought the provincial government to 
the treaty table in the early 1990s.”52 Carole Blackburn uses the example of treaty 
negotiations with the Nisga’a to make a similar point. She argues that the province 
wanted to transform Indigenous peoples’ rights “from unknown Aboriginal rights to a set 
of concrete treaty rights. Their knowability is essential for certainty; it is their 
transformation to known rights that eliminates them as threats.”53 Blackburn interviewed 
a member of the provincial treaty negotiation team who argued that “the wars in the 
woods create economic uncertainty” in B.C. He noted that financial markets in Toronto, 
New York and Asia responded negatively “to the uncertainties about Aboriginal title in 
British Columbia.”54  
The B.C. treaty process has been widely criticized for requiring First Nations to give up 
their Aboriginal title. Activist Arthur Manuel argues that the provincial and federal 
governments must abandon their existing policy of Aboriginal title extinguishment. 
Taiaiake Alfred encourages First Nations to withdraw from treaty negotiations until 
governments makes this change.55 However, extinguishing Aboriginal title is central to 
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the government’s goal of restoring economic certainty to B.C. As Christina Godlewska 
and Jeremy Weber write, Aboriginal title interferes with provincial resource policies and 
“if Aboriginal title is removed, the benefit accrues to the province.”56 Tony Penikett 
makes the same argument, only more succinctly: “For government, ‘certainty’ required 
extinguishment [of Aboriginal title].”57  
The 2010 Games were held on FHFN land and securing their support for the Olympic bid 
was essential to its success. If these nations challenged the province’s authority to host 
the Olympic Games, they could put the bid in jeopardy. The government had an 
economic incentive to host the Games: impact reports estimated that they could add 
between $2.9 billion and $4.2 billion to Canada’s Gross Domestic Product.58 If the B.C. 
government tried to contain the threat that Aboriginal title posed to the economy by 
establishing a treaty process, the VBC managed the risk the FHFN posed to its Olympic 
bid by including these Nations in its bid process. The corporation promised the IOC that 
it would do everything possible to minimize anti-Olympic protests and planned to 
involve “all community-based groups and agencies representing special interests to 
ensure that the benefits of an Olympic Games are inclusive of all citizens.”59 Partnering 
with the FHFN was central to this community involvement plan.  
The FHFN’s partnership with the VBC did not automatically guarantee its leaders 
influence within the bid corporation. Chief Ernest Campbell of the Musqueam Nation 
requested a seat on the organization’s board of directors, writing to Poole in February 
2002: “it is respectfully suggested that the Bid Corporation is remiss for not having 
solicited Musqueam’s participation [on the board of directors] earlier” and reminded 
Poole that nearly two-thirds of the events planned for the 2010 Games were scheduled to 
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take place on Musqueam “traditional territory.”60 In November 2002, the Squamish and 
Lil’wat Nations signed an agreement with the province and VBC which included 300 
acres of land for economic development, $2.3 million for skills training, $6.5 million for 
legacy housing, and $3 million to the Aboriginal Youth Legacy Fund, an organization 
that runs sport-related programs for Indigenous youth in B.C.61 The Musqueam and 
Tsleil-Waututh Nations signed memoranda of understanding with the Bid Committee 
much later, on July 1, 2003, the day before Vancouver won the Olympic bid.62 The 
memoranda guaranteed the nations $500,000 (to be shared) from VANOC and $20 
million (to each nation) in “legacy contributions” from the federal government.63  
Taiaiake Alfred describes the partnership between First Nations and the VBC as a 
“blatant pay-off” and “a sell-out designed to benefit elite politicians on both sides of the 
colonial divide.”64 For Alfred, the partnership exemplifies the weakened state of 
Indigenous peoples. He argues that instead of becoming involved in the Games, 
Indigenous peoples should focus on regenerating their cultures.65 The anti-Olympic group 
No2010.com66 also criticized the partnership, arguing that it gave the false impression 
that the FHFN were “the only legitimate Indigenous voice” on land issues related to the 
Games. They also pointed out that the financial gains the FHFN received did not directly 
benefit the majority of Indigenous peoples in B.C.67 No2010.com noted that the FHFN’s 
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population (5,000 to 6,000) was relatively small compared to the total Indigenous 
population in Vancouver (60,000) and argued that the “extent of corporate invasion 
associated with the Olympic industry” would negatively impact many Indigenous peoples 
in the province.68  
Setting “New Standards of Achievement:” Sustainability, 
Legacy and Profits 
 
Vancouver won its bid for the 2010 Winter Olympics on July 2, 2003.69 John Furlong 
became VANOC’s CEO in February 2004 and the organization’s board of directors 
included representatives from the federal, provincial and municipal governments 
(Vancouver and Whistler), the Canadian Olympic and Paralympic Committees, local 
First Nations, and the IOC.70 VANOC’s $1.9 billion operating budget and its $600 
million program for venue construction (which was distinct from its operating budget) 
were funded by a mix of public and private sources.71 The organization raised $756.8 
million from its domestic corporate sponsorship program, which was separate from the 
IOC’s international sponsorship program.72 The IOC described the latter as one of 
VANOC’s “major success stories” and celebrated the fact that it exceeded expectations 
(the VBC anticipated $253 million in profits).73 The program included three tiers: each 
national partner contributed between $50 million and $200 million; each official 
supporter contributed between $15 million and $49 million; and each official supplier 
contributed between $3 million and $14 million.74 Sales of Olympic licensed 
merchandise were also higher than expected. The $57 million in royalties was more than 
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double the anticipated $22.6 million in profits.75 The program included 45 licensees and 
1,600 retail stores, which stocked Olympic merchandise.76 VANOC and raised in excess 
of $230 million through ticket sales. 77  
The IOC also argued that VANOC “set a new standard for sustainability and legacy 
planning.”78 The organizing committee listed its accomplishments, including offsetting 
118,000 tonnes of carbon; implementing environmental management plans for Olympic 
venues and facilities; and inspiring Canadian youth to live more active and sustainable 
lifestyles.79 Moreover, it considered “the unprecedented Aboriginal participation in the 
planning and hosting of the Games” a central sustainability and legacy achievement.80 
VANOC praised Olympic sponsors’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices, 
arguing that they enhanced the sustainability and legacy program.81 For example, Coca-
Cola recycled all the bottles used during the Games and introduced the PlantBottle, which 
was made partly from plant-based materials.82 It also donated $350,000 to construct an 
outdoor sport course for inner-city youth in Vancouver.83 This initiative illustrates that 
VANOC’s sustainability goals served corporate sponsors’ interests. In fact, the 
organizing committee argued that earning money from the Games was a reasonable 
sustainability and legacy goal: “A healthy and balanced economy can increase living 
standards and manage the impact of human activities on nature and communities by 
reducing waste and pollution and more efficiently using resources such as energy, 
materials and labour.”84 Thus, the sustainability and legacy program of the Vancouver 
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Olympics was underpinned by the market fundamentalist drive to reduce all aspects of 
social life to market principles.85  
The Aboriginal Licensing and Merchandising Program, jointly developed by VANOC 
and the FHFN, helped the organizing committee earn a profit from its sustainability 
practices. The program sold “authentic Aboriginal products” and donated one third of the 
royalties, amounting to $200,000, to the Aboriginal Youth Legacy Fund.86 Coca-Cola 
also supported the Aboriginal Youth Legacy Fund by establishing an Aboriginal Art 
Bottle Program. The company auctioned off Coke bottles designed by Indigenous artists 
in Canada, donating all proceeds to the legacy fund.87 This practice is an example of what 
Michael Silk and David Andrews describe as a “glocalized” marketing campaign.88 They 
argue that, beginning in the mid-1990s, Coke began to affiliate its brand with local 
cultures while still promoting itself as a global brand. For example, the company 
sponsored the 1996 Cricket World Cup in India and designed ad campaigns linking red 
Coke cans to red symbols of Indian culture, like red bindis and cricket balls.89  
FHFN CEO Tewanee Joseph praised the Aboriginal Licensing and Merchandising 
Program for sharing “the best Aboriginal artists from across Canada” with the world.90 
However, Shain Jackson, who owned a company that sold artwork by Indigenous artists, 
criticized VANOC for selling products that were not made in Canada or distributed by 
Indigenous retailers. He circulated a petition calling on VANOC to stop describing the 
commodities sold through the Aboriginal Licensing and Merchandising Program as 
authentic.91 VANOC did not submit to Jackson’s request, arguing instead: “every piece of 
Aboriginal Games merchandise was marked with a FHFN logo, signifying its 
                                                 
85
 Margaret Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to have Rights 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 79-82.  
86 VANOC, Sustainability Report, 6, 81.  
87 IOC, Marketing Report, 51. 
88 Michael Silk, and David Andrews, “The spatial logics of global sponsorship: corporate capital, cola wars 
and cricket,” in Global Sport Sponsorship, eds. John Amis and T. Bettina Cornwell (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 
71.  
89 Ibid.  
90 Tewanee Joseph, qtd in IOC, Marketing Report, 116.  
91 Mark Hume, “Vancouver 2010 merchandise distribution: Native artist attacks VANOC over authenticity 
of handcrafts,” Globe and Mail, Jan. 14, 2010, A2.   
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authenticity. The fact is, when games enthusiasts purchased an official Vancouver 2010 
licensed Aboriginal product, they invested in the future of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada.”92 This statement drew attention away from Jackson’s criticism and redirected it 
to the social cause linked to the program.  
VANOC Vice President of Sponsorship Sales and Marketing, Andrea Shaw, argued that 
the Vancouver Games added value to the Olympic brand, noting: “what we did with the 
[IOC’s] brand was raise the bar and make it even more valuable to the Olympic 
Movement.”93 She does not say how VANOC accomplished this feat (the quote was 
included in an Olympic-related education resource targeted to students). I argue that 
VANOC enhanced the value of the Olympic brand by strengthening the pre-existing link 
between this Olympic brand and positive social values. According to the IOC, “Olympic 
partners enjoy a multitude of benefits, including the opportunity to align themselves with 
the Olympic rings – one of the most widely recognized symbols in the world and one that 
is associated with a set of ideals that resonate strongly across the globe.”94 The IOC 
began conducting market research in 1985 in order to make the Olympic brand more 
appealing to Olympic sponsors95 and the IOC’s marketing report for Vancouver 2010 
highlighted the stakes involved in maintaining this positive brand identity. Readers were 
told: the IOC relies on its marketing program to preserve “the independent financial 
stability of the Olympic movement.”96 As IOC Marketing Commission Chairman 
Gerhard Heiberg wrote: “Put simply, without the support of our official commercial 
partners, the Games would not be able to happen.”97  
                                                 
92 VANOC, Sustainability Report, 81.  
93 Andrea Shaw, qtd in “Case Study: Brand Development and the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter 
Games”, Canadian Olympic School Program (COSP). www.olympicschool.ca. 
94 Ibid, 44, italics in original.   
95 Joseph Maguire, Sarah Barnard, Katie Bulter, and Peter Golding. "'Celebrate humanity' or 'consumers'?: 
A critical evaluation of a brand in motion,” Social Identities 41, no. 1 (2008):  67.  
96IOC, Marketing Report, 21.  
97 Ibid., 44.  
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“Unprecedented and Amazingly Successful:” The New 
Relationship in B.C.  
 
In the mid-2000s, the B.C. government initiated the “New Relationship with Aboriginal 
People and Communities in British Columbia” (New Relationship); VANOC’s 
partnership with the FHFN became an important part of this endeavour. The New 
Relationship committed the province to develop partnerships with Indigenous peoples 
based on respect, reconciliation and recognition of their rights and title.98 The province 
promised to consult with First Nations about relevant public policy and would ensure that 
they shared in the profits earned from resource extraction practices on their land.99 As 
part of the New Relationship, a $100 million New Relationship Trust Fund was 
established.100 Government representatives maintain that the New Relationship is not a 
replacement for treaty negotiations. Rather, they recognized that these negotiations take 
time and that they needed “to find practical and timely ways to improve social and 
economic conditions” for Indigenous peoples in the province.101  
Two Supreme Court decisions from 2004, Haida Nation vs. British Columbia (Minister 
of Forests) and Taku River Tlingit First Nations vs. British Columbia (Project 
Assessment Director), influenced the government’s decision to establish the New 
Relationship. These rulings obligated the government to consult with First Nations when 
activities on Crown land might influence their rights and Aboriginal title.102 Caitlyn 
Vernon argues that the 2010 Olympic Games also played a role in B.C. Premier Gordon 
                                                 
98 B.C. Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, “New Relationships with Aboriginal People 
and Communities in B.C.”, http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr/reports/down/2007-
08%20FINAL_NewRelationships.pdf: 1. 
99 B.C. Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, “The New Relationship: Aboriginal People 
and the Government of British Columbia: Building a healthy and prosperous future together”, 
http://www.sfu.ca/~palys/new_relationship_brochure.pdf 
100 Ibid.  
101 Ibid; The New Relationship marked a significant change in the B.C. Liberal’s position on First Nations’ 
land claims. See: David Rossiter and Patricia Wood, “Fantastical topographies: neo-liberal responses to 
Aboriginal land claims in British Columbia,” The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe canadien, 49 no. 
4 (2005). 
102 B.C., MARR, The New Relationship: Aboriginal People and the Government of British Columbia 
Building a healthy and prosperous future together (Victoria: MARR).  
http://www.sfu.ca/~palys/new_relationship_brochure.pdf. 
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Campbell’s decision to implement the New Relationship because “the upcoming 2010 
Olympics were putting pressure on the provincial government to improve its image 
regarding Aboriginal relations.”103 The B.C. Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and 
Reconciliation described the FHFN’s involvement in the Games as a central achievement 
of the New Relationship. Writing in 2009, it claimed that the FHFN would showcase 
“British Columbia’s unique Aboriginal cultures and history to the world.”104 The follow 
year, it noted that, as the first Indigenous hosts of the Olympic Games, the FHFN had 
“achieved something historic, unprecedented and amazingly successful.”105 Furthermore, 
the Ministry argued that the 2010 Olympic Aboriginal Pavilion, which showcased 
Indigenous art, business, food and music, revealed “why Aboriginal culture – First 
Nations, Inuit, and Métis – is an important part of B.C.’s past, present and future.”106  
Like the B.C. treaty process, the establishment of the New Relationship helped return 
economic certainty to the province. According to Penikett, the Business Council of B.C.  
encouraged Premier Campbell to start the New Relationship by arguing that foreign 
investment opportunities in the province would dry up if questions about land and 
resource ownership remained uncertain.107 Verner interviewed government 
representatives, business operators, and Indigenous peoples who all “agreed that a major 
impetus to develop the New Relationship arose from the desire by the provincial 
government, industry and some First Nations to secure access to lands and resources for 
economic development.”108 David Rossiter and Patricia Wood argue that the provincial 
government’s approach to the New Relationship “reveals a position firmly rooted in the 
assumption that full and equal citizenship in the province is predicated on an economic 
                                                 
103 Caitlyn Vernon, “What New Relationship? Taking Responsibility for Justice and Sustainability in 
British Columbia,” in Alliances: Re/Envisioning Indigenous-non-Indigenous Relationships, ed: Lynne 
Davis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 283.   
104 British Columbia. Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation (MARR). New Relationships 
with Aboriginal People and Communities in B.C. (Victoria: MARR, 2008), 16. 
http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr/reports/down/2007-08%20FINAL_NewRelationships.pdf  
105 B.C. Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, “New Relationships with Aborigional People 
and Communities in British Columbia, Annual report on progress 2009-2010”: 7,  available for download 
at: http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/aboriginal-people/progress-reporting#newrelationship. 
106 Ibid.   
107 Penikett, Reconciliation, 257. 
108 Ibid., 282.   
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relationship that puts at the top of the agenda private investment in resources and their 
subsequent exploitation for individual gain.”109  
Rossiter and Wood’s argument illustrates that Indigenous peoples could earn citizenship 
rights by participating in the New Relationship. As Margaret Somers argues, these rights 
have become privileges that individuals can receive by making material contributions to 
the nation.110 The Indigenous peoples who were involved in the 2010 Games earned 
citizenship right by strengthening the province’s tourism industry. As B.C. Attorney 
General Geoff Plant said in 2004: “There are enormous openings emerging in Aboriginal 
tourism as we prepare for the Olympics and we are working to support these.”111 
Similarly, the provincial Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation argued that 
the 2010 Winter Games increased support for the “Aboriginal cultural tourism 
industry.”112 Rossiter and Wood argue that by emphasizing Indigenous peoples’ 
“participation in regimes of capitalist accumulation as the ultimate sign of equality,” the 
B.C. government reduced “complex Aboriginal cultures to a single commodity that can 
be peddled by knowledgeable salespeople (read: properly trained Natives) to eager 
consumers (read: tourists).”113 This insight draws attention to the fact that the benchmark 
by which the province measured the success of the New Relationship was underpinned 
by market fundamentalist principles.  
As part of the New Relationship, the provincial government committed to significantly 
reducing the socio-economic gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. To 
measure its progress, the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation compared 
the social and economic welfare of Indigenous peoples in B.C. from 2005/2006 to 
2010/2011. Its findings show that the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
                                                 
109 Rossiter and Wood, “Fantastical topographies,” 363. 
110 Somers, Margaret. Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to have Rights . 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 70-117.    
111 Geoff Plant, B.C. government press release, 2004, qtd in Rossiter and Wood, “Fantastical topographies”, 
364.  
112 B.C., MARR, New Relationships with Aborigional People and Communities in British Columbia, 
Annual report on progress 2009-2010 (Victoria: MARR, 2010): 30, italics added. 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/aboriginal-people/progress-reporting#newrelationship.   
113 Rossiter and Wood, “Fantastical Topographies,” 363. 
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peoples’ quality of life in B.C. did not significantly decrease in this time period. The 
report revealed that the number of long-term drinking water advisories on Indigenous 
reserves rose from 19 in 2005 to 25 in 2011.114 The report revealed that “overall a Status 
Indian individual is statistically 1.7 times more likely to die at any stage of their life than 
other persons of the same age.”115 Perhaps most troubling, between 2001 and 2005, the 
ratio of Indigenous vs. non-Indigenous youth suicides (expressed as the number of 
suicides per 10, 000 people) was 3.8 to 0.8. Between 2006 and 2010, the ratio was 3.0 to 
0.7.116 While the reduction in the number of youth suicides is positive, this number was 
still alarmingly high. The report also revealed that the FHFN’s participation in the Games 
did not have a significant impact on public perception of First Nations in the province. In 
2010, 30% of British Columbians described themselves as very aware “of the diversity of 
First Nations cultures” within the province, up only four percent from 2007 when the 
same question was asked. The percentage of British Columbians who strongly agreed 
with the statement “First Nations have made a wide range of valuable contributions to 
B.C.” increased only marginally between 2007 and 2010, rising from 23% to 27%.117  
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has illustrated that the partnership between the VBC, VANOC, and the 
FHFN helped Vancouver win its bid for the 2010 Olympic Games. Moreover, the VBC 
used its relationship with the FHFN to showcase its commitment to sustainability and to 
convince the public to support Vancouver’s Olympic bid. VANOC’s relationship with the 
FHFN helped it continue, and build upon, the VBC’s dedication to sustainability, an 
activity that enhanced the value of the Olympic brand and companies’ sponsorship of the 
Games. The partnership also financially benefitted the FHFN and involved them in the 
Olympic planning process. However, outside of this small number of First Nations, the 
Olympic Games did not have a significantly positive impact on the broader Indigenous 
                                                 
114 B.C., MARR, New Relationships with Aboriginal People and Communities in B.C.: Measuring 
Outcomes, 2011-2012, 8. 
115 Ibid., 11.   
116 Ibid., 11; the report defined youth as aged 15 to 24 year old.  
117 Ibid., 11.  
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population of B.C. The Games largely promoted the interests of the provincial 
government, which sought to restore economic certainty to the region, than they did to 
advance the socio-economic and political interests of indigenous peoples throughout the 
province.  
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Chapter 7  
 Haunted History: National Identity, Indigenous-
Settler Relations, and the 2010 Vancouver Olympics  
 
When the Vancouver 2010 Olympic torch relay passed through Fort Langley, B.C. on 
February 8th 2010, the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) temporarily re-opened a local 
trading post that had been closed for 124 years. Once filled with provisions for gold 
miners, the post was now stocked with Olympic merchandise including red mittens 
etched with white maple leaves and plush toys of the Olympic and Paralympic Games’ 
mascots, Miga, Quatchi, and Sumi.1 Animal pelts remained in the store but, as Justine 
Hunter observed, “young customers were more interested in the small Quatchi-on-a-key-
chain.”2 Hunter wrote that the store’s 19th century customers had given “rise to the 
colony of British Columbia – and eventually allowed Canada to stretch from sea to 
shining sea.”3 Bruce Mavis, the town’s torchbearer, was the great-grandson of a 
successful prospector, Alexander Mavis, who had passed through the Fort Langley 
trading post in 1858. Mavis later returned to the area and purchased the trading post from 
the HBC.4 In her article, Hunter did not mention that Indigenous peoples lived in Western 
Canada before Settlers like Mavis came to the area in search of gold. However, the 
animal pelts in the trading post were evidence of the commercial exchanges that HBC 
traders had made with Indigenous fur trappers. Because the pelts attracted little attention, 
it was easy to miss or ignore these symbols of Canada’s colonial past.  
                                                 
1 Justine Hunter, “Vancouver 2010: The Torch Relay Day 102: They came for a pelt and left with a 
Quatchi,” Globe and Mail, Feb. 9 2010, A3.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
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Figure 27: Image from: Justine Hunter, “They Came for a pelt and left with a Quatchi,” the Globe 
and Mail, Feb. 9, 2010, A3. The original caption reads: “While pelts of fox and other animal furs 
were on display in the temporary HBC post, visitors were more interested in the mitts, Quatchi and 
hats.”  
 
The example of the torch relay’s stop in Fort Langley highlights a key question I address 
in this chapter: how were national history and identity represented in the Vancouver 
Olympics? I begin this chapter by identifying prominent ideas about Canadian society 
promoted through the Games. These include the notion that Canada is a progressive, 
culturally diverse country and that Indigenous-Settler relations have improved 
dramatically in recent years. Like Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 2008 apology to 
survivors of Indian Residential Schools, these narratives made it appear as though the 
oppression of Indigenous peoples occurred in the past and elided the colonialist policies 
and practices that caused this oppression.5 In contrast, anti-Olympic protestors drew 
                                                 
5 This argument is informed by critiques of the federal government’s reconciliation practices. See: Matthew 
Dorrell, “From Reconciliation to Reconciling: Reading What ‘We Now Recognize’ in the Government of 
Canada’s 2008 Residential Schools Apology,” English Studies in Canada 35, no. 1 (2009): 27-45; Jennifer 
Henderson  and Pauline Wakeham, “Colonial Reckoning, National Reconciliation?: Aboriginal Peoples and 
the Culture of Redress in Canada,”  English Studies in Canada 35 no. 1 (2009): 1-26; Jennifer Henderson 
and Pauline Wakeham, “Introduction”, in Reconciling Canada: Critical Perspectives on the Culture of 
Redress, eds. Jennifer Henderson and Pauline Wakeham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 3-
30; Eva Mackey, “The Apologizers’ Apology,” in Reconciling Canada: Critical Perspectives on the 
Culture of Redress, eds. Jennifer Henderson, and Pauline Wakeham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2013), 47-62; Keavy Martin, “Truth, Reconciliation, and Amnesia: Porcupines and China Dolls and the 
Canadian Conscience,” English Studies in Canada, 35, no. 1 (2009) : 47-65. 
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attention to such information. Olympic commodities, I argue, were fetish objects haunted 
by the history and legacy of colonialism in Canada. This chapter contributes to existing 
scholarship on reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples and the 
Olympic Games. Although research has been done on the Sydney 2000 Olympics and 
reconciliation, no comparable work has been done on the Vancouver Olympics.6  
The Inukshuk is a “Symbol of Canada:” Representations of 
National Identity  
 
In April 2005, the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games (VANOC) announced the results of a competition it ran to select the 
official emblem of the Vancouver Games. Out of 1,600 entries, organizers chose a 
contemporary interpretation of an inukshuk (a stone sculpture that Inuit people use as a 
directional marker)7 submitted by Vancouver designer Elena Rivera MacGregor. The 
design showed five coloured stones stacked on top of each other that, combined, looked 
like a person extending his arms.8 The emblem’s colour scheme (green, blue, red, and 
yellow) symbolized various elements of the Canadian landscape (forests, oceans, sunsets, 
and wheat fields). The emblem was called Ilanaaq, the Inuktitut word for “friend,” and 
this emphasis on friendship was a key feature of the ideas about national identity that the 
emblem sought to convey.9 It represented the fact that Canadian society was welcoming, 
hospitable, and recognized the value of Indigenous peoples’ cultures. Ilanaaq was 
                                                 
6 See: Catriona Elder, Angela Pratt, and Cath Ellis, “Running race: Reconciliation, nationalism and the 
Sydney 2000 Olympic Games,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 41, no. 2 (2006). 
7 Norman Hallendy told the Globe and Mail that describing the emblem as an inukshuk (plural: inuksuit) 
was misleading. An inukshuk is a collection of stones assembled by the Inuit that operate as navigational 
beacons and come in many different shapes. Similar stone figures that look like humans are called 
innunguaq. However, Olympic organizers said that the emblem is one person’s “contemporary 
interpretation of an Inuit tradition”: Jane Armstrong, “The friend nobody likes,” Globe and Mail, April 27, 
2005, A1. 
8 Peter Kennedy, and Grant Kerr, “Inukshuk to be logo of Vancouver Games,” Globe and Mail, April 25, 
2005, A8; The statue in Stanley Park was created by Alying Kanak of Rnaklin Inlet on behalf of the 
government of the Northwest Territories and was featured in the 1986 World Exposition which was held in 
Vancouver. 
9 IOC, Marketing Report, 128; an inukshuk statue located near Vancouver’s Stanley Park inspired 
MacGregor’s winning design.  
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frequently described as a national symbol. For example, an article published in the Globe 
and Mail argued: “as with the maple leaf, although the maple tree is only native to certain 
regions of Canada and cannot grow in others, the inuksuit may belong first and foremost 
to the Inuit but they have become a symbol of Canada.”10As such, the emblem functioned 
as synecdoche, a part of something (i.e. a cultural symbol within Canada) that stands in 
for the entire thing (i.e. all of Canada).  
 
 
Figure 28: Vancouver Olympics emblem, VANOC, Vancouver 2010: Staging the Olympic, Winter 
Games Knowledge Report, September 2010, 1. 
 
The choice of a national emblem for the Games, rather than a regional one, contrasts with 
the emblems of the 1976 Montreal and 1988 Calgary Olympics. As I argue in earlier 
chapters, the Montreal Games’ emblem symbolized French-Canadian culture while the 
Calgary Games’ emblem represented the co-existence of regional (Western Canadian) 
and national identities. The Vancouver Games’ emblem reflected organizers’ efforts to 
ensure that the Games belonged to all Canadians.11 The motto of the Vancouver 
Olympics, “with glowing hearts,” was taken from a line in the national anthem and 
reinforced this idea.12 Some Indigenous leaders in B.C., including Grand Chief Edward 
John of the First Nations Summit and Chief Stewart Phillip, President of the Union of 
B.C. Indian Chiefs, criticized VANOC for not selecting an emblem that reflected 
                                                 
10 N.a., “Olympic Medals: the Aboriginal aesthetic,” Globe and Mail, Oct. 19, 2009, A16.  
11 VANOC, Staging the Olympic Winter Games, 8.  
12 The French theme “Des plus brillants expoits” a line from the French version of the national anthem, was 
the French theme:  VANOC, Vancouver 2010: Staging the Olympic Winter Games, 12.  
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Indigenous cultures from the West Coast.13 Others, like Chief Gibby Jacob of the 
Squamish First Nation (who was a member of VANOC’s board of directors) defended 
the emblem design by pointing out that it represented national rather than regional 
identity.14  
The emblem appeared on Olympic commodities like stamps and Vancouver 2010 
glassware.15 Shoppers could literally consume Ilanaaq by buying shortbread cookies in 
the shape of an inukshuk (dubbed “inukie cookies.”)16 Canada Post sold envelope seals 
that reflected “defining aspects” of the host province, including totems and an inukshuk 
that, according to the company, “speak to the region’s rich Aboriginal history and 
culture.”17 This description is bizarre considering that the inukshuk reflects the culture of 
an Indigenous group (the Inuit) that does not live in B.C. Some 350 million Olympic-
themed coins distributed by the Royal Canadian Mint also contained the inukshuk 
emblem.18 The Mint’s Olympic Pavilion included an enormous Olympic loonie on the 
floor, upon which children could lay while their parents took pictures of them.19 
MacGregor’s design of Ilanaaq personified the inukshuk by giving it arms, legs, and a 
smile. By lying on top of the loonie and covering Ilanaaq with their own bodies, children 
personified the emblem to an even greater degree.  
                                                 
13 Jim Morris, “B.C. natives criticize Olympic logo choice”, Globe and Mail, April 26, 2005, A9  
14 Gibby Jacob, qtd in Morris, “B.C. natives criticize Olympic logo choice”.  
15 IOC, Marketing Report, 115; “Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games,” CanadaPost, Jan. 12, 2010. 
https://www.canadapost.ca/cpo/mc/personal/collecting/stamps/2010/2010_Olympic_Winter_Games.jsf.  
16 “Inukie cookie a hot seller,” Canada.com, June 9, 2008. 
http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=5bcec139-f120-49ad-b116-cd06ebc1161b. 
17 “Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games,” CanadaPost, Jan. 12, 2010. 
https://www.canadapost.ca/cpo/mc/personal/collecting/stamps/2010/2010_Olympic_Winter_Games.jsf.  
18 IOC, Marketing Report, 115.  
19 Adriana Barton, “Vancouver 2010 Today’s Pavilion: Royal Canadian Mint Pavilion,” Globe and Mail, 
Feb. 28, 2010, S2. 
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Figure 29: Vancouver Olympics loonie, Royal Canadian Mint website, www.mint.ca.  
 
The design of the Games’ mascots was heavily influenced by Indigenous themes. The 
Olympic mascots were Miga, a sea bear (part killer whale, part Kermode bear) and 
Quatchi, a sasquatch. The Paralympic mascot was Sumi (an animal spirit). A marmot 
named Mukmuk, which VANOC described as a “mascot sidekick,” often appeared with 
the other mascots.20 The company Meomi designed the mascots based on “local 
Aboriginal mythological creatures.”21 For example, Miga’s identity as a sea bear was 
“inspired by the legends of the Pacific Northwest First Nations, tales of orca whales that 
transform into bears that arrive on land.” 22 The Indigenous themes reflected in the 
mascots helped make them representative of B.C. and Canada. According to VANOC 
CEO John Furlong, the mascots “had to appeal to children from all over the world, they 
needed to represent the people, geography, and spirit of British Columbia and Canada, 
and they had to personify the values and essence of the 2010 Winter Games.”23  
VANOC sold more than 200,000 mascot-related commodities in 2007, the year they were 
unveiled. These objects included plush toys, tote bags, hats, key chains, and jewelry.24 A 
picture book about the mascots, Miga, Quatchi and/et Sumi: The Story of the Vancouver 
                                                 
20 IOC, Marketing Report, 132. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Michael Murphy, Miga, Quatchi and/et Sumi: The Story of the Vancouver 2010 Mascots/L’Histoire des 
Mascottes de Vancouver (Vancouver: Whitecap Books, 2008), 22.  
23 John Furlong, qtd in IOC, Marketing Report, 132.  
24 Rod Mickleburgh, “Mukmuk no longer on the sidelines,” Globe and Mail, Nov. 28, 2009, A13.  
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2010 Mascots/L’Histoire des Mascottes de Vancouver, became a national bestseller.25 
Lapel pins and coins recreated scenes from the picture book.26 Glen Street, president of 
the manufacturing company Street Characters Inc., observed that VANOC “has done a 
great job of making the character desirable. Every kid at school has a Quatchi backpack, 
keychain, something.”27 The Canadian Olympic School Programme designed educational 
resources “to inspire youth to become ‘Smarter, Better, Stronger,’” encouraging them to 
explore Olympic values while pursuing healthy, active lifestyles.28 Sponsored in part by 
RBC, the curriculum included an activity involving the Vancouver Olympic mascots; the 
case study, “Brand Development and the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games,”29 
asked students to write a persuasive paragraph arguing for or against the following 
statement: “The mascots for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games were a playful 
representation of Canada and its Aboriginal peoples’ mythology.”30 
 
                                                 
25 The book was published in English and French; each page of the book contained the same information in 
both languages.  
26 Murphy, Miga, Quatchi and/et Sumi, note on front cover.  
27 Glen Street, qtd in: Shawna Richer, “Vancouver 2010 Star wattage in a cute and cuddly package: We 
love you, Quatchi. Oh yes we do. We don’t love anyone as much as you,” Globe and Mail, Feb. 20, 2010, 
F3.  
28 IOC, Marketing Report, 91. 
29 “Case Study: Brand Development and the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games”, Canadian Olympic 
School Program (COSP). www.olympicschool.ca. 
30 Ibid; Mark Devitt argues that, although the Olympic Education program has the potential to help students 
develop critical thinking skills, the Vancouver Olympic Education program uses “one-sided rhetoric” to 
promote the Olympic Games and their corporate sponsors. See: Devitt, Mark. “Olympic Education: Gold 
Medal for Propaganda?” in Problems, Possibilities, Promising Practices: Eleventh International 
Symposium for Olympic Research (London: Centre for Olympic Studies, 2012). 
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Figure 30: Miga, Quatchi, and Sumi commodities available for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com. 
 
Figure 31: A bin full of Quatchis, IOC Marketing Report Vancouver 2010, 118. 
 
VANOC’s emphasis on Indigenous cultures was similarly evident in the Olympic torch 
relay and opening ceremony. The relay, which passed within an hour of 90% of the 
Canadian population, included approximately 600 Indigenous torchbearers and visited 
197 
118 Indigenous communities.31 In September 2009, RBC, a corporate sponsor of the 
torch relay, hired Phil Fontaine, former National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, 
to maximize “the involvement of the aboriginal community in the 2010 Olympic Torch 
Relay.”32 VANOC decided that the domestic audience for the opening ceremony was its 
most important audience, reasoning that if the ceremony engaged Canadians from across 
the country, they would be more likely to support the Games.33 Some 23 million 
Canadians (almost 80% of the country’s population) watched the opening ceremony,34 
which featured an official welcome delivered by representatives from the Four Host First 
Nations (FHFN). The announcer introduced the FHFN by recognizing that the Games 
were being held on their “traditional territories.”35 After their welcome, FHFN 
representatives were joined on stage by more than 300 Indigenous performers who, as 
VANOC noted, “wore their own traditional clothing or regalia.”36  
The Vancouver Olympics did not mark the first time that Indigenous peoples had played 
a central role in an international sporting event in Canada. Organizers of the 1994 
Victoria Commonwealth Games pioneered many of the strategies that VANOC later used 
to maximize Indigenous peoples’ participation in the Olympics. The Victoria 
Commonwealth Games Society (VCGS) established a Native Participation Committee to 
involve Indigenous peoples in the Games’ planning process.37 Just as VANOC 
recognized that the 2010 Games were being held on the FHFN’s “traditional territories,” 
the VCGS acknowledged that the “Greater Victoria area is the traditional territory of 
                                                 
31 IOC, Marketing Report, 9. 
32 Tara Perkins, “Financial Services: Guess who’s coming to Bay Street? Fontaine signs on with Royal 
Bank,” Globe and Mail, Sept. 2, 2009, B1.  
33VANOC, Staging the Olympic Winter Games, 15. 
34 Nathan Kalman-Lamb, “‘A Portrait of This Country’: Whiteness, Indigeneity, Multiculturalism and the 
Vancouver Opening Ceremonies,” Topia 27(2012): 6.  
35 “Vancouver 2010 Opening Ceremony.” Vancouver Organizing Committee for the Olympic and 
Paralympic Games. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxZpUueDAvc   
36 VANOC, Vancouver 2010: Sustainability Report 2009-10 (Vancouver: VANOC, 2010), 82. 
37 Report Summary of the Native Participation Committee Business Plan, Series 187: Ceremonies and 
Culture records re: Native Participation Committee 1992-1994, Vancouver Commonwealth Games Society 
Fonds: PR74 (VCGSF), City of Victoria Archives (CVicA); Letter from from Edward Philip Oscapella, 
General manager of the Ceremonies and Culture, to Geoff Burrett, Government Relations Officer, B.C. 
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several bands of the Coast Salish Nation, one of the three First Nations on Vancouver 
Island.”38 While the FHFN welcomed athletes and visitors to the 2010 Games, a Coast 
Salish welcome ceremony linked to the Victoria Games occurred on August 8, 1994.  
The participation of Indigenous peoples in the Victoria Commonwealth and Vancouver 
Olympic Games conveyed the message that relations between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples were improving. The VCGS noted that the Coast Salish welcoming 
ceremony would “wipe away the tears of the past so that a new relationship and 
celebration can begin.”39 Similarly, the connotations of friendship and hospitality 
reflected in the Olympic emblem, along with its connection to Inuit culture, gave the 
impression that relations between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians were based 
on mutual respect. This message is significant in light of the fact that Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper delivered a formal apology in 2008 to former students of Indian 
Residential Schools, their families, and communities. Matthew Dorrell points out that 
Harper’s apology began by depicting residential schools as “a sad chapter in our history” 
and concluded by expressing the desire to improve relations between Indigenous peoples 
and Settler Canadians.40 A narrative of progress similar to the one in Harper’s apology 
was promoted in the Olympic Games’ opening ceremony during the “landscape of a 
dream” sequence. This sequence began by dramatizing the first meeting of Indigenous 
peoples and European Settlers. The two groups, distinguished from one another by their 
clothing, waved at each other and then came together tentatively to shake hands. A Spirit 
Bear emerged from the ground and opened its arms.41 Suddenly, the floor broke apart and 
people became separated from one another by cracks in the ground. Everyone on stage 
looked surprised and worried when they realized that they were standing on glaciers 
floating in the ocean. As the gap between the glaciers widened, the stadium went dark. 
This moment, I argue, symbolized a dark period in the past when the harmonious 
                                                 
38 Program Notes for the Opening Ceremony. Series: Communications Department – Communication 
Services, Communication Services Director Records, Box 2, File 6, Ceremonies, 1993-1994. VCGSF, 
CVicA; italics added. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Dorrell, “From Reconciliation to Reconciling, 32; these quotations are taken from Harper’s 2008 
apology. 
41 Kalman-Lamb, “A Portrait of This Country,” 17. 
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relationship between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians had broken down.    
 
The darkness in the stadium was suggestive of a difficult period in Indigenous-Settler 
relations. When the light returned, the audience was taken on a journey across the country 
through oceans, forests, wheat fields, and snowy mountains (notably, these same parts of 
Canada were represented through the Games’ emblem). Music, dance, spoken word, and 
acrobatic performances accompanied colourful visual displays of the landscape.42 The 
poem, “We are More,” recited by Shane Koyczan at the end of this visual journal 
described Canada as a friendly, welcoming, and diverse country: “we are more than 
genteel or civilized. We are an idea in the process of being realized. We are young. We 
are cultures strung together then woven into a tapestry and the design is what makes us 
more than our history. We are a design going right for a change.”43  
Nathan Kalman-Lamb argues that this segment in the opening ceremony celebrated white 
cultures in Canada and gave the impression that Indigenous peoples were “part of a past 
that no longer exists.”44 By contrast, I argue that the welcome given by FHFN leaders 
during the opening ceremony made it appear as though indigenous peoples were thriving 
in Canada. The narratives promoted in the ceremony consigned the mistrust and discord 
that exists between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians (rather than Indigenous 
peoples themselves) to a bygone past. Eva Mackey argues that the Prime Minister’s 
apology relegated “over two hundred years of colonial violence” to the past so that 
Canadians could “move forward into a unified future.”45 The Vancouver opening 
ceremony gave the impression that this “unified future” had arrived. 
                                                 
42 VANOC notes that the emblem consisted “of five stone-like formations depicted in Vibrant colours 
found in both the natural features of the Vancouver-Whistler region and across Canada”: VANOC, Staging 
the Olympic Winter Games, 10. 
43 The entire Vancouver 2010 Opening Ceremony is available to view on YouTube: “Vancouver 2010 
Opening Ceremony.” Vancouver Organizing Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games. YouTube. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxZpUueDAvc   
44 Kalman-Lamb, “A Portrait of This Country,” 15. 
45 Mackey, “The Apologizers’ Apology”, 49.  
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“This is Not the Start of a New Relationship:” Haunting 
Truths 
 
Commodities of the Olympic emblem and mascot were haunted by information that 
contradicted the celebratory ideas about national identity promoted by Olympic 
organizers. As such, they were fetish objects that held together competing information 
about the nation.46 Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida argue that ghostly hauntings are 
absences that can be perceived and felt.47 Gordon asserts: “the ghostly haunt gives notice 
that something is missing.”48 Olympic commodities were haunted by the fact that Prime 
Minister Harper’s 2008 apology did not mark the beginning of an entirely successful 
reconciliation process between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians. This fact was 
evident in an article by Stella August and Philipa Ryan published in 2009. The authors 
are part of the Downtown Eastside Power of Women Group, whose members include 
“women from all walks of life who are working poor, homeless or on social assistance” 
and describe themselves as living “in extreme poverty.”49 August is a residential school 
survivor who, in her words, is “living proof of the residential school era.”50 She wrote:  
Like many others, I am not satisfied with last year’s formal 
apology from the federal government. The apology was 
supposed to start a new relationship with Indigenous peoples, 
one based on respect. But the 2010 Olympic Games represents 
just one of the many examples of the continuation of the same 
kind of colonial relationship; we are not consulted, are forcibly 
                                                 
46 This conceptualization of fetish is based on Anne McClintock’s definition of the term: Anne McClintock, 
Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest (New York: Routledge, 1995), 
184. 
47 Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 1997); Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Morning 
and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
48 Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 15.  
49 Stella August, and Philipa Ryan, “In Our Own Words: Women living in Downtown Eastside weigh in on 
the Olympics,” The Dominion, Special Issue 2009: Issue #64: Olympics, 28, PAM 2009-12, PC, CVA.  
50 August, “In Our Own Words: Women living in Downtown Eastside weigh in on the Olympics,” The 
Dominion, Special Issue 2009: Issue #64: Olympics, 28, PAM 2009-12, PC, CVA; August and Ryan wrote 
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201 
displaced, and endure increasing poverty for their benefit. This 
is not the start of a new relationship.51 
The final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) illustrates 
that August is not alone in her criticism. The report found that “Aboriginal leaders 
identified a post-apology gap between the aspirational language of Canada’s apology and 
Aboriginal peoples’ continuing realities.”52 The report concluded that the “The promise 
of reconciliation, which seemed so imminent back in 2008 when the Prime Minister, on 
behalf of all Canadians, apologized to Survivors, has faded.”53 The TRC report defined 
reconciliation as “an ongoing process of establishing and maintaining respectful 
relationships” between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians.54  
Olympic commodities were intended to reflect the notion that Canada is a friendly and 
welcoming place, but many Indigenous peoples in Canada faced, and continue to face, a 
radically different reality. For example, the anti-Olympic group No2010.com55 argued 
that VANOC’s celebration of Indigenous peoples’ cultures drew attention away from the 
high incidences of unemployment, poverty, homelessness, suicide, violent death, drug 
and alcohol addiction, imprisonment, HIV, and tuberculosis in Indigenous populations in 
Canada.56 Soon after the Games, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of Indigenous peoples, James Anaya, released a report on the status of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights in Canada. Anaya makes explicit the disjuncture between the Canada 
depicted by Games’ organizers and the Canada experienced by many Indigenous peoples: 
                                                 
51 Ibid.  
52 TRC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 268.  
53 Ibid., 8. 
54 Ibid., 16; Henderson and Wakeham prefer the term “cultures of redress” over reconciliation because the 
latter term “imposes closure upon grievances”. However, the TRC’s definition of reconciliation rejects 
closure in favour of ongoing action. In this chapter, I rely on the TRC’s definition in order to distance my 
work from the problematic ideas about reconciliation reflected in official documents: Wakeham and 
Henderson, “Colonial Reckoning, National Reconciliation?: Aboriginal Peoples and the Culture of Redress 
in Canada”, 8-9. 
55 This name refers to the anti-Olympic organization and the website that its members created. 
56 No2010.com, “Anti-2010: Information against the Olympic industry: no Olympics on stolen Native 
Land,” 2010, PAM 2010-21: Anti 2010, City of Vancouver Archives Pamphlet Collection: AM 1519 (PC), 
City of Vancouver Archives (CVA); this information initially appeared on the organization’s website and 
was subsequently made available in print for individuals who were not able to access the internet.   
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“It is difficult to reconcile Canada’s well-developed legal framework and general 
prosperity with the human rights problems faced by indigenous peoples in Canada, which 
have reached crisis proportions in many respects.”57 International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) member René Fasel said the emblem of the Vancouver Games reflected Canadian 
values,58 but his comment raises the question: what values make it possible for Settler 
Canadians to remain unaware or unmoved by the disturbing facts that Anaya and 
No2010.com identified? 
Rivera MacGregor has said that her Olympic emblem design was inspired by Canadian 
hospitality: “As Canadians, we are proud of being friendly people; you know, 
we’re...non-threatening and we smile.”59 However, this declaration was contradicted by 
numerous incidents of violent confrontations in Canadian history. One such example is 
the 1990 clash between provincial and federal troops and Mohawk protestors in Oka, 
Quebec. The conflict began over the town’s plan to expand a golf course, which 
impinged on “The Pines,” a forested area that Kanehsatake Mohawk consider sacred and 
have used as a burial place. In March 1990, protestors barricaded the entrance to “The 
Pines” to prevent construction of the golf course expansion. On July 11th, approximately 
100 members of the Quebec police force confronted the protestors. Shots were fired and 
Corporal Marcel Lemay was killed.60 The provincial police subsequently withdrew, 
leaving behind several vehicles which protesters used to barricade all entrances to the 
disputed land.61  
As an act of solidarity with the Kanehsatake, Mohawk from the nearby Kahnawake 
reserve, located near Chateauguay, Quebec, blocked three major highways in the area and 
                                                 
57 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 27th session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, on the situation of indigenous peoples in Canada 
(A/HRC/27/52/Add.2) (4 July 2014), 6.  
58 René Fasel, qtd in IOC, Marketing Report, 128. 
59 Elena Rivera Macregor, qtd in Armstrong, “The friend nobody likes”.  
60 Pertusati, Linda. In Defense of Mohawk Land: Ethnopolitical Conflict in Native North America. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1997: 102; It is not clear whether the bullet that killed Corporal 
Lemay was fired by the Mohawk protestors or a police officer because individuals on both sides of the 
confrontation used identical rifles.  
61 Ibid., 102.  
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seized the Mercier Bridge, which connects Montreal suburbs to the city’s downtown 
core.62 Non-Indigenous residents of Chateauguay gathered nightly to oppose the 
blockade, sometimes shouting racist remarks and burning effigies of Mohawk people.63 
On August 8th, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney invoked Canada’s National Defense Act 
and sent more than 4,000 federal troops to the blockades. Shortly thereafter, the Oka 
municipal council agreed to sell the disputed land to the federal government, thus ending 
the proposed golf course expansion. On August 29th, the Mohawk began dismantling 
their barricades.64  
When the Vancouver Olympic torch relay passed through Kahnawake, the legacy of the 
Mohawk-Oka crisis was difficult to miss. Although they allowed the torch to enter their 
community, the Kahnawake did not let the RCMP, provincial police officers or VANOC 
vehicles on their land. Instead, Mohawk Peacekeepers accompanied the torch. Grand 
Chief Michael Delisle Jr. told journalist Sean Gordon that no one in the community 
would identify as Canadian.65 Gordon wrote that this leg of the relay illustrated a “mostly 
unspoken dichotomy: the Olympic ideal is held up as a symbol of hope and achievement 
to young people in Aboriginal communities, but in Kahnawake, that inspiration has little 
to no connection with the national celebration the 2010 Games organizers envision.”66 
The headline of Gordon’s article read: “In a town haunted by Oka, nobody is 
‘Canadian’”67 and it drew attention to the fact that the torch relay’s passage through 
Kahnawake brought the past to life.  
Olympic commodities were haunted by the history of the Mohawk-Oka crisis and, more 
broadly, colonialism in Canada. Paulette Regan argues convincingly that Canada’s 
colonial past lives in the present. She writes:  
                                                 
62 Ibid., 103.  
63 Ibid., 107.  
64 Ibid., 117-119. 
65 Sean Gordon, “Vancouver 2010 The Torch Relay Day 40: In a town Haunted by Oka, nobody is 
‘Canadian,’” Globe and Mail, Dec. 9, 2009, A3.    
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid.   
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For Indigenous people, the past is a painful chronicle of broken 
treaties, stolen lands, Indian residential schools, and the Indian 
Act...this problematic history is not in the past: it sits with us in many 
places – government offices, boardrooms, negotiating tables, 
churches, hospitals, classrooms, and community halls. Whether or not 
we acknowledge its presence, we know intuitively that this history is 
still alive.68  
This past also animated Olympic goods, making them ghost(ed) objects that merged, in 
Gordon’s words, “the visible and the invisible, the dead and the living, the past and the 
present.”69 As discussed in Chapter Three, the term ghost(ed) object is borrowed from 
Sharon Rosenberg, Amber Dean, and Kara Granzow. They describe a picture of an 
Indigenous settlement in Alberta as a ghost(ed) image that represented a “haunting 
presence repeatedly disavowed” by a narrative about the province’s history; this narrative 
separated “colonial history from the present.”70 By representing the idea that Canadian 
society is friendly and values Indigenous peoples’ cultures, the Games’ emblem and 
mascots disavowed the fact that the devastating effects of colonialism still affects 
Indigenous peoples. Taiaiake Alfred argues, for example, that the “complex relationship 
between the effects of social suffering, unresolved psychophysical harms of historical 
trauma and cultural location” caused by colonialism in Canada has limited indigenous 
peoples’ ability to be “self-sufficient, healthy and autonomous.”71 
Like Olympic goods, the Victoria Commonwealth Games mascot (a smiling orca whale) 
and commodities of the mascot were haunted by the past. The VCGS asked the public to 
recommend names for the orca, ultimately selecting “Klee Wyck.” Four people suggested 
                                                 
68 Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and 
Reconciliation in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 20.  
69 Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 24.  
70 Sharon Rosenberg, Amber Dean, and Kara Granzow, "Centennial hauntings: Reckoning with the 2005 
celebration of Alberta's history," Memory Studies 3, no. 4 (2010): 397.  
71 Gerald Taiaiake Alfred, “Colonialism and State Dependency,” Journal of Aboriginal Health (November 
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this name, with one person arguing: “What better name for our Commonwealth mascot, 
the noble Orca, than KLEE WYCK. An Indian name meaning ‘the Laughing One,’ it was 
the one given to Emily Carr, our very own famous Victoria artist.”72 As the above 
quotation illustrates, the mascot’s name was intended to represent the harmonious 
relationship that Emily Carr shared with Indigenous peoples. Official VCGS documents 
translated the mascot’s name, Klee Wyck, as “the laughing one.” However, according to 
the Victoria Commonwealth Games’ Mascot Steering Committee, this was a 
mistranslation. A committee report from 1991 observed: 
Klee Wyck does not, in fact, quite translate from Chinook into English as 
‘The Laughing One.’ This, apparently, was Emily Carr’s interpretation of 
what her Indian friends were calling her, communicated to her by them 
through sign language. The actual translation is closer to ‘the smiling 
one,’ and its correct anglicised written translation is one word, not two.73  
The report reveals that the Victoria Games’ mascot represented a Settler’s literal 
misunderstanding of Indigenous peoples. More broadly, “Klee Wyck” symbolized 
instances of impaired communication between Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups, 
where Settlers have been unable or unwilling to understand Indigenous peoples’ 
perspectives.  
Confronting the ghosts that haunt Olympic and Commonwealth Games commodities can 
alter their meaning and transform them into uncanny objects. According to Sigmund 
Freud, the uncanny emerges when previously unknown information comes to light, 
making something that used to be familiar seem unfamiliar.74 Margot Francis notes that 
“an experience of the uncanny can emerge when the place one considers home is 
                                                 
72 Naming of Mascot Entry, Series 138: Communications Department – Information Services, Promotional 
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73 Initial recommendations of the XV Commonwealth Games Mascot Steering Committee, June 14 1991, 
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somehow rendered unfamiliar.”75 Trying to reconcile the official narratives about the 
nation represented by Olympic and Commonwealth commodities with the truths that 
haunt these commodities can be an uncanny experience. These items could become 
representations of an unfamiliar version of “home” (the nation) that is no longer fully 
recognizable to Settler Canadians.  
The TRC report identifies the importance of recognizing unsettling truths about the 
nation, and it is worth quoting at length:  
non-Aboriginal children and youth need to comprehend how their own 
identities and family histories have been shaped by a version of Canadian 
history that has marginalized Aboriginal peoples’ history and experience. 
They need to know how notions of European superiority and Aboriginal 
inferiority have tainted mainstream society’s ideas about, and attitudes 
towards, Aboriginal peoples in ways that have been profoundly 
disrespectful and damaging. They too need to understand Canada’s history 
as a Settler society and how assimilation policies have affected Aboriginal 
peoples. This knowledge and understanding will lay the groundwork for 
establishing mutually respectful relationships.76 
Put another way, reconciliation is an ongoing process that requires Settler Canadians to 
acknowledge uncanny and unfamiliar versions of the nation and use this newfound 
recognition to create social change.77 
Coming to terms with the truths that haunt Olympic and Commonwealth commodities 
can produce unpleasant emotions, like discomfort and confusion, which contrast with the 
comforting and pleasing ideas about national identity that the objects ostensibly 
represented. However, as the TRC argues, “No Canadian can take pride in this country’s 
                                                 
75 Margot Francis, Creative Subversions: Whiteness, Indigeneity, and the National Imaginary, (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2011), 7.   
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77 Ibid., 16.  
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treatment of Aboriginal peoples.”78 Moreover, Keavy Martin points out that the goal of 
reconciliation is not to free settler Canadians from the responsibility of remembering 
Canadian history or to alleviate their guilt about the past.79 Rather, reconciliation can 
make Settlers feel uncomfortable and unsettled because it requires them to, in Regan’s 
words, “confront the history of colonization, violence, racism and injustice that remains 
part of the IRS [Indian residential school] legacy today.”80 
“This Magic Mitten Moment:” The Hudson’s Bay Company 
and Brand Canada  
 
Canadian torch bearers and athletes who marched in the Parade of Nations during the 
Vancouver opening ceremony wore uniforms designed by the HBC. Subsequently, the 
red and white mittens they wore became popular consumer items. These mittens 
symbolized ideas about national identity and history that the HBC promoted in its 
marketing campaign. When the company unveiled its Olympic apparel line in 2009, 
Nathalie Lambert, Canada’s Chef de Mission for the Games, said: “Finally, we are given 
an identity, a look and feel to the Canadian team. I think it will inspire millions of 
Canadians.”81 Canadian Olympic Committee CEO Chris Rudge summed up the look 
succinctly: “This line of apparel screams ‘Canada.’”82 The HBC intentionally designed 
its Olympic merchandise to reflect national identity.83 Company executive Mark Kinnin 
said: “There’s a great story around Canada and the history of Canada and the team and 
how we’re getting ready for the Vancouver Games...Can we commercialize that? 
Absolutely, because sports is a business.”84 Fashion journalist Amy Verner endorsed this 
practice by noting that the “Games offer a global marketing op – and a chance to parlay 
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81 Natalie Lambert, qtd in n.a., “Olympic Attire: Opinion,” Globe and Mail, Oct 2, 2009, A13.  
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the True North into lasting cool.” 85 She added that companies can “package and promote 
brand Canada globally.”86 The HBC’s promotion of “brand Canada” was a central part of 
the company’s re-branding strategy. In order to attract more business, HBC began 
“mining the retailer’s heritage advantage by bolstering its Signature Shop with about 120 
new items (canoes, trapper hats, maple sugar cubes) alongside its signature striped ‘point’ 
blankets and throws.”87 The company emphasized its long history (it was founded in 
1670) by using its full name, original crest, and trademark “point blanket” pattern in 
promotional material.88  
 
In keeping with the HBC’s branding strategy, company President Jeffrey Sherman said 
that the Vancouver 2010 Olympic clothing line displayed “a sense of history of what it 
means to be Canadian.”89 This sense of history was, however, incomplete. An HBC TV 
ad that aired during the Games problematically promoted the myth that Canada was 
uninhabited before European explorers arrived. The ad, “We Were Made for This,” 
showed Europeans arriving by boat to Canada for the first time and discovering empty 
land. The narrator glorified their ability to survive the harsh conditions, noting: “We 
arrived 340 years ago to a land of rock, ice, and snow. We outfitted a nation of pioneers, 
explorers, and dreamers. We are the skiers, we are the sledders. We didn’t just survive 
the elements. Together, we thrived in them.”90 The HBC ad obscured the fact that 
Indigenous peoples inhabited land in Canada long before the arrival of Europeans. It also 
failed to note that the labour of Indigenous peoples was essential to the company’s early 
success. Yet actors in the ad wore clothing made from iconic HBC “point blanket” design 
and this detail drew attention to the relationship fur traders established with Indigenous 
peoples. Specifically, HBC employees exchanged blankets made from this striped 
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material for the furs that Indigenous peoples trapped.91 Thus, like the Fort Langley 
trading post mentioned earlier in this chapter, the role of indigenous people in the fur 
trade was obscured but not completely invisible in the HBC ad.  
Some people criticized the company for including a knock-off Cowichan sweater in its 
2010 Olympic clothing line. These critics drew attention to the labour involved in 
producing HBC commodities that typically remains hidden.92 Coast Salish knitters are 
known for making sweaters with a distinctive design and the HBC considered asking 
them to produce these items for its Olympic line. However, the company ultimately 
decided that the knitters would not be able to make enough sweaters in time for the 
Games. Instead, it sold a product that “nods towards this icon of Canadian fashion.”93 
FHFN CEO Tewanee Joseph raised the issue with VANOC and Cowichan knitters were 
eventually permitted to sell their sweaters in the First Nations Pavilion and the Olympic 
Superstore in Vancouver.94 
Donica Belisle’s analysis of the HBC historical publication The Beaver shows that the 
company viewed itself as a major player in Canada’s early development as a nation. 
“Proud of its heritage,” she writes, “the HBC did not let customers forget it had helped 
create modern Western Canada.”95 For example, a 1921 article informed readers that 
HBC employees had “fed, clothed and supported the natives, and held the future Western 
Canada in trust for the British Empire.”96Another article published the same year noted 
that as more white people arrived in Canada in the early 1900s, the HBC’s “Indian” 
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customers “gradually died out.”97 Although Indigenous peoples shopped at HBC stores in 
the 1920s, ads from this time period, like the article, made it appear as though only white 
Settlers frequented the store.98 By 2010, such accounts would have likely been seen as 
racially offensive. However, the use of the pronoun “we” in HBC’s 2010 Olympic ad 
(“We arrived 340 years ago to a land of rock, ice, and snow” and “We are the skiers, we 
are the sledders”) suggests a continuation of such views by exclusively targeting Settler 
Canadians. 99  
Verner wrote that she did not normally express her national pride through clothing: 
“When it comes to fashion, I have never been a flag waver – no maple leaf patches on my 
backpacks, no Canada scrawled across my sweatshirt.”100 However, she was taken with 
the HBC mittens, and described herself as “captivated by this magic mitten moment.”101 
Verner praised the mittens for keeping “hands feeling cozy”102 and when Canadians 
embraced the mittens as positive symbols of the nation, they adopted a “cozy” view of 
Canada that was untroubled by the “seething absence” of Indigenous peoples.103 The 
HBC sold 3.5 million pairs of the mittens and a post on the Canadian Olympic 
Committee website noted that athletes, celebrities, politicians, and fans wore the red 
mittens to demonstrate “their support for the Canadian Olympians. They were, and still 
are, a symbol of Canadian pride.”104 
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Figure 32: Hudson’s Bay Company mittens in the Vancouver Olympics, IOC, Marketing Report 
Vancouver 2010, 107, 160. 
 
This quotation illustrates that, like the Olympic emblem, the mittens operated as 
synecdoche for the nation. In fact, they looked like mini versions of the Canadian flag 
and their popularity contrasts with Globe and Mail journalist Lawrence Martin’s 
complaint that few Canadians at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games waved the national 
flag.105 The mittens were fetish objects that obscured Canada’s colonial history. On the 
one hand, they represented ideas about the nation present in the “We Were Made for 
This” ad: that national identity is rooted in Europeans’ “discovery” of Canada and their 
ability to survive in harsh environmental conditions. On the other hand, they were 
haunted the reality that Settlers appropriated Indigenous peoples’ land and pursued a 
policy of assimilation that had a devastating, inter-generational impact on Indigenous 
peoples’ lives.  
By purchasing the HBC mittens, Canadians made material contributions to the nation. As 
such, they participated in an activity that helped them earn the privilege of citizenship. 
This argument relies on Margaret Somers’ contention that individuals’ relationship with 
the nation has become transformed into a “contractual quid pro quo market exchange.” 
                                                 
105 Lawrence Martin, "Canadians lag in another league, fans' cheering not medal calibre," The Globe and 
Mail, July 22, 1976, 51.  
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106 She maintains that citizens earn rights by contributing to the nation in economically 
profitable ways.107 The people who bought the mittens supported a charity because net 
proceeds from sales went to Own the Podium, a national funding program for Canadian 
Olympians.108 Additionally, by wearing the mittens, consumers enhanced the positive 
affiliation between the HBC and Olympic brands and the Vancouver Games. The 
Canadian Olympic Committee website encouraged people to “keep warm and show your 
support for Canadian athletes in their quest for gold at the 2010 Winter Games by 
wearing a pair of Vancouver 2010 Red Mittens.”109 It noted too that these items had 
become “the most visible illustration of Canada’s excitement for 2010.”110 Canadians 
wearing these garments, Furlong said, “literally wore their hearts on their hands.”111 
They also wore a corporate and Olympic brand on their bodies.  
Anti-Olympic activists made Canada’s colonial history, and HBC’s involvement in this 
history, difficult to ignore. The Olympic Resistance Network (ORN) popularized the anti-
Olympic slogan “No Olympics on Stolen Native Land,” which drew attention to the 
history of colonization in the province and, according to No2010.com, “reveals the fact 
that government and corporations are involved in theft (of land & resources), and 
therefore lack moral and legal authority to govern or conduct business.”112 The ORN also 
published a flyer that quoted Prime Minister Harper’s surprising public statement in 2009 
that “Canada has no history of colonialism.”113 The organization told readers that the 
“Olympics are occurring on unceded & unsurrendered Indigenous lands” and asked 
                                                 
106 Somers, Margaret. Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to have Rights . 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 70-117.   
107 Ibid., 70-117.    
108VANOC, Staging the Olympic Winter Games: 10.  
109 Ahtletes CAN – Supporting the Voices of 2010 and Beyond,” Canadian Olympic Committee. Nov. 19, 
2009. http://olympic.ca/2009/11/19/athletescan-supporting-the-voices-of-2010-and-beyond/. 
110 “As Red Mittens Fly off Shelves, Olympic Spirit Builds,” Canadian Olympic Committee. Dec. 21, 2009. 
http://olympic.ca/2009/12/21/as-red-mittens-fly-off-shelves-olympic-spirit-builds/ 
111 John Furlong, qtd in IOC, Marketing Report, 115. 
112 No2010.com, “Anti-2010: Information against the Olympic industry: no Olympics on stolen Native 
Land,” 2010, PAM 2010-21, PC, CVA.  
113 Harper made this comment to a Reuters reporter. See: Aaron Wherry, “What he was talking about when 
he talked about colonialism,” Macleans Oct. 1, 2009. http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/what-he-was-
talking-about-when-he-talked-about-colonialism/ 
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rhetorically: “Really, no colonial history?”114 Editors of grassroots publication The 
Dominion noted that the HBC “was active in the British colonization of Canada, building 
forts and claiming land on behalf of Great Britain.”115 Balaclava!, a newspaper dedicated 
to “2010 anti-Olympic convergence,” published a photograph of protestors smashing the 
glass of an HBC storefront on February 14, 2010. The blurb under the photo read: the 
HBC “represents the colonization of British Columbia directly through it’s [sic] own 
involvement in the colonization and genocide” of Indigenous populations.”116  
Finally, the ORN distributed pamphlets showing the red and white HBC mittens dripping 
with blood under the caption “Blood On Your Hands.” The pamphlet stated that the HBC 
had “acted as the colonial government” in Canada.117 The Canadian Olympic Committee 
noted that “the Red Mittens became the iconic item for Canadians as the Games were 
celebrated on home soil.”118  The ORN drew attention to the fact that the “soil” (land) 
upon which Settlers established a “home” was already occupied by Indigenous peoples. 
As I have argued earlier in this chapter, the importance of Settler Canadians openly 
recognizing and coming to terms with this fact cannot be understated; it is an essential 
part of meaningful reconciliation practices.   
                                                 
114 Olympic Resistance Network, “Do you hate the Olympics?,” 2010, PAM 2010-7: Do you hate the 
Olympics, PC, CVA.  
115 The Dominion, Special Issue 2009: Issue #64: Olympics, 6. PAM 2009-12, PC, CVA.  
116 Balaclava! The daily newspaper of the 2010 anti-olympic convergence, Feb. 14, 2010, Issue 5.PAM 
2010-17, PC, CVA. 
117 “Blood On Your Hands,” PAM 2010-37,  PC, CVA.   
118 “Hudson’s Bay: Official Outfitter,” Canadian Olympic Committee.  http://olympic.ca/partners/hudsons-
bay/hudsons-bay-official-outfitter/ 
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Figure 33: “Blood On Your Hands” pamphlet, City of Vancouver Archives, PAM 2010-37, Fonds: 
AM1519: City of Vancouver Archives pamphlet collection, City of Vancouver Archives. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has identified the dominant ideas about Canadian identity and history that 
were promoted through the Vancouver Games. These ideas, I argued, were reflected in 
Olympic commodities. However, they left out significant and often contradictory 
information. Truths about the gap in socio-economic status between Indigenous peoples 
and Settler Canadians; the history of colonialist policies and practices in Canada; and the 
legacy of colonization were obscured during the Vancouver Olympics. By applying 
Gordon’s theory of ghostly haunting to my analysis of Olympic commodities, I argued 
that, although not overtly acknowledged, troubling facts about Canada were not 
completely invisible. Additionally, anti-Olympic protestors publicized these facts, 
including Canada’s colonial past. Finally, I identified why confronting the information 
that haunted Olympic commodities is so important: it is an essential part of the ongoing 
process of reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians.  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion: “Defiant Fists” and “Loyal Corporate 
Bodies”  
Toronto became the most recent Canadian city to consider an Olympic bid after it 
successfully hosted the Pan Am and Parapan Am Games in the summer of 2015. Toronto 
Mayor John Tory ultimately decided not to submit a bid, but the public discussion 
surrounding the issue is instructive. Bob Hepburn of the Toronto Star wrote on July 11, 
2015 that Toronto should bid for the Olympics only if it makes economic sense and much 
of the public discussion around the bid has centered on the cost of the Games. 1 However, 
as this dissertation has shown, politicians and citizens should consider additional factors 
beyond economic ones: who will be advantaged and disadvantaged by the Games, both 
economically and socially? Who will fund the Games and what role will corporate 
sponsorship play? How will tax dollars and consumer dollars be used to finance the 
event? What role will Indigenous peoples play? Will the majority of labour come from 
volunteers or paid staff? What types of Olympic educational materials will enter the 
schools? Will branding initiatives target students directly?  What roles will 
“sustainability” and “legacy outcomes” play and what sorts of beneficial social change 
might they engender?   
This dissertation, which critically analyzed the commercial practices and products of the 
Olympic Games hosted in Canada, has demonstrated the importance of asking such 
questions. I show that the symbolic meanings of Olympic commodities and commercial 
practices linked to the Games primarily served the interests of Settler Canadians at the 
expense of Indigenous peoples’ well-being. In making this argument, I fill a gap in 
research on branded/corporate nationalism by devoting attention to the social and 
                                                 
1
 Bob Hepburn, “Why Toronto should bid for the 2014 Olympics: Hepburn: Pan Am Games have been 
good for the GTA, and Olympics could be even better,” Toronto Star, July 11 2015. 
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2015/07/11/why-toronto-should-bid-for-the-2024-olympics-
hepburn.html.  
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political significance of the symbolism of Olympic commodities.2 Additionally, unlike 
existing scholarship, I consider how narratives about Canada’s colonial history shape 
contemporary definitions of national identity. The 1974 Montreal Olympic mascot (a 
beaver named Amik) and select Olympic coins symbolized the history of the fur trade in 
Canada and were haunted by the role indigenous peoples in this important economic 
activity. They were also haunted by the assimilation policies developed in Canada. As 
Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida argue, ghostly hauntings are instances when 
something (like an image or an idea) is missing but not entirely invisible;3 in other words, 
a haunting draws attention to the existence of a “seething absence.”4  
The commemorative glassware sold by Petro Canada during the 1988 Calgary Olympics 
were also haunted, this time by the fact that the Lubicon Cree’s continued survival as a 
distinct cultural group was threatened by commercial activity on their land. Meanwhile, 
the Vancouver Olympics emblem (a stylized inukshuk) and mascot commodities 
(inspired by legends of West Coast First Nations) were haunted by facts that complicated 
and/or contradicted official narratives about the nation. These facts include the idea that 
past colonialist policies and practices by the Canadian state left an inter-generational 
impact on Indigenous communities. The red and white mittens included in the Olympic 
clothing line produced by the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) were haunted by the fact 
that European explorers had established a country on land already inhabited by 
Indigenous peoples. This type of haunting, I argue, makes it possible for Settler 
                                                 
2 See: Catherine Carstairs, "Roots Nationalism: Branding English Canada Cool in the 1980s and 1990s," 
Histoire Sociale/Social History 39, no. 77 (2006): 235-255; Patricia Cormack, and James Cosgrave, 
Desiring Canada: CBC, Contests, Hockey Violence, and Other Stately Pleasures (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2013); Steven Jackson, "Globalization, Corporate Nationalism and Masculinity in Canada: 
Sport, Molson Beer Advertising and Consumer Citizenship," Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, 
Politics 17, no. 7 (2014): 901-916; Gregory Millard, Sarah Riegel, and John Wright, "Here's where we get 
Canadian: English-Canadian nationalism and popular culture," American Review of Canadian Studies 32, 
no. 1 (2002): 11-34; Ira Wagman, "Wheat, Barley, Hops, Citizenship: Molson's 'I Am [Canadian]' 
Campaign," The Velvet Light Trap - A Critical Journal of Film and Television Fall (2002): 77-89.  
3
 Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 1997); Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Morning 
and the New International, trans. (Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 1993). 
4
 Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 21. 
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Canadians to avoid confronting select truths about the nation’s colonial history and the 
ongoing injustices that Indigenous peoples face. As I demonstrate in Chapter Seven, 
meaningful reconciliation between Settler Canadians and Indigenous peoples is not 
possible if Settlers do not acknowledge these facts. 
My dissertation also contributes to research on the commercialism of the Olympic 
Movement. While various scholars argue that Olympic-related commercial practices 
eclipse the political dimensions of the Games, I argue that, in Canada, they were mutually 
reinforcing.5 Marketing and branding campaigns in the Montreal and Calgary Olympics 
deepened pre-existing regional conflicts in Canada. For example, the design of the 
Montreal Olympic emblem drew attention to divisions between French- and English-
Canada and commodities bearing the emblem served as visual reminders that these were 
primarily Quebec’s Olympics. During the Calgary Olympics, 40 oil and gas companies, 
known collectively as Team Petroleum, sponsored the Olympics. These corporate 
sponsorships complemented city and region branding practices in the Games, which 
highlighted Alberta’s frontier history and booming oil and gas industry. The impression 
given in the Games was that, although the federal government had tried recently to assert 
greater control over Alberta’s natural resources, the province had ultimately retained 
principal sovereignty over its oil and gas reserves. Moreover, many Canadians earned the 
privilege of citizenship by participating in the torch relay, either as spectators or 
torchbearers. This argument relies on Margaret Somers’ claim that, under market 
                                                 
5
 See: Robert Barney, Scott Wenn, and Scott Martyn. Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic 
committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism, (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2002; Andrew 
Billings, Olympic Media: Inside the biggest Show on Television, (New York: Routledge, 2008); Helen 
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John Amis and T. Bettina Cornwell (New York: Berg, 2005): 281-296; Joseph Maguire, Sarah Barnard, 
Katie Bulter, and Peter Golding, "'Celebrate humanity' or 'consumers'?: A critical evaluation of a brand in 
motion," Social Identities 41, no. 1 (2008): 63-76 ; Momin Rahman, and Sean Lockwood. "How to 'use 
your Olympian': the paradox of athletic authenticity and commercialization in contemporary Olympic 
Games," Sociology 45, no. 5 (2011): 815-829; Maurice Roche, Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and 
Expos in the Growth of Global Culture, (London: Routledge, 2000); Alan Tomlinson, "The 
Commercialisation of the Olympics: Cities, Corporations, and the Olympic Commodity," in Global 
Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games, ed. Kevin Young and Kevin 
Wamsley (Boston: Elsevier Jai, 2005): 179-200; and Gary Whannel, “The Five Rings and the Small 
Screen: Television, Sponsorship and New Media in the Olympic Movement," in Global Olympics: 
Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games, ed. Kevin Young and Kevin Wamsley (Bingley: 
Emerald JAI, 2007): 161-178.  
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fundamentalism, the “government’s relationship with its citizenry changes from 
noncontractualism to contractual quid pro quo market exchange.”6 
The example of Team Petroleum also highlights how Olympic-related commercial 
practices became implicated in struggles involving land and natural resources in Canada, 
often at the expense of Indigenous peoples’ interests. Many of the same petroleum 
companies that sponsored the Calgary Games were active in Northern Alberta, including 
on the Lubicon Cree’s land. The Lubicon boycotted the Calgary Games to draw attention 
to the devastating impact that oil and gas extraction practices were having on their 
community and traditional ways of life. Their protest highlighted the human cost of 
petroleum companies’ commoditization of the land. Additionally, the 2010 Vancouver 
Winter Olympics were held on the territory of the Lil’wat, Musqueam, Squamish, and 
Tsleil-Waututh Nations, known collectively as the Four Host First Nations (FHFN). They 
helped Vancouver win its Olympic bid and were the first Indigenous group to officially 
partner with an Olympic Games organizing committee. This partnership added value to 
the Games’ international and domestic corporate sponsorship programs. The FHFN’s 
involvement in the Vancouver Olympics also benefitted the B.C. government by helping 
it manage the threat that Indigenous land claims posed to the provincial economy. Few 
First Nations in B.C. have signed treaties with the Crown and, beginning in the 1990s, 
many began to assert their jurisdiction over the province’s natural resources. Companies 
became concerned that the government would not be able to protect their investments in 
the province’s resource sectors; the FHFN’s involvement in the Vancouver Olympics was 
part of a broader strategy and set of practices aimed at restoring economic certainty to 
B.C.  
My dissertation contributes to studies of branded nationalism and the commercialism of 
the Olympic Movement by identifying the socio-economic factors that made the 
intersection of commercialism and nationalism possible. I show that organizers of the 
Montreal Olympics fundraised for the Games by selling commodities containing symbols 
of French-Canadian identity. Consumers were told that they could support the Games by 
                                                 
6
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purchasing Olympic coins and stamps. However, sales fell far below expectations in part 
because, in the 1970s, Canadians were unfamiliar with cause-related marketing 
campaigns. Additionally, many people believed that the 1976 Olympics were Quebec’s 
Games, not Canada’s. In contrast to the Montreal Games, the 1988 Calgary Winter 
Olympics were a profitable endeavour. Organizers ran the Games in accordance with 
market fundamentalism, a comprehensive worldview and political movement governed 
by the belief that market capitalism exists in a natural state outside the realm of politics 
and government and, as such, should not be heavily regulated.7 Additionally, consumer 
goods from the Calgary Games, especially commemorative Petro Canada glassware, sold 
very well and helped raise money for Canadian athletes. Similarly, the red and white 
mittens sold by HBC during the Vancouver Olympics were popular consumer items that 
symbolized Canadians’ national pride. People who bought and wore these mittens earned 
the privilege of becoming full-fledged citizens. 
Adding to scholarship on Indigenous peoples’ involvement in, and opposition to, the 
Olympics in Canada, I consider how anti-Olympic campaigns drew attention to the 
competing ideas about the nation that were embedded within Olympic objects.8 The 
Lubicon’s boycott of the Calgary Olympics highlighted their plight, while the “No 
Olympics on Stolen Land” campaign in Vancouver made Canada’s colonial history 
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difficult to ignore. Anti-Olympic campaigners also made land rights and questions around 
jurisdiction over natural resources key issues in 1988 and 2010. These activists 
undermined the coherency of the ideas about Settler society that were promoted through 
the Olympics and represented by commodities. On a related note, protestors turned 
Olympic commodities into uncanny, unrecognizable symbols of Canada. As Freud 
famously noted, the uncanny emerges when something familiar becomes unfamiliar.9  
Jim McKay has written about the stark difference between the “defiant fists” of Tommie 
Smith and John Carlos, who gave black power salute at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, 
and the “loyal corporate bodies” of the 1992 Barcelona Games. 10 At the latter, Nike-
sponsored basketball players used the American flag to cover the Reebok logo on their 
uniforms.11 This study has examined both defiant gestures of protest and instances of 
compliant, branded bodies related to the Olympic Games in Canada. In 2010, anti-
Olympic protestors on Vancouver streets provided stark contrasts to the bodies of 
Olympic supporters wearing red and white HBC mittens to show their national pride. 
Protestors drew attention to the fact that supporters’ bodies were marked by “impassioned 
objects” which were haunted by “seething absences”12 and made it impossible to 
completely ignore these absences.  
Put another way, anti-Olympic protests added to broader efforts aimed at reckoning with 
the ghosts that haunt Settler colonial Canada. What is at stake in such a reckoning is the 
success of efforts to restructure the relationship between Indigenous peoples and Settler 
Canadians through practices like honouring Indigenous peoples’ land rights and 
respecting their sovereignty rights. Thus, the political costs of defining Canadian identity 
and creating social inclusion through consumer culture include cementing the authority of 
the Settler state and preventing the kinds of social change necessary to address 
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contemporary inequalities within Canadian society. Instead of using commodities and 
consumption as a way of  understanding their national identity, Settler Canadians can 
take the opportunity afforded by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada to 
listen to Indigenous peoples testify about their experience in residential schools.13 
Settlers can also learn about the resiliency of survivors, many of whom resisted the 
state’s assimilationist agenda. As Paulette Regan argues, Settlers should act on the moral 
and ethical obligation to “own the residential school history and legacy” in Canada14 and 
recognize that such history “cannot be addressed in isolation from Indigenous people’s 
political struggle to live as self-determining, self-sufficient, healthy communities in 
accordance with their own customs, laws, and connections to the land.”15   
As an example of unofficial commemorative acts that “restoried” history, Regan 
describes commemorative marches held in Minnesota beginning in 2002. These marches 
remembered and honoured Dakota people who were forcibly relocated from their 
homelands in 1862. Some Settlers participated in the march as allies while others were 
sympathetic observers. 16 Applying this example to a Canadian context illustrates that, 
instead of defining and enhancing their national identity through consumption, Settler 
Canadians can become actively involved in civil society. As Somers convincingly argues, 
civil society “is central to the balance of power in the triadic configuration of state, civil 
society and market.”17 In Canada, Settlers can participate in civil society by doing things 
like collaborating with Indigenous peoples to raise awareness about the high number of 
missing and murdered Indigenous women in the country and participating in protest 
movements like the Idle No More Movement. Other activities include volunteering for a 
local representative, writing letters to the editors, and becoming involved in artistic and 
cultural events in their community.   
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Many works of art being produced in Canada reckon with the ghosts that haunt the nation 
and are valuable counterpoints to the haunted, fetish objects I discuss in my research. 
Margaret Francis provides trenchant examples of Indigenous artists whose work engages 
with the ghosts of the national imaginary, engendering “a different kind of 
remembering.”18 She describes a series of photographs from Jeff Thomas showing his 
son, Bear, in front of contemporary historical artifacts (like statues of early Canadian 
Settlers). Francis argues that this work invites viewers to consider how markers of 
racialized identity are inseparable from the historical images that “ghost them.”19 
Similarly, a series of paintings by Kent Monkman, called the Moral Landscape, draws on 
and subverts the norms of landscape painting and highlight how such paintings have 
traditionally been used to promote Settlers’ entitlement to the land.20 Like Monkman’s 
paintings, my research refutes the “empty lands” myth and exposes stories, events, and 
information that haunt the nation.  
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